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Abstract 
 
The main goal of this thesis is to use the diffusion models to improve our 
understanding of SPP markets, with special focus on (a) identifying the main 
determinants of the diffusion of solar photovoltaic panels worldwide, 
particularly the role played so far by public incentives, (b) characterising the 
scale and temporal profiles of the major domestic shocks in SPP markets which 
mostly occurred after 2007, (c) discussing the resulting perspectives, and the 
involved role of public policies, for the future development of the market. 
Chapter 1 is introductory and preparatory for subsequent ones and pinpoints 
that (a) the presence of shocks is an intrinsic and often dominating feature of 
energy markets, thereby motivating the use of tools as the GBM, (b) only a few 
countries have developed long-term energy plans towards which to manage 
consistently their short-medium term policies, (c) the concept of energy 
framework was useful to indicated a number of commonalities among 
countries. 
The main findings of Chapter 2 were the following: i) essentially everywhere 
the effectiveness of media communication proved negligible, ii) the early phase 
where the growth of the market was completely sustained by internal 
communication only, iii) major changes in the market adoption curves have 
occurred in the form of massive positive shocks which took place between 2006 
and 2016 possibly following incentive measures in the various states, iv) 
inspection of the parameter estimates describing the temporal pattern of the 
shocks showed a lack of temporal persistence of the effects of incentive as well 
as a sharp trade-off between intensity and persistence of the actions.   
The results of Chapter 3 show that the SPP residential market in UK suffers not 
only the structural difficulties of this sector, but also the possible perception of 
relative penalisation suffered by late cohorts of adopters compared to the past 
cohorts who benefited higher rates of FIT. In the commercial and utility sectors 
the imitation rate is higher which might be explained by the fact that firms 
make more rational decisions based on economic factors rather than being led 
by perceptions. 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
Under the scaring pressure and threats of global warming and global 
climate change, the current model of the earth economic development, 
mainly based on fossil fuels, is coming to an end (Archer and Rahmstrof, 
2010; Clark and York, 2005; Dessler and Parson, 2006; IPCC, 2014; 
Paris2015; Bonn2017). Though available estimates and forecasts based on 
current rates of use of fossil fuels suggest that reserves of oil and gas might 
last for some decades and coal for another century (Shafiee and Topal, 
2009), nonetheless the recent scientific evidence on global warming clearly 
indicates the need to rapidly switch to renewable energies (RE) even if the 
availability of reserves of fossil fuels were much more optimistic than 
currently forecasted (Höök and Tang, 2013; IPCC, 2014; Mohr et al., 2015; 
Shafiee and Topal, 2009)]. These pressures, ranking at the top of the 
agendas of international agencies at least in the last twenty-five years i.e, 
following the 1992 Rio Earth summit on sustainable development, the 
resulting Kyoto Protocol (1997), and the 2002 Johannesburg summit, are 
finally spurring numerous countries to invest for mitigation alternatives 
that better suit their energy needs conditioned on the international agenda 
and their current energy framework (Johnstone et al., 2010; Meade and 
Islam, 2015; Popp et al., 2011).  
In this regard, the spread of technologies for the exploitation of RE - 
ranging from solar photovoltaic panels (SPP), to wind energy, biomasses 
etc. - represents a growing reality whose rate of diffusion was able to 
outperform that of all other energy technologies ever appeared on earth 
(ITRPV, 2018). Nonetheless, even this might be plainly insufficient to meet 
the recent targets of the Paris agreement (ITRPV, 2018). This state of affairs 
therefore calls for a massive effort, both at the international level as well as 
at the level of single countries, in order to remove the major barriers – be 
they economic, political, cultural, or socio-demographic - that are delaying 
or preventing the generalised adoption of RE (Beck and Martinot, 2004; 
Karneyeva and Wüstenhagen, 2017; Painuly, 2001; Reddy and Painuly, 
2004). 
This thesis focuses on SPP as a key RE source (Schleicher-Tappeser, 2012; 
Strupeit and Palm, 2016). SPP are of interest in many respects, first because 
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they represent the main RE technology currently available to households, 
second – in relation to barriers - because they represent costly long-term 
investment for both households and firms. For instance, the SPP literature 
highlighted the negative impact resulting from (i) the high installation cost 
of the system and the long payback period (Hammond et al., 2012; 
Yamaguchi et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2011); (ii) the lack of environmental 
awareness (Dharshing, 2017); (iii) the uncertainty of the internal political 
situation (Stokes, 2013); (iv) logistic arguments e.g., related to the difficulty 
in developing  large SPP installations in urban areas with high population 
density (Balta-Ozkan et al., 2015).   
Given these barriers, public incentives can play a key role to help SPP 
competing successfully against «dirty» alternatives, which are currently 
less costly but not environmentally friendly. There is a growing literature 
on the possible beneficial role of public incentive in supporting the 
domestic demand of SPP (Avril et al., 2012; Chowdhury et al., 2014; Lund, 
2015; Zhang et al., 2011). Consequently, all the world’s largest SPP adopters 
have massively resorted to incentive policies, to the point that incentive 
possibly represented a necessary driver of SPP adoptions (Faiers and 
Neame, 2006; Guidolin and Mortarino, 2010; Keirstead, 2007a; Olaniyan 
and Evans, 2014).  Nonetheless, despite these large efforts the SPP diffusion 
is slow or even stalling in many countries (IEA International Energy 
Agency, 2018). 
The main goal of this thesis is to use the diffusion models of the 
management literature, namely the Bass model (Bass, 1969) and especially 
the generalised Bass model (Bass et al., 1994), to improve our 
understanding of SPP markets, with special focus on (a) identifying the 
main determinants of the diffusion of solar photovoltaic panels worldwide, 
particularly the role played so far by public incentives, (b) characterising 
the scale and temporal profiles of the major domestic shocks in SPP 
markets which mostly occurred after 2007, possibly reflecting the complex 
interplay between major epochs of public intervention supporting 
domestic SPP demand and a number of external stimuli, such as (among 
many others) e.g., the Kyoto protocol deadlines, (c) discussing the resulting 
perspectives, and the involved role of public policies, for the future 
development of the market. 
After a few fore-runners, the main momentum to the growth of diffusion 
models in the management sciences was supplied by the publication of the 
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celebrated Bass model (Bass, 1969). The Bass model describes an 
irreversible diffusion process where an item (a durable good, a new 
technology, a new idea, etc) spreads in a population of potential adopters 
having fixed size, thanks to two main drivers identified in the key 
communication channels. These communication channels are represented 
by both the spontaneous communication between individuals as a 
consequence of their daily social encounters (be they real or virtual), often 
termed as “word-of-mouth”, and an external communication, justified by 
the individual’s intrinsic propensity to adopt a new technology as a result 
of the publicly available information supplied by the media, the public 
system, etc, i.e., without being affected by other individuals in the social 
system. The Bass model is nowadays considered a cornerstone 
paradigmatic model especially in the field of the marketing sciences 
(Mahajan and Muller, 1998), that is still providing motivations and stimuli 
for the development of new research tools and areas (Peres et al., 2010). 
The Bass model was later extended (Bass et al., 1994) with the purpose to 
also include decision variables inner to the firms of the sector considered, 
such as advertising and prices. This extended model was termed the 
generalised Bass model (GBM). However, a main conclusion by Bass and 
co-workers (Bass et al., 1994) was that in many cases the role of inner 
decision variables was secondary compared to the communication forces. 
A major innovation in the use of the GBM was provided by Guseo and co-
workers, who suggested in a number of papers that the GBM model was 
rather valuable as a key tool to capture the effects, rather than of inner 
decision variables, of external shocks capable to perturb the “normal” 
diffusion trajectory as shaped by the communication forces. They 
consequently applied the GBM to a number of problems including e.g., the 
effects of the price shocks in the oil markets (Guseo et al., 2007), modelling 
seasonality in innovation diffusion (Guidolin and Guseo, 2014), the 
competition between nuclear power and RE technologies (Guidolin and 
Guseo, 2016) up to the role of public incentive in stimulating the domestic 
demand in SPP markets (Guidolin and Mortarino, 2010).  
The latter paper by Guidolin and Mortarino (2010), who applied the GBM 
to describe and forecast SPP adoptions in the eleven countries that 
represented the major SPP adopters worldwide up to 2006, was a main 
source of inspiration for the present work.  Their study was important in 
clearly highlighting the positive effect of incentive policies in stimulating 
the diffusion of the SPP technology. Among their conclusions we found of 
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particular interest the point where they concluded that some SPP markets, 
amongst the pool of early adopting countries, had already entered their 
maturity phase. This conclusion, though perfectly correct based on the 
adopted model, was soon denied by reality, which instead showed since 
2007 a dramatic growth in SPP adoption in all countries considered, 
possibly corresponding to large incentive schemes introduced with a 
surprising synchrony in most countries. We therefore thought that this, far 
from representing a forecasting failure of the Bass model, was instead 
evidence of the complexity prevailing in the SPP market, which deserved 
an upgrade of their work with the purpose to add further insight and 
understanding of the main determinants, and barriers, to SPP adoptions.  
In relation to our main above stated objectives, it is useful to clarify what is 
meant by “determinants” of an adoption process according to the language 
of Bass-type diffusion models, and more in general where the usefulness of 
diffusion models lies. Unlike e.g., an econometric model, where a response 
variable is regressed over a number of explanatory variables, perhaps at 
different hierarchical levels, with the purpose to identify the most 
important “determinants” of the response, in the standard GBM the 
determinants of a diffusion process are primarily represented by the 
mutual dynamic interplay between the communication forces i.e., the 
media and word of mouth, and those external factors, including public 
incentive as well as a number of other shock factors, capable to re-shape 
adoption trajectories by perturbing (either positively or negatively) the 
strength of communication.  
This thesis is divided into three chapters.  
Chapter 1 is introductory and preparatory for subsequent ones. Based on 
data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) the chapter aimed to: (a) identifying 
the “energy framework” of a large number of countries worldwide 
representing the major SPP adopters in 2017, (b) reviewing the influence of 
main shocks occurred in the energy market, including technological 
innovation, major economic shocks (e.g., oil price shocks), environmental 
catastrophes, etc on the countries’ energy portfolios; (c) reviewing the role 
of public incentives with special focus on SPP diffusion; (d) reviewing the 
main aspects of SPP diffusion in the main adopting countries given the 
underlying energy framework. In particular, this chapter was useful to 
pinpoint that (a) the presence of shocks is an intrinsic and often dominating 
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feature of energy markets, thereby motivating the use of tools as the GBM, 
(b) only a few countries have developed long-term energy plans towards 
which to manage consistently  their short-medium term policies, as 
documented in the proposed analyses by the evidence that a number of 
public interventions were carried out as mere responses to external stimuli, 
such as the deadlines of Kyoto protocol; (c) the concept of energy 
framework was useful to inform the discussion on individual countries 
SPP adoption trajectories reported in subsequent chapters, which indicated 
a number of commonalities e.g., countries with oil and gas reserves 
developed a market for the SPP generally later compared to countries 
lacking such reserves (while availability of coal reserves seems not to have 
delayed the SPP diffusion).  
Chapter 2, which is the central chapter of this thesis, extends the afore-cited 
research by Guidolin and Mortarino (2010), by applying the GBM to an 
extended dataset on installed SPP capacity in the 26 countries that mostly 
contributed to SPP worldwide adoptions between 1992 and 2016. The 
analysis paid special focus on the major shocks occurred over the decade 
2007-2016, during which the installed capacity worldwide experienced an 
unprecedented growth (+95%), shared also by those countries, as Germany 
and Japan, which already experienced an important adoption history. This 
dramatic acceleration, possibly stemmed from a period of major policy 
efforts, aimed to sustain the domestic SPP demand. 
Our principal findings were the following: i) essentially everywhere the 
effectiveness of media communication proved negligible, suggesting that 
the SPP market started its lifecycle without being assisted by continued 
effective public media support (thus confirming on our extended dataset a 
previous finding of Guidolin and Mortarino (2010)), ii) this in turn implied 
a prolonged early phase where the growth of the market was completely 
sustained by internal communication only, whose magnitude however 
proved to be plainly insufficient to ensure the achievement of any target of 
market development within the time frame indicated by international 
protocols and agreements, iii) major changes in the market adoption curves 
have occurred in the form of massive positive shocks which took place 
between 2006 and 2016 possibly following incentive measures in the 
various states, iv) however, inspection of the parameter estimates 
describing the temporal pattern of the shocks showed, as a rule, a lack of 
temporal persistence of the effects of incentive as well as a sharp trade-off 
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between intensity and persistence of the actions (i.e., the more intense 
actions were also those lasting short).   
Crossing out model-based results with the available information about 
public incentive programs in the countries considered, our findings overall 
suggest a number of points that might be useful for future policy 
interventions in both the countries considered in this work as well as in 
countries where the adoption of this technology is in its infancy. A first one 
regards the generalised lack of media support in the different countries 
during the early SPP lifecycle, in turn mirrored by the slow early growth of 
SPP markets, which is in fact characteristic of diffusion processes mostly 
driven by word-of-mouth only. Indeed, in Bass-type diffusion models, the 
importance of sustained media communication is that of rapidly creating 
an initial cohort of adopters which then “initialise” the word-of-mouth 
component from much more favourable conditions. Therefore, a target of 
public policy in countries where the SPP lifecycle is still in its initial phase 
might be that of relevantly supporting private communication on the 
media in order to encourage the development of an initial cohort of true 
“innovators” (Mahajan et al., 1995). A second main point regards the 
nature of the SPP market and the role of public incentive. The SPP market 
appears from our results as a frail and complicate one where public 
incentive were a necessary resource to allow the market full take-off but, at 
the same time, showed little temporal persistency, thereby failing in going 
beyond their direct short-term effect and in providing a sustained 
momentum to the market. Indeed, the characteristic temporal trend of the 
market, dominated by consecutive incentive-forced waves followed, in 
many countries, by negligible post-incentive adoptions until the next shock 
(in relation to this the case of Italy and Spain is exemplar) – besides 
removing any predictive ability of the model - suggests that the use of 
incentive was badly designed so to yield undesired counter-productive 
outcomes. These facts lead, as a further point, to the need to identify the 
intervening barriers preventing further growth of adoptions. In relation to 
this, a straightforward but possibly critical consequence of such 
discontinuous trends, seems to be the emergence of a deleterious role of 
expectations. Indeed, the dramatic drop in adoptions observed in many 
countries in the periods in between subsequent incentive actions really 
seems to mirror the situation where no-one will adopt in an incentive-free 
period while waiting for (and forcing, thanks to their non-adoption 
behaviour) the next incentive wave. 
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This argument suggests that public incentives may play a double and 
contradicting role: on the one hand they may well encourage the process of 
SPP adoption in the short-term but, on the other hand, they might 
eventually create new barriers to the endogenous forces acting in the 
diffusion process. The latter effect may be due to the role played by 
expected future incentives that, when implemented, would make a future 
(rather than current) adoption even more convenient. Though this was not 
among the main objectives of the thesis, in the Appendix we have 
developed a game-theoretic scheme aiming to capture this key intuition. In 
this scheme we argue that the private sector – households and firms – look 
for a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the threat by the public sector 
not to provide any more future incentives would not be credible. The 
optimal strategy for the private sector, then, would be not to adopt SPP in 
the absence of economic incentives, so as to force the public authorities to 
provide them in the future. This would explain the stylized fact that in all 
countries the adoption of SPP has been driven strictly by the shocks 
represented by public incentives. We believe that this hypothesis might 
deserve further investigation in future research. 
In the final chapter (Chapter 3) we present a case study of the UK as a 
further and more detailed analysis of a national SPP market with more 
detailed adoption data. Indeed, a main shortcoming of Chapter 2 lied in the 
coarse data used, represented by yearly data on total installed capacity and 
not on installations, therefore not distinguishing between the types of 
adopters namely households (low-scale installation systems), commercial 
and enterprises (medium-scale systems), and public utilities (very large 
scale). To make a trivial example, a single installation by a large public 
utility in a just started market might represent a large shock in the overall 
adoption curve, therefore making the aggregate capacity a biased indicator 
of the true underlying processes. In the UK case, the energy department 
makes it available from 2010 onward data on both the number of monthly 
installations disaggregated by type of adopters (household, commercial, 
public utilities) and the corresponding total installed capacity. 
Therefore, in this chapter we again used the GBM to analyse the diffusion 
of the SPP technology in the UK comparing the trend in the various sectors 
of the market: residential, commercial and utility, again with special focus 
on the role of the UK government efforts in sustaining the market. 
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The results of this chapter are broadly confirmative of some main findings 
of Chapter 2, for example about the absence of media support in both the 
household and the commercial SPP branches of the market, as well on the 
key role of incentives as market drivers. In addition to this the results 
highlight a number of further interesting issues when disaggregating by 
type of agents. In particular, the estimated magnitude of the word-of-
mouth effect in the residential market appeared to be dramatically low, 
suggesting a non-vital market, capable to grow only as a consequence of 
public support. The situation is quite different for the utilities and 
commercial sectors where the size of the word-of-mouth effect resulted an 
order of magnitude higher than for residentials. By correlating the 
temporal trends of the two main types of incentive adopted for the SPP 
market in the UK in this phase, we argue that the UK incentive policy for 
households is an example of a badly handled policy that should never be 
used in the same way in a strategic market as the one for SPP.  
Therefore, it seems that the SPP market in UK suffers not only the 
structural difficulties of this sector, but also the possible perception of 
relative penalisation suffered by late cohorts of adopters compared to the 
past cohorts who benefited higher rates of FIT. The value about 0 of the 
imitation rate (q) suggest that in absence of incentives the market is 
essentially dead possibly because agents believe in the expectation of 
further future increasing in the value of FIT and therefore in the return of 
the investment. In the commercial and utility sectors the imitation rate is 
higher which might be explained by the fact that firms make more rational 
decisions based on economic factors rather than being led by perceptions. 
A more effective and easy to implement solution for a successful policy 
might be the creation of individual customized policies which should take 
into account the real price of the initial investment paid by each individual 
and the actual material and maintenance costs, instead of an estimated 
price based on past dynamics. This solution would allow a better 
government control over the continuously occurring market changes and 
could avoid excessive SPP demand stimulated by high profitability caused 
by the gap between a sudden decrease in price and the slow adjustments in 
FIT tariff as it occurred during the Chinese overproduction. 
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Chapter 1. The diffusion of solar 
photovoltaic power within the energy 
market and the role of public 
incentives: a review 
 
                  Abstract 
Based on data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) the chapter aimed to: (a) 
identifying the “energy framework” of a large number of countries 
worldwide representing the major SPP adopters in 2017, (b) reviewing the 
influence of main shocks occurred in the energy market, including 
technological innovation, major economic shocks (e.g., oil price shocks), 
environmental catastrophes, etc on the countries’ energy portfolios; (c) 
reviewing the role of public incentives with special focus on SPP diffusion; 
(d) reviewing the main aspects of SPP diffusion in the main adopting 
countries given the underlying energy framework. In particular, this 
chapter was useful to pinpoint that (a) the presence of shocks is an intrinsic 
and often dominating feature of energy markets, thereby motivating the 
use of tools as the GBM, (b) only a few countries have developed long-term 
energy plans towards which to manage consistently  their short-medium 
term policies, as documented in the proposed analyses by the evidence that 
a number of public interventions were carried out as mere responses to 
external stimuli, such as the deadlines of Kyoto protocol; (c) the concept of 
energy framework was useful to inform the discussion on individual 
countries SPP adoption trajectories reported in subsequent chapters, which 
indicated a number of commonalities e.g., countries with oil and gas 
reserves developed a market for the SPP generally later compared to 
countries lacking such reserves (while availability of coal reserves seems 
not to have delayed the SPP diffusion). 
Keywords: energy market, renewable energy sources, global diffusion of 
solar power, state incentive, classification of public SPP incentives 
JEL: N70, O13, O38, Q48, Q58 
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1.1 Introduction 
Earth holds a limited amount of fossil fuels that we use to provide energy. 
According to (Shafiee and Topal, 2009), the reserves of oil and gas are 
forecasted to be depleted around 2040 while coal availability is predicted to 
last until 2112. Additionally, the planet increasing population and 
consumption brought critical threats regarding global warming and global 
climate change. These pressures gained the attention of important 
international organizations in the recent decades which spurred numerous 
countries to search for mitigation alternatives that better suit their 
necessities. 
At the beginning of the 1970s fossil fuels accounted for 75% of the share in 
world total electricity output (Figure 1.1), while the rest of the share was 
mainly sustained by renewables. Also, this was the beginning of the 
nuclear expansion as the third main source of energy which reached the 
highest share (almost 18%) in the 1990s. During this decade a sort of 
market stability was achieved with shares of 60%, 22% and 18% 
respectively for fossil, renewables and nuclear. Nowadays, fossil fuel is still 
by far the main energy source with a share in total electricity output of 66% 
in 2015. Instead, nuclear energy suffered a significant decrease to 10.6% in 
the past three years while renewables follow an increasing trend. 
 
Figure 1.1 Global share of main energy sources in total electricity output (Own 
calculation using the electricity output from IEA Headline Global Energy Data 
2017. 
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Before 2000 hydropower was the primary renewable energy resource (RES) 
with over 93% of the share in total renewable energy (RE) installed capacity 
(Figure 1.2). From then on, the renewable market expanded to mass-
production of innovative technologies exploiting alternative sources: 
geothermal, bioenergy and wind in a first phase and solar in a second 
phase. This brought the share of hydropower to 58% of total RES in 2015, 
while wind, solar and bioenergy covered respectively 23.2%, 14.7% and 
5.4%. Marine and geothermal technologies are still negligible, with a share 
under 1%. Thus, the recent growth in the share of RES in total electricity 
output is fundamentally due to the production of energy from other 
“clean” sources. This tendency seems to persist since many countries 
established short or long-term targets in order to reduce the use of fossil 
fuels. 
Among the RES, solar photovoltaic power (SPP) is considered an attractive 
solution especially for isolated populations with difficult access to grid-
electricity because it transforms sunlight into energy without any further 
production and transportation costs. The SPP technology market has 
experienced a great expansion around the World, being present in 178 
countries in 2016 (IRENA, 2017). The total installed capacity of SPP grew 
almost exponentially in the past three decades and reached 303GW in 2016 
(Sawin et al., 2017) with nearly 33% increase from 2015. Nevertheless, 85% 
of the growth was driven by five countries only: China, USA, Japan, India 
and UK (IEA, 2016). China has 34.5 GW installed capacity and has the 
Figure 1.2 Main renewable energy installed capacities in the World (data from 
IRENA) 
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largest solar park worldwide, the Tengger Desert Solar Park with 1540MW 
installed capacity in June 2017 [2]. Also, India, in search of solutions to the 
air pollution problem [1]1, decided to invest in SPP, particularly in solar 
farms or parks with huge capacities: Kurnool Ultra Mega Solar Park is the 
third largest solar park in the World with 900MW installed capacity. 
Being a vanguard solution against global warming, the solar power 
technology has been of vast multi-disciplinary interest. We will focus on 
the evolution of the solar photovoltaic power (SPP) market with particular 
attention to public policy schemes as determinants of the SPP adoption 
(Meade and Islam, 2015; Radomes and Arango, 2015; Yamaguchi et al., 
2013; Zhang et al., 2011). Our aim is to compare them using data on 
electricity generation, research demonstration and development (RD&D) 
investments from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and data 
regarding renewable energy installed capacity from International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). 
In the next section we present the general energy frameworks of different 
countries analysing the division of the electricity output by main energy 
source (fossil fuels, nuclear and RES) together with the availability of 
distinct categories of fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas). In the third 
section, we discuss the motivations which underlie the adoption choice of 
the energy sources. Our focus is on the dynamics of SPP adoptions by 
looking at the major events in the energy market and its several sectors. In 
the fourth section we classify SPP public policies while highlighting their 
importance based on recent literature. In the fifth section, we will focus on 
the SPP diffusion within the RES sector highlighting the influence of 
policies in each country. Finally, in the sixth section, we discuss the SPP 
evolution and its relationship with other energy sectors. 
 
1.2 Energy framework 
In order to understand the motivations driving the adoption of RES, and 
particularly of SPP, in this section we provide an overview of the energy 
framework dynamics between 1971 and 2016 in 24 IEA countries2 which 
                                                          
1 The numbers in brackets refer to the sitography of Chapter 1 that can be found at 
the end of the document 
2 Excluding Thailand and Malaysia for shortage of data 
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cover more than 90% of the SPP global market. We classify countries into 
six major groups according to their main source of energy (domestic fossil 
fuels, imported fossil fuels with little or no domestic production, nuclear 
power, RES and mixed portfolio) as a share of total electricity output 
(Figure 1.3). The origin and the composition of fossil fuel reserves (coal, oil 
and natural gas) as well as the degree of availability of each traditional 
energy sources (coal, oil and gas) may render the use of RES more or less 
compelling (Figure A1. 1). 
 
1.2.1 Domestic production of fossil fuels 
The first set comprises five countries with domestic fossil fuel resources as 
their main energy source for the electricity generation. Australia and India 
with a rather stable trend at over 80% share of fossil fuels (mostly coal and 
gas), China and USA, with a soft reduction down from around 80% to 
respectively 74% and 67%, and Mexico with a generally increasing trend of 
fossil fuel consumption (mostly oil) from 50% in the 1970s up to 80% in 
2016. Mexico is the only country having a systematic increase in the use of 
“dirty” energy. This is most probably related with the fact that, despite the 
decreasing gas production, Mexico can fully satisfy the domestic demand 
for oil. On the contrary, Australia, China, India and USA have more coal, a 
particularly polluting resource compared to the other two, and present a 
decreasing trend of domestic oil production. The insufficiency of domestic 
oil and the dependency on imports might be influential factors of SPP 
adoption in these four countries. Also, we notice the lack of significant 
nuclear power in all countries (except 20% in USA). The lack of both 
nuclear energy (or the refusal to use it given the risks it implies) and oil 
reserves might have also contributed to boost the SPP market in countries 
presenting such a feature. 
 
1.2.2 Domestic and imported fossil fuels 
The second group consists of five countries mostly relying on imported 
fossil fuels and some domestic resources. Germany and the UK are quite 
similar regarding the general energy framework experiencing a general 
decrease in the share of fossil fuels (mainly coal), respectively from 93% to 
56% and from 88% to 53%, implementing nuclear power during the years 
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and having significantly growing RES shares in the past two decades. By 
comparison, Israel, the Netherlands and Turkey have high shares of fossil 
fuels and no significant nuclear power. Germany and Turkey use the main 
categories of fossil fuel for electricity production in rather equal portions. 
Nevertheless, most of it is imported and only respectively 18% and 15% 
derive from domestic production, mostly from coal. Compared to the other 
countries, the UK and the Netherlands have more domestic production 
(47% and 27%) and they are also fossil fuel exporters mostly of oil in the 
case of UK and gas in the case of the Netherlands.  
 
Figure 1.3 Share in electricity output by source of energy 1971 – 2016 
(provisional). Own calculations based on IEA Headline Global Energy Data 
2017 data on Electricity Output 
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For a long time, Israel’s energy portfolio was entirely composed by fossil 
fuels. Despite Israel being a producer of natural gas, only 28% of the 
electricity output is provided internally in 2016 and no significant exports 
are detected. Over the last decade, country’s investments in renewables 
brought the share to 3% of total electricity output. 
The presence of oil and gas might have postponed the SPP deployment 
until the last decade in countries such as the UK, the Netherlands and 
Israel, whereas Germany registered an earlier deployment. Interestingly, 
Turkey has also a delayed SPP deployment despite the high dependency 
on foreign gas. An explanation might be that the current political situation 
and the war in Syria prevents the SPP development in the country. 
 
1.2.3 Imported fossil fuels only 
Next, we group the countries dependent on foreign fossil fuels. In this 
category we include Italy, Japan and South Korea, all with an average 70% 
share in total electricity output. The three countries used domestic fossil 
fuels before 1990: gas for Italy, coal for Korea and both coal and gas for 
Japan. Nevertheless, the production was only used for the domestic market 
and it almost faded out in the recent years which made the countries highly 
reliant on imports. In order to reduce the dependency on other countries, 
Japan and Korea focused on nuclear power reaching the peaks around the 
1980s and the 1990s with shares on total output of 20% and 50%, 
respectively. Instead, Italy gave up nuclear power (following the outcomes 
of two referenda on this issue) and focused on renewable energies which 
reached a share of 43% of overall electricity production in 2014. Nowadays, 
Japan also shifted its attention to RES almost removing the nuclear power 
from its energy portfolio, while Korea followed a decreasing trend in 
nuclear power at the advantage of fossil fuels leaving the RES with only 2% 
share. 
 
1.2.4 Nuclear power 
Belgium and France have nuclear power as their main energy source, 
contributing to respectively 50% and 70% average share of total electricity 
output. Regarding RES, since 2000 Belgium experienced a sustained 
growth in RES share while in France the growth was milder and slowed 
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down in recent years. In terms of fossil reserves, domestic production of 
coal in both countries and natural gas only in the case of France faded out 
over the past two decades. 
 
1.2.5 Renewable energy 
Four countries have renewables as their main source of energy. First, 
Norway has a unique framework, relying almost entirely on RES. In 
Austria the lack of nuclear power entailed a competition between RES and 
fossil fuels. Generally, the share of RES increased to approximately 80% at 
the disadvantage of fossil fuels. Conversely, in Switzerland the fossil fuels 
are almost absent, and the energy sector is steadily split in 60% RES and 
40% nuclear on average after 1990. However, an increasing trend of RES is 
observed starting with 2010 which is also a response to the ambitious target 
of Switzerland to eventually phase out the nuclear power [3]. A more 
diversified energy portfolio is observed in Canada with no radical changes 
over time: 60% RES, 25% fossil and 15% nuclear on average.  
Analysing the fossil fuel domestic production, it is easy to notice that 
Switzerland lacks reserves and Austria decreased its energy production 
based on coal, oil and gas to levels close to the phase out. In contrast, both 
Norway and Canada are large producers and also exporters of all three 
types of fossil fuels. Indeed, Norway is exporting most of its production 
while Canada exports around 40% of the energy produced both from 
domestic and foreign sources.  
 
1.2.6 Mixed portfolios 
In the last group, we include countries with mixed energy portfolios 
Starting from 1980s, Finland had a very balanced energy market divided 
among the three main sources. Nevertheless, in 2016 the share of energy 
generated by fossil fuels registered a historical minimum of 21% to the 
benefit of RES (45%) while the nuclear power shows a stable trend at 34% 
on average. Also, Spain uses all three energy sources, but with more 
unstable trends especially due to the introduction of nuclear. The time 
series display a portfolio mainly composed by energy from fossil fuels and 
interchangeable trends of nuclear and RES with on average respectively 
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53%, 21% and 26%. Yet, recently the shares are quite different compared to 
the past and put RES and fossil fuels on the same level at 39% with nuclear 
remaining at 22%.  
In Portugal we come across a market without nuclear but composed by 
oscillating trends with the supremacy of fossil fuels between 1990 and 2010, 
followed by the recovery of RES in recent years to an almost fifty-fifty 
market division. Similarly, we observe oscillating trends in Sweden 
between nuclear and RES even though with a more stable tendency, while 
the fossil fuels decreased considerably over time and reached very low 
levels. In 2016 the energy market is split in 57% RES, 41% nuclear and only 
2% fossil fuels.  
Denmark registered the most intense growth of energy from RES after a 
lengthy period of using only “dirty” energy. Since it was using significant 
imported resources of fossil fuels and avoiding the adoption of nuclear 
power, Denmark focused on RES which recently became the main source 
of electricity with a share of 62% in 2016. Also, the domestic production of 
oil and natural gas is mainly addressed to exports.  
Except for a limited coal production in Spain and Finland, which is 
nevertheless low compared to the imported quantity, and the modest oil 
and natural gas production in Denmark, countries with a mixed energy 
portfolio do not have significant fossil fuel resources. 
  
1.3 Important shocks in the energy market 
In this section we investigate the major events that particularly influenced 
the energy market from 1970 onwards searching for evidence in the trends 
of shares in total electricity output (Figure 1.3) and analysing the evolution 
of research, demonstration and development investments (RD&D) by type 
of main energy source (Figure A1. 2) and by type of RES (Figure A1. 3).  
 
1.3.1 Negative shocks on fossil fuel sector 
The first important event that affected the fossil fuel sector was the oil crisis 
which started in October 1973 by embargoing Canada, Japan, the 
Netherlands, UK, USA and later Portugal from the Middle East exports. 
This caused a sharp increase of the oil price which motivated many 
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countries to reconsider their energy portfolio. In the aftermath of the first 
oil crisis, research on the production of solar energy, for example, started in 
Japan with the Sunshine Programme in 1974 developed by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI). Although this ambitious project 
was considered successful (Chowdhury et al., 2014), the evidence shows 
that the SPP R&D has always been far below the huge levels directed to 
nuclear energy (Figure A1. 2) 
A second shock wave occurred in 1979 with another oil crisis induced by 
the Iranian revolution which reduced significantly the oil supply which 
consequently increased even more the price of oil (Salameh, 2004). This 
drove the search for alternative resources to fossil fuels. The immediate 
solution seemed to be the adoption of nuclear power (Toth and Rogner, 
2006) as it was the case of Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, 
Korea, Spain, Sweden, UK and USA which registered their deployment 
during this particular period (Figure 1.3). On top of this, even countries 
without significant nuclear installations throughout history, such as 
Austria, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands, invested 
considerable public RD&D in the nuclear technology (Figure A1. 2). 
Instead, Australia, Canada and Norway concentrated their efforts also into 
fossil fuels (mainly oil), probably to increase the capacity of extraction of 
their rich territories and take advantage of the situation to export their 
products at high prices. The countries that directed RD&D investments into 
RES are: Australia, Portugal, Switzerland and the Netherlands mainly in 
solar; Spain and USA in both solar and geothermal; Denmark in wind and 
solar; and with more balanced proportions Sweden in solar, wind and 
bioenergy (Figure A1. 3). While the previous shocks were provoked by 
supply disruption, the third important oil shock which started in October 
2007 and lasted until the middle of 2008, was induced by an unsatisfied 
demand due to stagnation of global production (Hamilton, 2011, 2009). 
During this period the price peaked at 147.3$/barrel [5]. Though the 
economy became more flexible to an oil price shock due to the reduction of 
the share of fossil fuels in total energy production (Blanchard, Olivier J, 
Gali, 2007; Salameh, 2004), this long-lasting problem was handled rather 
poorly, because the 2008 financial collapse brought down the oil price but 
produced other serious long-term problems (Hamilton, 2009). Hence, the 
consequences of the two opposite shocks are difficult to interpret on yearly 
data since in that particular short period we cannot clearly distinguish one 
cause from another. Nevertheless, we could observe a general decrease in 
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the share of fossil fuels over the total electricity output in 2008 compared to 
2007, except for Australia, Portugal and Turkey, (Figure 1.3) and a clearer 
increase on investments in RES technologies for Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, Italy and Spain, while a decrease in nuclear investments is 
detected in Korea and France. 
 
1.3.2 Negative shocks on the nuclear sector 
In March 1979 an accident occurred at the Three Mile Island Nuclear 
Generating Station in the USA. On one hand, this could be a possible 
explanation why Austria, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands 
that initially invested in nuclear as a response to the 1973 oil crisis did not 
proceed with the national implementation of nuclear plants. On the other 
hand, in Sweden even if the public opinion was influenced by the accident, 
the effect was short-lasting (Nohrstedt, 2005) and the result of the 1980 
nuclear referendum on the future of nuclear power was not implemented 
(Gallager and Uleri, 1996, p. 23). A reduction in RD&D public investment 
in 1980 can be observed for Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Japan and Spain. 
(Figure A1. 2) 
The Chernobyl disaster in April 1986 is considered the most catastrophic in 
terms of casualties and costs. For this reason, also Italy had a referendum in 
1987 through which the adoption of nuclear power was abolished. 
Consequently, the nuclear share in RD&D dropped significantly (Figure 
A1. 2). Even Japan registered a reduction in RD&D directed to nuclear 
technologies in 1987, but there was no long-lasting effect. Over all, we 
observe that in the second half of the 1980s many countries that chose the 
nuclear energy reached the maximum share of nuclear in total electricity 
output (Figure 1.3) and maintained a rather stable position over the time. 
Perhaps a phase out of the nuclear power for the countries that invested in 
this specific technology in order to be less dependent on foreign fossil fuels 
did not seem a feasible solution despite the catastrophic Chernobyl 
accident.  
The second largest and more recent nuclear tragedy was the Fukushima 
event on 11 March 2011. Nevertheless, the contemporary global warming 
debate and the availability of information helped spreading 
communication regarding the risks of nuclear plants and sensitized 
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significantly the public opinion around the world, probably more than the 
Chernobyl accident (Glaser, 2011; Kim et al., 2013).  
On one hand, the Fukushima event led to the drop in the share of nuclear 
power in total electricity output in Japan and corresponded with a smooth 
and continuous reduction in other countries such as Belgium, Germany 
and Switzerland. On the other hand, UK and Finland continued to increase 
their share. In the case of UK, policymakers remained on the track of their 
initial long-term decision to increase electricity generation from nuclear 
sources. In Germany the government agreed to re-evaluate the security of 
all national nuclear power facilities (Wittneben, 2012) and later planned to 
phase out the nuclear plants by 2022 [6].  
In the case of Italy, we notice that the nuclear RD&D share remained quite 
high over the years in view of reviving the nuclear energy in the country. 
However, the Fukushima disaster put an end to this plan and forced the 
country to focus on alternative solutions. Another referendum took place in 
Switzerland after a longer period of debate. However, RD&D directed to 
RES exceeded the ones directed to nuclear and continue to grow. As a 
consequence, to the Fukushima disaster the risk perception regarding 
nuclear energy augmented (Siegrist et al., 2014) and led to the positive 
result of the 2017 referendum on the gradual phase out of national nuclear 
plants while the focus will be on RES [7]. 
 
1.3.3 Environmental warning shocks 
As mentioned above, the RES sector got some attention in the 1970s during 
the oil crises but its evolution was rather restrained in the following period 
(Ackermann and Söder, 2002; Leung and Yang, 2012). Exceptions are 
Austria, Denmark and Sweden which have been making significant 
investments in RES technologies since the 1980s (Figure A1. 2). 
Additionally, to the oil crisis shock, a non-profit organisation called the 
Club of Rome, was the first most important to arise the problem of 
environmental deterioration. Founded in 1968, it gained public attention in 
1972 thanks to its clear message of the famous report “The limits to 
growth” (Meadows et al., 1972) suggesting that continuous and 
uncontrolled exploitation would bring our planet to collapse during the 
21th century. Despite the warning, most politicians, managers and 
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economists criticised the report. Only later, after the two oil crisis 
environmental awareness started to grow (Colombo, 2001).  
Over time climate change awareness brought countries together to discuss 
and find solutions for the global threat. The first significant international 
treaty regarding global warming is the 1994 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), extended with the Kyoto 
Protocol signed in 1997 and including 192 countries. The main goal of the 
treaty is to reduce the greenhouse gas concentrations under a scientifically 
proven level that would prevent hazardous interferences in the climate 
system [8]. In order to do so, countries are committed to reach certain 
targets with pre-established deadlines (2008, 2012 and 2020). This is in line 
with the fact that only recently we observe that RD&D trends addressed to 
RES technologies took the lead in terms of share in total RD&D in countries 
like Finland, Germany, Korea, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (Figure 
A1. 3). The share of RES in total electricity output increased noticeably in 
Germany, Spain, UK, Italy and Portugal (Figure 1.3). Among the analysed 
countries Japan, Canada and USA did not participate at the second round 
of targets.  
Additionally, the European Union established climate actions for its 
members - 20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1999, 20% 
energy from RES sources and 20% improvement in energy efficiency - to be 
achieved by 2020 [9]. 
Next it followed the Paris Agreement in 2015 within UNFCCC which 
motivates countries to self-establish gradual targets for short and long 
periods. This drove many nations to improve RES policies and set up 
ambitious thresholds. For example, France announced the implementation 
of the “Five-Year Plan” which targets the extinction of petrol and diesel 
vehicles by 2040 [10]. Moreover, the International Solar Alliance (ISA) of 
120 countries was founded to join forces to lower the costs of the SPP 
technology and to promote and develop solar products below the tropics 
and beyond [11]. 
As a response to environmental awareness and driven by the technology 
price reduction various countries fixed targets for the SPP installed 
capacity or RES in general (Kumar Sahu, 2015). Among the most ambitious 
countries we find India, China, France, Germany, Korea (RES in general) 
and Japan. The last four mentioned countries have also made significant 
investments in SPP RD&D which highlights the success of their initiative. 
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(Figure A1. 3). On the contrary, among the nations without a target we find 
Austria, Finland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and USA, while 
Canada is far from reaching it. This is not surprising since Canada and 
USA do not participate in the Kyoto Protocol, Austria, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden have great hydropower and Spain focused more on wind 
energy (Figure 1.6). Including China and India, 16 out of 24 analysed 
countries established long or short targets, considering also Denmark 
which exceeded in advance its scheduled target even though it did not fix 
another.  
Despite the continuous scientific evidences that global warming is a serious 
threat, over the year some political parties strongly expressed their opinion 
against the environmental degradation caused by excessive human 
exploitation of the planet and consumption (McCright and Dunlap, 2011). 
Especially in the US, the conservative party seems to have impacted the 
country’s climate change policy (McCright and Dunlap, 2003) and thus 
delayed the deployment of SPP. During his campaign, the president Trump 
strongly expressed his disbelieve in the global warming. More recently The 
US government withdrew from the Paris Agreement and announced the 
promotion of fossil fuel and nuclear power during the Bonn Climate Talks 
[12].  
 
1.4 SPP public incentives 
Before 1990 the SPP technology was mainly used in niche projects 
beginning with space satellites and followed by off-grid terrestrial 
applications for isolated rural populations (Breyer et al., 2010). Fossil fuels 
and nuclear energy enjoyed a competitive advantage in terms of immediate 
costs and efficiency. However, scientists discovered that long-term costs 
had not been correctly took into consideration because they should include 
externalities. “The consequence for costs such as global warming or nuclear 
power can be very significant”(Rabl, 1999, p. 111) on future generations in 
terms of environmental damage and health problems. 
This is one of the many reasons for which governments around the world 
offered various incentives to make RES technologies, and SPP in particular, 
economically attractive to compete with the existing energy technologies. 
These were the foundations for a more efficient mass-production 
technology that it is nowadays used mostly as on-grid rooftop PV system 
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and available at a price approximately 30 times cheaper than in the early 
1990s [13]. 
Next, we will present a summary classification of the main SPP policies 
based on a thorough analysis of the national survey reports in IEA 
countries [14] and their importance in the SPP adoption, as studied in the 
literature.  
 
1.4.1 Policy classification 
Public intervention supporting the SPP market has been implemented in 
the form of a wide range of incentives. These can be crudely classified into 
two broad classes that we call respectively direct and indirect policies. 
Direct policies are those offering an economic support directly targeting the 
SPP adopters (be they households, companies, institutions, etc). These can 
be further subdivided into (i) installation related actions, including e.g., 
discounts or refund of a proportion of the initial installation price, credit 
facilities such as interest-free loans, extended loan periods, etc; (ii) 
production related, such as feed-in-tariff schemes (FIT) and net-metering 
schemes (NMS), both aimed at rewarding the electricity produced in excess 
with at least the same price per kWh as charged by the local utility for a 
fixed period established at the beginning which could vary from 10 to 25 
years. Moreover, for systems connected to the grid there is no need for 
storage facilities because the electricity can be used at any time from the 
utility company to whom the consumer is providing the clean energy.  The 
difference between the two lies in the use of two meters in the case of FIT 
whereas the NMS needs only one bi-directional meter to measure the 
electricity flow [31]. Also, net-metering allows RES producers to 
compensate for the energy generated over a long period of time, ranging 
from one month to several years. With net-metering, customers can 
compensate for their electricity consumption, over an entire billing period, 
using it at a time other than when it is produced. This kind of incentives 
are continuously revised, recently even monthly, in order to fall in line 
with the SPP market conditions, such as the price decrease of the SPP 
systems. One of the first and the most successful implementation of FIT 
happened in Germany starting from 1990 (Kumar Sahu, 2015). In fact, in 
Germany FIT is adapted very month depending on the degree of 
achievement of the PV government target. Compensations differentiated 
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sometimes also base on differences in solar radiation in different regions. 
Nowadays around the world, more than 75 jurisdictions adopted the 
production related policies which makes FIT the most popular policy 
(Dusonchet and Telaretti, 2015; Timilsina et al., 2012). NMS was 
implemented in several countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy 
and Belgium (Dusonchet and Telaretti, 2015). 
Indirect policies include the efforts provided by the government or 
companies to promote more favourable market conditions allowing to 
reduce over time the high initial cost of installation or to discourage the 
adoption of other technologies, especially “dirty” technologies. These 
include public investments and taxes. On the one hand, public investment 
in R&D reduce the direct costs of buying the technology, while the public 
effort in promoting its awareness e.g., by demonstration projects or 
promoting associations (Yamaguchi et al., 2013), decrease the side costs of 
investments (EcoFys B.V., 2012). On the other hand, taxes consist of e.g., (i) 
the carbon tax for fossil fuel energy users (Farrag and Gmbh, 2013), which 
increases the relative benefit of investing in SPP, (ii) penalties for utilities 
that do not buy energy from “clean” energy producers, (iii) green 
Certificates (IEA, 2013a). 
Few policies are directly addressed to SPP producers. Among those we 
mention the Chinese government intentions to encourage domestic 
companies by offering tax-free grid connected systems (Kumar Sahu, 2015). 
As a matter of fact, it would not make any sense to have production 
facilities if there is not a market for them. So, most incentives are in favour 
of consumers. 
Here we also mention the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), which is a 
governmental measure that constrains the electricity supply companies to 
produce a certain share of electricity from RES. Thus, we cannot call it an 
incentive, but rather an obligation imposed to often monopolist utility 
companies.  
Several studies emphasize the impact on the SPP diffusion of heterogenous 
policies. In the next section, we discuss the main SPP policies. 
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1.4.2  The role of public incentives 
The key role of public policies relative to renewable energies (RE) is to 
increase their profitability either by expand the scale of production so as to 
reduce the unitary cost, or by improving the quality of the technology, 
given the cost. This would make «clean» technologies competitive with 
«dirty» alternatives, which are less costly but not environmentally 
«friendly» (Avril et al., 2012; Chowdhury et al., 2014; Ratinen and Lund, 
2015; Zhang et al., 2011).  
Other two important roles of the policies that have not been stressed 
sufficiently in the literature could be to provide a viable source of energy 
for countries missing fossil fuels (in particular oil and gas) and to acquire a 
technology leadership, as currently evident for China, which has become 
the major producer of solar modules worldwide since 2007 (IEA, 2016, p. 
53) . Other cases such as Germany, Japan, Italy and India (among others) 
also point in this direction. 
Earlier studies used the learning curve approach (Breyer et al., 2010; Foxon, 
2010; Masini and Frankl, 2003) to underline the importance of public and 
private investment (R&D) in reducing the unit cost of the SPP technology. 
Breyer et al (2010) studies OECD countries and indicates that 6 to 12% of 
SPP industry sales is invested in R&D dedicated to improvements of the 
manufacturing process or the creation of new products, such as storage 
batteries. Moreover, Foxon (2010) highlights that, globally, an annual cost 
of 1 to 2 % of the GDP would be sufficient to reach the targets against 
global warming, which in contrast would bring to a loss of 5 to 20% of total 
GDP. Masini and Frankl (2002) suggest that suitable policy actions are 
essential for the maximum penetration of the PV system.  
Also Avril et al. (2012) highlights the importance of continuous R&D 
investments. In fact, after analysing the policy schemes in Japan, Germany, 
USA, France and Italy, they recommend a policy scheme based on R&D in 
a first phase to be followed by a second phase of FIT or any other demand-
pull policy and the prolongation of R&D support even if at a lower level. 
The investment in R&D leads to a reduction of the substantial initial plant 
cost of the SPP technology, which represents a significant disadvantage 
(Zhang et al., 2011) and requires a more complex decision process. 
Therefore, not only domestic factors but also globalization factors should 
be taken into consideration when designing the right policy scheme in a 
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certain country. A prediction of 67% decrease in the module price by 2020 
is given in de La Tour et al. (2013) using experience curve models. They 
indicate consequently that the price of SPP generated electricity should 
align with the price of conventional electricity especially in countries with 
high irradiation levels. 
Several comparative studies analyse the impact of various types of 
measures on the SPP diffusion in different locations. Solangi et al. (2011) 
highlights that, based on past literature, FIT and RPS appear to be the most 
common and to bring most of the advantages among different incentives. 
Additionally, in the case of South Korea the RPS reveals to be more 
significant in explaining the RE diffusion compared with the FIT (Lee and 
Huh, 2017). Even Ismail et al. (2015), after reviewing the SPP progress in 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries shows that 5 
out of the 10 analysed countries applied FIT as central policy to drive SPP 
adoptions and finds it one of the most effective. Also, Radomes and 
Arango, (2015) study the SPP diffusion in Medellin, Colombia and reveal 
that the investment subsidy and the FIT rate offer the highest marginal 
increase in diffusion rate. In line with their findings, Zhao et al., (2013) 
relying on a large panel dataset, discover that FIT and direct investment 
incentives are the only efficient promoters for all types of RES.  
Furthermore, Kumar Sahu (2015) describes the evolution of SPP 
installations in the top 10 SPP countries in terms of electricity production 
and emphasises that the success of the market is highly dependent on each 
country’s policy schemes, but also on the involvement of manufacturing 
companies. The study also indicates that the latest reduction in SPP module 
price pushed various countries to establish short- or long-term targets for 
the adoption of SPP. 
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In the next section we examine SPP diffusion within the RES sector in 
countries with various energy portfolios as presented in the first section.   
 
1.5 SPP diffusion 
SPP diffusion is very different from other RES. As we can see from Figure 
1.4, in the past two decades, on average, the growth rate of hydropower, 
geothermal and bioenergy remained rather constant, while wind presents a 
general declining trend. On the contrary, the solar power registered 
various significant fluctuations with three peaks in 2004, 2008 and 2011 
which match with the implementation of FIT in Germany and the first two 
deadlines of the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, it is interesting to investigate more 
deeply the SPP market and the applied policies in various states.  
Since every country is unique from the socioeconomic, financial and 
cultural point of view, the choice of incentives can be thought as tailored to 
the different objectives that one wants to pursue. It might be useful how 
much energy is consumed by families as opposed to companies. Moreover, 
subsidies may favour the installation of PV solar panels with families, or 
industrial or public institutions. 
In general, the countries based their RES mostly on hydropower and only 
recently they developed a market also for other types of RES, starting with 
Figure 1.4 Growth rate by type of RES at global level. Own calculation based 
on data from IRENA Renewable Electricity Capacity and Generation 
Statistics (RECGS), March 2017 
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wind technology or, in few cases, with bioenergy. In what follows, we 
examine the detailed RES framework in each country and highlight the use 
of RD&D (Figure A1. 3) and the main incentives (as the growth rate peaks 
suggests in Figure 1.4) addressed to the SPP technology. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Growth rate of cumulative SPP installed capacity 1993 - 2016. Own 
calculation from IEA-PVPS Trends. 
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1.5.1 Countries with energy mainly produced by domestic fossil fuels 
From our analysis of countries with large reserves of fossil fuels (Australia, 
China, India, Mexico, USA) we observe that their main RES is hydropower 
followed by wind energy (Figure 1.6). Only Australia has installed a 
significant amount of SPP in the last decade which made it the second source of 
RES. The Australian effort in adopting SPP can be seen from the important 
amount of RD&D investments in the technology over the years, ever since 1980 
(Figure A1. 3). Also, USA invested in SPP in early years, but most likely her 
effort was directed to niche projects as explained at the beginning of the section 
Figure 1.6 Share in total RES by type of source. Own calculations based on 
IRENA RECGS, March 2017 
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rather than to mass-production. Over the years the RD&D for RES switched 
mostly to bioenergy. Moreover, in all countries the incentives with higher 
impact on the SPP diffusion occurred after 2008 which might be as a 
consequence to the third oil crisis but probably delayed by the sudden 
reduction in oil price given the following financial crisis. 
1.5.1.1 Australia 
Since every country is unique from the socioeconomic, financial and 
cultural point of view, the choice of incentives can be thought as tailored to 
the different objectives that one wants to pursue. It might be useful how 
much energy is consumed by families as opposed to companies. Moreover, 
subsidies may favour the installation of PV solar panels with families, or 
industrial or public institutions. 
In general, the countries based their RES mostly on hydropower and only 
recently they developed a market also for other types of RES, starting with 
wind technology or, in few cases, with bioenergy. In what follows, we 
examine the detailed RES framework in each country and highlight the use 
of RD&D (Figure A1. 3) and the main incentives (as the growth rate peaks 
suggests in Figure 1.4) addressed to the SPP technology.  
1.5.1.2 China 
On the contrary, China became in a brief period the first producer of SPP in 
the World. Kumar Sahu (2015) highlights the importance of manufacturing 
companies for the success of the SPP diffusion in China. Thus, the Chinese 
government is one of the few who created policies directed to SPP 
producers which include permits and tax-free installations for national grid 
connected structures. This led to overproduction and as a consequence the 
survival of the Chinese downstream SPP manufacturing companies is 
strictly dependent of the export, accounting for 95% of the national 
production in 2009 (de la Tour et al., 2011; Iizuka, 2015; Yu et al., 2016). The 
overproduction led to low SPP module prices and conflicts with the 
importer countries (e.g. “antidumping investigation”) despite the effort of 
the Chinese government to guide companies to a higher-value-added 
rather than a low-value-added technology (Iizuka, 2015). 
In order to overcome the barriers encountered in exporting SPP 
technology, the Chinese policy started to shift from production supply 
prioritization to demand-side policy domination (Zhi et al., 2014) aiming 
the domestic SPP diffusion also through FITs with deployment in 2009. 
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This is also the year from which we see a significant increase in growth rate 
(Figure 1.5). 
Despite the increase in the number of patents over time (Fu and Zhang, 
2011), criticism concerning low investments in R&D are pointed out in the 
literature (Zhi et al., 2014) as the production competences of the SPP 
technology are based mainly on imitative behaviour, low-barrier 
technological components and building scientific linkages with Germany 
(de la Tour et al., 2011; Iizuka, 2015). 
1.5.1.3 India 
A similar case of exceptional development and export (70% of SPP 
production) of the SPP industry has been registered in India thanks to 
mixed mechanisms of domestic innovation and international technology 
transfer (Fu and Zhang, 2011). The country also aims at installing 175GW 
of RES by 2022 and to eventually reach 100GW from solar energy3 of which 
40GW from rooftop SPP (Goel, 2016; Kar et al., 2016). In order to achieve 
the established target, India focused also on the construction of 25 huge 
solar parks with total installed capacity of 20GW for shared use of 
electricity (Kar et al., 2016).  
Furthermore, there have been early RD&D investments in RES in general, 
but recently the focus is mostly on SPP manufacturing capacities (Goel, 
2016; Rao and Shrivastava, 2015). In addition of numerous energy 
programs and huge solar parks, starting from 2011 some gross or net 
metering schemes were introduced at regional level4. Also, for off-grid 
systems an initial cost subsidy is provided (Rao and Shrivastava, 2015). 
1.5.1.4 Mexico 
Even though Mexico has a high radiation index, the country has low SPP 
installed capacity compared to other RES (Figure 1.6). Because the country 
is one of the oil exporters and because of the bad economic situation and 
scarcity of private investments (Ramirez et al., 2000), the interest of Mexico 
in alternative technology remained low. Only until recently, due to the 
decrease in oil production and increase in energy consumption, Mexico 
                                                          
3 The target is intended also for other solar technology, not only for 
photovoltaics.  
4 See (Goel, 2016) and (Kar et al., 2016) for a regional summary of policies.  
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showed interest in investing in RES to avoid an energy crisis that might be 
caused by the demand-supply gap (Mundo-Hernández et al., 2014). 
Initially, the Federal Electricity Boar was aiming to installing wind 
hydraulic and geothermal (Cancino-Solórzano et al., 2010), excluding solar 
from the first choices probably because of the absence of domestic 
manufacturing companies and the high price of imported SPP. It was only 
in 2014 that the “Mexican Center for Innovation in Solar Energy” was 
created for consulting services, research and development, etc. (IEA, 2016, 
p. 83) Moreover, there are no incentives for the mass adoption of SPP 
except for the Mexican Energy Reform which contemplates a share of 35% 
of RES in electricity generation. The main part of the installed capacity 
derive from private investors and developers on large public or private 
projects (Mundo-Hernández et al., 2014).   
1.5.1.5 USA 
As pointed out in the case of Australia, the peer effect seems to exert a 
positive and significant influence on the probability to adopt SPP through 
the power of example in term of SPP visibility and word-of-mouth, as 
suggested by a study in California (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012).  
However, the high price of SPP technology in the USA due to associated 
learning, hardware and soft costs and additional sales taxes (Seel et al., 
2014) caused a slower SPP deployment compared to other competitive 
countries. In order to face the high cost, the Federal Investment Tax Credit 
was implemented in 2006 (Sherwood, 2010) and successfully continued to 
stimulate the SPP adoption by offering a 30% tax credit on residential and 
commercial SPP [15]. Likewise, thanks to the trade dispute resolution the 
Chinese were allowed to export their SPP technology in the USA at lower 
prices (Kumar Sahu, 2015) which boosted the SPP diffusion after 2010 
(Figure 1.5).   
In terms of RD&D the USA shows a declining share of solar in total RES 
ever since 1970’s which got substituted by investments in bioenergy 
(Figure A1. 3). Nevertheless, since 2011 the SunShot Initiative was 
launched with the aim of reducing the price of a kWh to 0.06$ by 2020 and 
to 0.03$ by 2030 (Ardani et al., 2013) and to consolidate the SPP 
manufacturing industry (Kumar Sahu, 2015).  
Despite the absence of a national framework for the support of RES, at state 
and local levels the incentives have been successful in many areas, 
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especially the RPS (IEA, 2016, p. 110). However, with the Trump 
administration the attention has been redirected to traditional sources of 
energy which creates an unpredictable scenario for the future of RES. 
 
1.5.2 Countries with energy mainly produced by domestic and 
imported fossil fuels 
Countries that have some production of fossil fuels but not enough to 
satisfy the domestic demand of energy are still dependent on imported 
resources. For this reason, they searched for solutions in the adoption of 
RES, especially of wind and solar technologies. Exception is the case of 
Turkey in which case the hydropower is still by far the RES with higher 
installed capacity.   
1.5.2.1 Germany 
In Germany the RES market is mainly composed by wind and solar energy 
with 80% share of total RES. Ever since 1970s Germany focused the RD&D 
investments mostly on solar power. Recently, the SPP market reached a 
satisfactory level of development and the RD&D investments are more and 
more directed also to wind and bioenergy (Figure A1. 3).  
The three peaks in the SPP growth rate (Figure 1.5) coincide with: the 
implementation of the FIT scheme in 2000, which pays 0.52EUR/kWh and 
gradually decreases by 5% per year; the revision of the FIT rates in 2004 
with the increase to 0.57EUR/kWh and decreasing to 0.43EUR/kWh in 2009 
and so on until lower rates were achieved such as 0.0671EUR/kWh in 2018; 
the EU approval of the 18% RES of total electricity consumption target for 
2020 [16]. Also, at residential level the SPP adoption rate has been shown to 
be influenced by distinct financial policies (Dharshing, 2017).  
On one hand, the decrease in the SPP module price along with the FIT 
scheme made SPP more economically appealing (Chowdhury et al., 2014) 
which made Germany the leader of the SPP market in terms of SPP 
adoptions. Among the cost components with major impact on the total SPP 
price which permit to have a lower price in Germany are especially 
acquisition, installation labour and profit (Seel et al., 2014). On the other 
hand, Germany was hardly hit by the sharp decrease of the SPP price due 
to the Chinese overproduction. The phenomenon caused the bankruptcy of 
domestic manufacturing companies and the disruption of the policy 
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equilibrium also because Germany could not sustain the SPP demand with 
the domestic production (Yu et al., 2016). 
1.5.2.2 Israel 
As mentioned in the first section, Israel is highly dependent on fossil fuels, 
with only 3% share of RES in electricity generation. Hence, the country 
found in SPP a vigorous solution to start substituting the “dirty” energy 
especially since it has been scientifically proved that only from rooftop a 
32% share of the national electricity consumption could be reached 
(Vardimon, 2011). Consistent RD&D investments were directed to both 
academic institutions and start-up companies (Mason and Mor, 2009). The 
peak in the SPP growth was reached in 2009 thanks to the implementation 
of FIT in 2008. The value of FIT was of 0.197NIS/kWh and decreased 
considerably over time but the growth continued to be sustained by the 
introduction of NMS for all RES up to 5MW in 2013 (IEA, 2016, p. 67). In 
the past few years the adoption rate returned to the pre-incentives levels 
probably because politicians continue to support fossil fuel, especially after 
the discovery of large natural gas reserves in 2009 from which followed the 
defunding of the national climate change engagement plan (Michaels and 
Tal, 2015). 
1.5.2.3 The Netherlands 
RD&D investments in RES are addressed over the years to solar, wind and 
bioenergy (Figure A1. 3). In fact, we observe that wind and bioenergy 
always had a great share in RES while solar became significant in the RES 
portfolio only after 2008 (Figure 1.6) when a FIT scheme was introduced 
with tariffs around 0.33EUR/kWh for small systems (Vasseur and Kemp, 
2011). Before this period the SPP support was given mainly by 
municipalities and local authorities although with poor success due to 
inconsistence in policy (Vasseur and Kemp, 2011) and support of other 
types of RES which nevertheless helped the achievement of the short-term 
Kyoto and European targets (Guidolin and Mortarino, 2010). However, the 
efforts of regional support were later rewarded because together with the 
FIT scheme and other small complementary attractive incentives they 
increased the technology awareness and facilitated the adoption (IEA, 
2013b). Moreover, although the Dutch SPP manufacturing industry is 
considered rather small at international levels (Vasseur et al., 2013), it 
remains active and growing and created over 10,000 jobs (IEA, 2016). 
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1.5.2.4 Turkey 
Turkey faces a rapid increase in energy consumption in concomitance with 
a decrease in production which pushes the government to take actions in 
improving energy efficiency. Thanks to high irradiation solar might just be 
the solution if proper incentives are offered (Celik, 2006). In fact, in 
December 2010 a FIT scheme was introduced with a tariff of 0.133$/kWh 
for household for 10 years and 0.08-0.12EUR/kWh for industry (Dinçer, 
2011) which triggered the SPP deployment in recent years (Figure 1.5). In 
the past few years we observe an increase of solar RD&D share (Figure A1. 
3). This seems to facilitate the achievement of the 2023 target of 5GW solar 
energy which most likely will be reached given the 3.4GW cumulative 
installed capacity in December 2017 [17]. However, the target is far from 
ambitious compared with the domestic consumption and more 
investments and government support should be provided in order to 
secure a stable market for this technology with great potential in this 
particularly highly irradiated country and with significant environmental 
improvement capacities (Adam and Apaydin, 2016).  
1.5.2.5  UK 
Over the years there have been RD&D investments in all four types of RES: 
solar, wind, marine and geothermal, in somewhat balanced proportions 
(Figure A1. 3), although geothermal and marine have insignificant shares 
of RES installed capacity, while wind and solar are at the first and the 
second place with approximately 42%, respectively, 31% (Figure 1.6).  
The public incentive that mostly impacted the SPP diffusion is the FIT 
scheme implemented in April 2010 which consequently led to the sharp 
growth rate increase in 2011 up to 120 times higher than the previous year 
(Figure 1.5). The reduction in tariff the following year discouraged 
especially project developers of large solar installations who still encounter 
a financial barrier due to the high cost of the system (Balcombe et al., 2014, 
2013; Dusonchet and Telaretti, 2015). In fact, in terms of number of 
installations the SPP market in UK is mainly composed by rooftop rather 
than large installations. While in the past it was also true in terms of 
cumulative installed capacity, recently the SPP market has been supported 
mainly by large systems whereas small installations are following a rather 
steady trend [18]. Moreover, instead of complementary markets, the SPP 
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and wind technologies seem to be in conflict and immerged in an uncertain 
environment due to lack of policy stability (Duan et al., 2014). 
 
1.5.3 Countries with energy mainly produced by imported fossil fuels  
Countries that are highly dependent on foreign fossil fuels have a RES 
portfolio composed by mainly hydro and solar power whereas wind and 
bioenergy register lower shares (Figure 1.6). This reflects the RD&D 
investments directed primarily to solar technology in all three countries 
(Figure A1. 3). 
1.5.3.1 Italy 
The SPP growth rate revels that the technology had its true deployment in 
the years after 2005 (Figure 1.5) when the “Conto Energia” FIT scheme was 
introduced. The fluctuations are even more consistent with the five phases 
of the scheme at monthly level and highlight that almost all of the 
installations benefitted from public support (Nencioni and Manfredi, 2015). 
Additionally, between 2009 and 2012 numerous large SPP plants were 
installed, the largest having approximately 85MW. As the FIT ended in 
2013 the diffusion went back to extremely low levels of growth rate 
sustained only by small programs such as net billing systems, electricity 
sales and later by the income tax deduction with low effects on the SPP 
diffusion (IEA, 2016, p. 70). The phenomenon has been analysed by 
(Palmer et al., 2015) at residential level from 2006 to 2011 through an agent 
based model of the policy design in Italy based on the payback period of 
investment, environmental benefits, household income and communication 
with other agents. Also, their study predicted the stagnation of the SPP 
market caused by a sudden decrease in the public support while they 
emphasise that a smoother decrease would have allowed a wider diffusion. 
Yet, (Orioli and Di Gangi, 2017) analyse the urban areas of Palermo, Rome 
and Milan from the economic point of view and compute the discounted 
payback period (DPB) of the SPP technology from June 2010 to May 2016. 
Their findings suggest that the value of DPB for the FIT (until July 2013) is 
longer than DPB of the successive tax credit program, oscillating from 7.44 
to 12.78 years at the end of 2015 based on the site’s latitude which strongly 
influences the efficiency of the SPP system. 
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Although they possess the quality and the efficiency of other international 
producers, the decrease in SPP adoptions affected the manufacturing 
industry in Italy which is struggling because of the significant gap between 
actual output and production capacity (IEA, 2016, p. 71). 
1.5.3.2 Japan 
In terms of investments, an important RD&D funding for the solar power 
was applied in 1993 through the “New Sunshine Project”. Later, Japan was 
also among the top inventors of SPP technology in the period 2000-2008 in 
terms of number of patents (Breyer et al., 2010). In fact, the Japanese market 
seemed less affected by the Chinese’s SPP overproduction because not only 
it manages to satisfy the domestic demand, but it is also an SPP technology 
exporter and has more restrictions regarding international trade (Yu et al., 
2016). 
Japan had predominantly two periods of incentives, before and after 2008. 
In the first period the increase is more gradual and it was based first on a 
50% reduction of the initial cost of residential installations and a NMS 
(1994-1996) and later, the reduction was extended to industrial and public 
institutions (1998-2003). (Chowdhury et al., 2014) highlight that factors 
such as inadequate energy policy, attention towards nuclear power rather 
than RES, the end of incentives and absence of targets were responsible for 
the diminishing adoptions in the years before 2009.  
In the second period, a substantial FIT scheme implemented in 2008 and 
improved in 2012, boosted the market to further develop both the 
residential and the industrial sector (Yamada and Ikki, 2017). From there 
on the tariff was generally reduced gradually on a yearly basis. Just 
recently, Japan announced another cut in the FIT for solar plants in 2018 of 
14% for non-residential installations [19] All in all, the Japanese SPP market 
is one of the most developed and counts numerous and various public 
incentives that helped the mass-adoption.   
In view of the forecasted reduction of domestic adoptions, the Japanese 
manufacturing market is working on further reductions of the module 
price and prepares itself for a further development on the international 
market (IEA, 2016, p. 75). 
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1.5.3.3 Korea 
Compared to the other two countries, Korea had a low electricity 
production from clean sources. Thus, the government is creating basic 
plans for RES by establishing a target of 13.4% share of total electric energy 
by 2035 (Lee and Huh, 2017).   
In 2001 a FIT scheme was introduced, but it was limited to only 20MW on 
the first come first served basis [20]. It was only after 2005 that the scheme 
was enlarged and along with the complementary 60% reduction in the 
residential installation cost and 100% for public buildings (IEA, 2007) 
boosted the market (Figure 1.5). The FIT program ended in 2011 because of 
financial difficulties and it was replaced by the RPS (Chen et al., 2014) 
which requires that utilities should produce 10% electricity from RES by 
2035. Although the FIT scheme had a higher impact from the growth rate 
point of view, its effect was only temporary, whereas the RPS seems to 
have influenced more significantly the diffusion of RES in Korea along 
with the international increase in oil prices (Lee and Huh, 2017). 
Over the years the SPP Korean industry developed considerably and 
nowadays it contains a supply chain of crystalline silicon SPP from 
feedstock to installation, although it needs substantial political support to 
become more competitive at international level (Yoon and Sim, 2015).  
 
1.5.4 Countries with energy provided by nuclear power 
Even if both France and Belgium have nuclear power as the main energy 
source for electricity production, the two countries are very different from 
the RES portfolio point of view, although in both countries the RD&D 
incentives are primarily addressed to solar and bioenergy. 
1.5.4.1 Belgium 
SPP in Belgium holds a constant share since 2012 just above 40% of total 
RES installed capacity, followed by wind which almost reached 30% in 
2016 (Figure 1.6). The SPP regulation is different by region. Thus, apart 
from the national target for 2020 that has been already reached in 2011, all 
other targets and support are decided at regional level (Dusonchet and 
Telaretti, 2010). The Flemish region was the first to impact the SPP 
adoption with the green certificates, a combination between a FIT scheme 
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and RPS (Jäger-Waldau, 2007), which produced the growth rate peaks of 
2007-2009 (Figure 1.5). Many other incentives are given even at local level 
such as premium amounts for investment costs and tax deduction (Huijben 
et al., 2016).  From 2011 onwards there has been a reduction of support in 
all three regions induced by the decline in SPP price and the financial 
constraints of public services (IEA, 2013a).  
The SPP industry is dynamic, composed by primarily two producers of 
classical modules for building-integrated SPP and other three companies 
working on the application of SPP (IEA, 2016, p. 48). 
1.5.4.2 France 
In the case of France, solar power occupies the third place among the RES, 
with a share of 14.5%, whereas at the first place we find hydropower with 
56.5% followed by wind with 25% (Figure 1.6). The SPP market started 
growing significantly from 2006 when a new FIT and income tax credit 
were implemented, along with various support from local authorities 
(Guidolin and Mortarino, 2010; Solangi et al., 2011). Because of the fear of 
abusive practices, the French government announced the revision of FIT 
for 2010 which created a rushed demand observed in the 2010 peak in SPP 
growth rate. After the reduction of incentives from September 2010 a 
limited annual growth was imposed at 500MW (Jacobs, 2012) and led to 
low levels of market growth (Figure 1.5). Recent targets were established to 
reach 18.2 GW by the end of 2023 established by the Decree of 24th April 
2016 [21], pointing especially to the ground based SPP as France has a 
market dominated by centralized grid-connected systems (Duan et al., 
2014). 
 
1.5.5 Countries with energy mainly provided by RES 
All four countries which have RES as a main energy source are very rich in 
hydropower. In fact, the share of hydropower exceeds 70% in all cases (Figure 
1.6). However, there are some differences in the implementation of other 
RES.  
1.5.5.1 Austria 
With only 5.8% share in RES installed capacity, the solar energy is 
surpassed by both wind and bioenergy. Actually, the RD&D pattern shows 
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an investment in solar technologies over the year, but an even greater 
interest in bioenergy which covers approximately 2/3 of total investments, 
except in the last decade during which solar has received more attention 
Figure A1. 3). Besides, Austria has an ambitious plan to eliminate fossil fuel 
by 2030 (IEA, 2016, p. 44) and will shortly exceed the established target of 
1.2GW by 2020 with the Green Electricity Act 2012 [22].  
The SPP growth rate trend (Figure 1.5) shows three main periods of 
interest. First, in 2001 the liberalization of the electricity market and the 
implementation of FIT at regional level brought a significant but short-
lasting increase (Mayr et al., 2014). Second, new and substantial FIT were 
applied in February 2006 (Guidolin and Mortarino, 2010) and revised in 
2009 for all RES, but the value of the tariff was higher for the SPP [23] The 
tariffs assigned through Ökostromverordnung [24] diminished over time 
and promoted installations above 5kW capacity. Third, in 2013 an 
investment subsidy was offered for small installations [25]. Furthermore, 
the Austrian SPP industry has developed and in 2015 it exported 50.5% of 
the module production and 36.4% in 2016 (IEA, 2017, p. 19). 
1.5.5.2  Canada 
In Canada the share of SPP is only 2.8% of total RES whereas wind energy 
goes over 12%, last being bioenergy with only 1.4% (Figure 1.6). Although 
the bioenergy has a lower share than the solar, in terms of RD&D the 
country has invested much more in bioenergy over the years (Figure A1. 3). 
Nonetheless, some significant investments have been made in the past five 
years which brought an expansion of the industry with 13% manufacturing 
revenues from export market in 2014 (IEA, 2016, p. 50). 
In Canada the situation is very particular because approximately 98% of 
the SPP installed capacity is concentrated in Ontario [26] which indicates 
that at the country level the government does not directly invest in solar 
power but supports the interested provinces in doing so (Moosavian et al., 
2013). Here the FIT scheme offered a very high payment for the electricity 
production, of 0.802 CAD/kWh in 2009 [6] which explains the registered 
peak (Figure 1.5). On one hand, the scheme attracted many local consumers 
but, on the other hand, encountered strong opposite political reactions. 
Thus, many changes have followed which brought criticism from both 
supportive and opponent coalitions. (Stokes, 2013) The FIT rates were 
revised periodically and decreased up to 4 times in 2016 [27]. 
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1.5.5.3 Norway 
Among the analysed countries Norway has the lowest share of solar power 
in total RES which is understandable given the great amount of 
hydropower possessed by the country (Figure 1.6). In fact, based on the 
RD&D investments we notice Norway’s unique interest in improving 
efficiency of hydropower, but also an interest in all other types of RES 
(Figure A1. 3), especially in SPP which enforced the Norway’s position as a 
SPP supplier industry of raw material and some companies involved with 
expansion projects of the SPP technology (Klitkou and Jørgensen, 2011). 
For example, the Household Subsidy Programme was applied to 
renewable heating technologies (Bjørnstad, 2012), but there are no targets 
for the SPP implementation. In 2016 a significant growth rate has been 
observed (Figure 1.5) although no policies are in act, except the Green 
Certificates implemented in 2012 with the Act of 24 June 2011 No. 39 [28].  
To further increase the market a 35% subsidy of the installation cost for 
grid-connected plants has been recently implemented (IEA, 2016, p. 88). 
 
1.5.5.4 Switzerland 
Switzerland distinguished from the other three countries thanks to its 
interest in the solar power, with a share of 10.5% or RES in 2016, followed 
by bioenergy and wind with shares under 2% (Figure 1.6). The market 
expansion has been a result of vast continuous RD&D investments in solar 
technology at least since 1974 (Figure A1. 3), strengthening the SPP market 
to fully cover the value chain (IEA, 2016, p. 103). 
A series of important incentives help the deployment of SPP, especially 
after 2008 when a visible increase in growth rate is detected. First, in 2007 a 
20% reduction of fossil fuel consumption was established for 2020. Second, 
in 2008 a CO2 tax on stationary fuels was introduced with further 
increments in 2010 and 2016. Third, a FIT scheme similar to the German 
one, divided by installation capacity and with payments over 25 years was 
adopted (Weibel, 2011). The tariffs decreased over time and eventually 
phased out in 2014 while a direct subsidy for small installations up to 
30kW was launched. Also, allowing self-consumption draws numerous 
commercial installations (Karneyeva and Wüstenhagen, 2017).  
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1.5.6 Countries with mixed energetic portfolios 
Finally, we will talk about countries with mixed energetic portfolios having 
in common the low interest in solar compared with other RES.   
1.5.6.1 Denmark 
The RES portfolio of Denmark is rather similar to the Netherlands because 
of the dominance of wind energy, in this case over 70% of RES. However, 
the RES portfolio is rather diversified as pointed out also by (Ratinen and 
Lund, 2012) including bioenergy with 17.7% and solar with 10.7% (Figure 
1.6). The pattern shadows the trend of RD&D investments over the years 
(Figure A1. 3). Despite this, the Danish SPP industry is not very developed, 
but it contains rather small manufacturing companies (IEA, 2016, p. 56). 
A NMS scheme was implemented (Dusonchet and Telaretti, 2010) which 
was meant to support Denmark’s ambitious goal announced in 2011 a 
commitment to produce energy only from renewable sources by 2050 
(Ratinen and Lund, 2015) and because of the global decrease in SPP price, 
the diffusion largely increased the following year, in 2012 (Pyrgou et al., 
2016). The incredible growth was fed by the NMS for private households 
and institutions and the decreasing cost of the technology. For this reason, 
the scheme was eventually considered unacceptable by the government 
and was revised in November 2012 which brought the growth back to its 
initial pace (IEA, 2013c). 
1.5.6.2 Finland 
Similar to Norway, also in Finland the share of solar power is extremely 
low (Saikku et al., 2017) with only 0.3% share in RES in 2016, whereas the 
other technologies are much more developed: hydropower with 46%, 
bioenergy with 31% and wind with 23% (Figure 1.6), also highlighted by 
the RD&D investments especially in bioenergy (Figure A1. 3). The plan for 
Finland is to eliminate production of energy from carbon sources and to 
cut greenhouse emissions by 95% by 2050. No national plan for the 
introduction of SPP is in act, but the SPP technology is considered 
attractive for self-consumption purposes whereas joint procurements might 
just lower the barriers to SPP adoption and overcome the absence of 
government support (Saikku et al., 2017). 
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1.5.6.3 Portugal 
Also in Portugal, the 49% share of hydropower is followed by the 42% 
share in wind whereas bioenergy and solar count only respectively for 
4.6% and 3.6% (Figure 1.6) despite high proportion of RD&D investments 
precisely in solar and bioenergy (Figure A1. 3). However, in Portugal are 
active highly automated factories of SPP module productions (IEA, 2016, p. 
91). 
Similar to Canada, also in Portugal we remark a two-year peak in the 
growth rate primarily caused by the application of the FIT scheme 
introduced in 2005 but revised in 2007 for a more complete coverage of all 
types of RES capacities [29] The FIT scheme continued, but the tariffs had 
been lowered over time and limitation to the installed capacity has been 
imposed (Dusonchet and Telaretti, 2010).  
1.5.6.4 Spain 
Spain is among the European countries with the highest number of hours 
of sunshine [30] which makes the SPP technology a strategic source to 
increase energy autonomy and, thus, gain independency from foreign 
suppliers. In Spain the energy context stabilised in the past few years and 
the RES market is divided in wind (45%), hydropower (39%), solar (14%) 
and bioenergy (2%) (Figure 1.6).  Also in this case, as in Portugal, the 
RD&D was mostly directed to solar and bioenergy technologies and only in 
the last two decades also to wind (Figure A1. 3). The Spanish SPP industry 
registers some successful manufacturing companies at international level, 
but in general it suffers for the low domestic demand (IEA, 2016, p. 98).  
Similar to Denmark, also in Spain the high FIT tariff induced high growth 
rates but with the arrival of the 2008 crisis the government encountered 
difficulties in supporting the large demand and cut the subsidies which 
caused the collapse of the SPP market (Dusonchet and Telaretti, 2010; 
Movilla et al., 2013). However, the country’s high irradiation and the 
decrease in SPP price makes the technology an opportunity especially at 
industrial levels which increases the probability for a second deployment 
of the market. 
1.5.6.5 Sweden 
Although it follows a general decreasing trend, the hydropower remains 
the main RES with a 59% share. Lately, the wind power (23%) surpassed 
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the bioenergy (17.5%) while solar, although increasing is still at extremely 
low levels (0.5%) (Figure 1.6). Despite continuous and substantial RD&D in 
bioenergy (Figure A1. 3), the share in total RES installed capacity remained 
quite constant over time.  
Similar to Switzerland, a carbon tax has been adopted to indirectly support 
RES technologies (Dusonchet and Telaretti, 2010) and green certificates 
were distributed in collaboration with Norwegian government. Because of 
the subsequent decline in SPP price, in 2014 the subsidy was lowered 
between 20 and 30%. Starting from 2016, an additional capital subsidy was 
introduced for self-consumption. Moreover, 80% of the population 
considers SPP a viable technology which deserves more attention (IEA, 
2016, p. 99). 
 
1.6 Discussion and future work 
Our synthesis emphasizes that the success of the RES market, and 
especially of SPP technologies, is highly connected with each country’s 
vision of the future. Only a few countries have developed a long-term 
energy framework and consistently managed their short-medium term 
energy policies. In general, countries with oil and gas reserves developed a 
market for the RES, and specifically of SPP, generally later or have low 
levels of installed capacity compared with the domestic electricity 
consumption. The evidence was found by studying the cases of: Mexico 
which is an oil exporter; Israel which has gas reserves, although the 
amount is insufficient to cover the domestic demand reason for which 
foreign oil is required to fill the gap; Norway and Canada which apart 
from the rich and diverse fossil fuel reserves they also possess great 
hydropower; Australia, USA, UK, the Netherlands which faced significant 
reductions in domestic production over the years show significant 
increases in SPP in recent years. Moreover, our findings are also in line 
with the study of Michaels and Tal, (2015) which indicates that Israeli 
politicians continue to support fossil fuel, especially after the discovery of 
large natural gas reserves in 2009 which led to the defunding of the 
national climate change engagement plan. Consequently, in Israel the 
adoption rate returned to the pre-incentives levels in the past few years. On 
the contrary, the presence of large coal reserves (Figure A1. 1) seems 
instead not to have delayed the SPP diffusion in some countries. In fact, 
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still nowadays we observe large coal exploitations in Australia, Germany, 
USA, China and India, the top countries in terms of installed capacity.  
On the other hand, some countries not disposing of such reserves invested 
as an alternative option in nuclear power as happened in Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and UK, especially 
after the two oil shocks from the 1970s. However, following the Chernobyl 
catastrophic accident and, further on, the Fukushima disaster, many 
countries decided to eliminate nuclear either from their future energy 
perspective (Italy, Austria) or to eventually phase out their already active 
nuclear plants (Switzerland, Germany). Other countries, such as Austria, 
Finland, Canada, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, also had the 
advantage of abundant hydropower, although in many cases insufficient to 
cover the generally increasing energy consumption. 
With the acknowledgement of the global warming threats, many countries 
aligned their efforts in finding a common solution and prepared long-term 
strategic plans to change their energetic portfolio into an environmentally 
sustainable one. The latest reduction in SPP module price drove various 
countries to insert the SPP technology among their energy portfolio 
solutions (Kumar Sahu, 2015). 
Nevertheless, in its initial stages the SPP technology was far from 
competitive with respect to the already well-integrated “dirty” 
technologies and needed a substantial support to become appealing to 
consumers and investors. Kumar Sahu, (2015) describes the evolution of 
the SPP installations in the top 10 SPP countries in terms of electricity 
production and emphasises that the success of the market is highly 
dependent not only on each country’s policy schemes, but also on the 
involvement of manufacturing companies. In addition, Yang and Zou 
(2016) indicates the necessity of cooperation between all the members of 
the SPP chain, from manufacturer to government to consumer, in order to 
overcome  he barriers to adoption. This is in line with the study of Lang et 
al., (2015) which indicates that regional interventions by themselves are not 
sufficient to influence SPP performance as occurred also in the case of 
Netherlands. Moreover, the policies should be technology-specific rather 
than opened to all types of RES and should include market conditions and 
technology stage (Polzin et al., 2015) on the diffusion curve.  
Likewise, when designing a policy, the political dimension should be taken 
into consideration in order to guarantee continuous support as indicated 
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by Stokes (2013) in referring to  Ontario, Canada. Public opinion can also 
have a great influence of the political dimension. In the Italian case 
however, the government kept investing a lot of money in RD&D for 
nuclear technologies which were widely not accepted by the public opinion 
and formally rejected with two referendums in 1987 and 2011. 
Avril et al. (2012) criticise the policy schemes in Japan, Germany, USA, 
France and Italy and recommend a policy scheme based on R&D in a first 
phase followed by a second phase of FIT or other demand-pull policies and 
the prolongation of R&D support even if at a lower level. Additionally, 
evaluating the case of Korea, Jeon et al. (2015) indicates an optimized 
subsidy by increasing the RD&D funding while reducing the financial 
subsidy. Moreover, among the policies studied in the literature, the most 
effective were discovered to be FIT, RPS and investment subsidies 
(Radomes and Arango, 2015; Solangi et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2013).  
Since the SPP market is very dynamic due to many unpredictable factors 
that might influence the SPP cost of adoption, a revision of policies once, 
twice or four times a year were clearly not sufficient to adjust the policies 
to the global SPP price reduction. A possible solution for a successful 
policy might be the creation of individual customised policies which 
should take into account the real price of the initial investment paid by 
each individual and the actual material and maintenance costs, instead of 
an estimated price based on past dynamics. This solution allows better 
government control over the continuous market changes and could avoid 
excessive SPP demand stimulated by high profitability caused by the gap 
between a sudden decrease in price and the slow adjustments in FIT tariff 
as it occurred during the Chinese overproduction. 
If on one hand the SPP technology has been found to be profitable in some 
locations even without subsidies (Lang et al., 2015), on the other hand it 
still encounters barriers such as  high priced and complex technology’s 
perception by adopters, inadequate policies and inappropriate 
management, especially in the rural areas (Karakaya and Sriwannawit, 
2015). Conversely, in other regions low “dirty” electricity prices are still 
obstructing the take-off of the SPP market (Lang et al., 2015).  
Another issue is highlighted in Vasseur and Kemp (2015). They show that 
adopters consider the SPP an affordable technology while the non-adopters 
consider it non-affordable probably because the adopters perceive more 
benefits than the non-adopters. Technology awareness and energy cost 
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saving impact significantly the probability to adopt an SPP which indicates 
the necessity of additional spread of information regarding investment 
criteria, policies and environmental attributes, but also of a scheme to 
speed up the imitative process (Islam, 2014). Orioli and Di Gangi (2017) 
also show that the DPB is lower nowadays than it was during the FIT 
scheme in Italy, but despite the economic advantage individuals’ negative 
perception might prevents the deployment of the market in absence of 
strong incentives. 
The research encountered some limitations due to incomplete RD&D data 
and the absence of data for China, India, Israel and Mexico. It would have 
been interesting to analyse China and India from this point of view because 
nowadays they are among the leaders of SPP adopters and producers. 
Also, in Israel the most popular RES technology is SPP and Mexico is 
planning the construction of mega solar farms. Data regarding imports 
from nuclear power was also not available. Moreover, Taiwan became the 
second producer of SPP technology in the World which makes it an 
interesting case to analyse, although only limited data is available.  
A noteworthy analysis might be the investigation of the imitative 
behaviour of some countries compared to the leading position of others. In 
the case of the SPP market some imitative countries (e.g. China and India) 
seized the opportunity of the increasing international demand and 
eventually surpassed the leading countries in terms of industry (e.g. 
Germany and Japan). 
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Chapter 2. State incentive and the 
global adoption of solar photovoltaic 
panels: perspectives based on 
diffusion models  
 
                  Abstract 
Background. The fast worldwide spread of renewable energies is a major 
critical action among the international response towards mitigation of global 
threats such as global warming and climate change. So far however, the 
diffusion of solar photovoltaic panels is stalling in many countries due to a 
number of diverse factors despite the support of public incentive. 
Objectives and main research questions. The main goal of this paper is to 
improve the general understanding of the main determinants of diffusion of 
solar photovoltaic panels worldwide, with special focus on the role played so 
far by public incentives, and of the resulting perspectives for the future 
evolution. 
Methods and data. By upgrading previous research relying upon data up to 
2006, i.e. before the main public interventions were undertaken in most 
countries, we applied the generalized Bass model to an extended dataset on 
adoptions of solar panels (26 countries between 1992-2016) in order to 
characterize the temporal profile of the major domestic shocks in SPP markets, 
mostly occurred after 2007, focusing on the role of public interventions in 
influencing scale and shape of SPP adoption curves. A review of the energy 
policy measures undertaken in the different countries was used to assist the 
interpretation of the results. 
Results. (i) The SPP market started everywhere without the assistance of 
effective public media support, so that its initial phase was sustained by word-
of-mouth communication only, (ii) the pace of word-of-mouth was however 
plainly insufficient to ensure the achievement of any target of market 
development within the time frame indicated by international agreements, (iii) 
most SPP market growth occurred by massive positive shocks which took place 
between 2007 and 2016, possibly following incentive measures in the various 
countries, iv) inspection of the parameter estimates describing the temporal 
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pattern of the shocks revealed a lack of temporal persistence of the effects of 
incentive as well as a sharp trade-off between intensity and persistence of the 
actions.   
Concluding remarks. A target of public policy in countries where the SPP 
lifecycle is still in its initial phase should certainly be that of supporting the 
market by adequate media communication. More in general, the SPP market 
appears as a frail and complicate one where public intervention represented a 
necessary resource to allow the market full take-off but, at the same time, 
showed little temporal persistency, thereby failing in going beyond their direct 
short-term effect and in providing a sustained momentum to the market. The 
temporal trend of the market, dominated by consecutive incentive-forced 
waves followed by negligible post-incentive adoptions until the next shock 
indicates that national incentive policies were in some cases badly designed, 
suggesting - by a simple game-theoretic argument - the emergence of a 
deleterious role of expectation where no-one will adopt in an incentive-free 
period because waiting for (and forcing, thanks to their non-adoption 
behaviour) the next incentive wave.  
 
Keywords: global diffusion of solar photovoltaic panels, state incentive, 
generalized Bass model, perspectives on adoptions of renewable energies. 
JEL: O33, C22, Q55 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The fast worldwide spread of renewable energies, including solar 
photovoltaic panels (SPP), wind energy, biomasses, etc, is a critical step in 
the international agenda aiming at mitigating the impact of global 
warming and global climate change (Kyoto Protocol 1997; Paris Agreement 
2015; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Bonn2017). With 
hindsight it is difficult to deny that renewable energies currently represent 
a growing reality whose rate of diffusion has been able to outperform that 
of all other energy technologies ever appeared on earth (Armaroli and 
Balzani, 2010; ITRPV, 2018) despite many obstacles, including the attempts 
to debunking global climate change from official science and policy 
(McCright and Dunlap, 2011, 2003; Oreskes, 2007). 
Though the recent pace of growth of renewable energies might appear a 
great success, it is pairwise difficult to deny that the pathway towards their 
generalized use is still difficult to achieve. In the case of SPP, from the 
viewpoint of households these obstacles are intrinsic to the nature of SPP 
adoption as a long-term investment which is still perceived as 
unsustainably costly in view of high initial installation costs (Masini and 
Frankl, 2003; Palmer et al., 2015; Yamaguchi et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2011); 
information costs and technical difficulties associated with management 
and maintenance (Vasseur and Kemp, 2015); constraint on financial 
resources (Palmer et al., 2015; Robinson et al., 2013); long payback period 
(Dharshing, 2017; Islam, 2014; Robinson et al., 2013), and finally, 
uncertainty about the future policies that governments would be following 
(Reddy and Painuly, 2004; Vasseur and Kemp, 2011) and uncertainty about 
future technological developments (Karneyeva and Wüstenhagen, 2017; 
Ruby, 2014). 
Public incentives therefore represent the primary instrument to moderate 
these costs and to stimulate the domestic demand. Public incentives may 
help the SPP market - which is the only renewable energy technology 
currently available to households – competing successfully against the 
«dirty» alternatives, which are less costly but not environmentally friendly 
(Avril et al., 2012; Chowdhury et al., 2014; Ratinen and Lund, 2015; Zhang 
et al., 2011). Additionally, public intervention can move in a number of 
further directions. For instance, an infant SPP industry willing to enter a 
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market which is already dominated by an incumbent foreign producer who 
is enjoying lower average costs thanks to the large market share it serves, 
would have a hard time being successful, given the high unitary cost due 
to the limited scale of its production – rather than by its inefficiency. Public 
incentives might help removing this obstacle. The supply side can also be 
favoured by improving the quality of the technology, for given costs, 
which, if allowing to charge higher selling prices, would increase 
profitability. Other important roles of public policies that have not been 
stressed enough in the literature are the need to provide a viable source of 
energy for countries with a low endowment of fossil fuels (oil and/or gas, 
in particular), especially when their market prices increase (Lee and Huh, 
2017), and to acquire a technology leadership, as it is appears in all 
evidence for China which has become the major worldwide producer of 
solar modules since 2007 (IEA, 2016, p. 53). 
The previous reasons have led many countries to introduce incentive 
measures, most of which are customer oriented (National Energy Reports, 
IEA), supporting the SPP market and allowing it to take off (IEA 
International Energy Agency, 2018; ITRPV, 2018).  
The scale and pace of diffusion, however, are still too low (Karneyeva and 
Wüstenhagen, 2017) (despite the almost continuing decrease of prices 
(ITRPV, 2018)), compared to what would be necessary to respond 
effectively to the current societal challenges. In turn, this raises doubts as to 
the true obstacles discouraging the growth of the domestic demand, but 
also as to the role played by incentives and by the way they are assigned, 
that might have made the SPP market totally dependent on them and 
therefore being unable to develop any autonomous self-sustained diffusion 
pathway.  
In the management sciences, the use of diffusion models to study the 
temporal shape of adoption patterns of new durables and technologies was 
fuelled by the celebrated Bass model (Bass, 1969). The success of the Bass 
model was due to two main reasons. The first one lies in its clear causal 
mechanism, identified in the social communication forces, namely public 
and media communication on the one hand, and imitation, or word-of-
mouth, following spontaneous communication between agents (Bass et al., 
1994; Mahajan et al., 1995; Mahajan and Muller, 1998). The second one lies 
in its ability to parsimoniously describe observed adoption trajectories, by 
using only social communication parameters (Bass et al., 1994; Mahajan et 
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al., 1995; Mahajan and Muller, 1998). The basic Bass model (BM for brevity) 
was later generalized (Bass et al., 1994) to include the effects of marketing 
decision variables such as prize and advertising, represented through 
external time -dependent perturbations of diffusion parameters. However, 
the main strength of this Generalized Bass Model (GBM), as emphasized in 
a number of contributions by Guseo and co-workers (Guidolin and Guseo, 
2016, 2014; Guseo et al., 2007; Guseo and Guidolin, 2009), possibly lies in its 
ability to incorporate in a parsimonious and manageable form external 
shocks forcing diffusion trajectories out of their natural pathway induced 
by communication forces including, among other, the effects of state 
interventions. 
The main objective of this paper is to use diffusion models to improve our 
understanding of the main determinants of the diffusion of SPP 
worldwide, and to offer perspectives on the future development of the 
market and the possible role of public policy. Accordingly, we applied the 
generalized Bass model (GBM) to an extended dataset on SPP adoptions 
including the 26 countries which mostly contributed to worldwide SPP 
diffusion between 1992-2016), with special focus on the characterization of 
(i) the mutual role played by the communication drivers, namely the media 
and word of mouth, vs that of public incentives in influencing scale and 
shape of SPP adoption curves, (ii) the temporal pattern of the major shocks 
in SPP markets, which mostly occurred after 2007.  
This work draws much inspiration from, and upgrades, previous work by 
Guidolin and Mortarino (2010) who first used the GBM to describe the 
effects of public incentive in a multi-country study focusing on the eleven 
countries which mostly contributed to SPP worldwide adoptions till 2007. 
However, as IEA data clearly show (IEA International Energy Agency, 
2018), it has been in the last decade following their work that the world 
SPP market definitely took-off, showing more than 95% of the total SPP 
capacity installed so far worldwide, with unprecedented growth even in 
those countries, as Germany and Japan, which already experienced a large 
adoption history. This dramatic acceleration possibly stemmed from major 
policy efforts aimed to sustain the domestic SPP demand since 2007. Using 
the GBM to upgrade the previous work by Guidolin and Mortarino (2010), 
who considered an epoch where shocks in SPP data were taking place on a 
much smaller scale, will enable us to supply an updated assessment of the 
current perspectives of SPP markets, particularly of the impact of incentive 
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policies, of their ability to persist over time and, finally, of their ability to 
bring final momentum to the market. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
methodology and the dataset. The main general results of the application 
of the GBM are reported in section 3.  A more detailed discussion where 
the results for each single country are discussed in the light of the 
underlying national energy framework and policies, as discussed in the 
first chapter of this thesis, is reported in section 4. Concluding remarks 
follow. Further details and results are reported in the appendix. 
 
2.2 Methods and data 
2.2.1 Data 
Yearly data over the period 1992-2016 on cumulative installed SPP capacity 
(in MegaWatt) in the 26 countries considered were gathered from 
published international sources (IEA, IRENA). The installation data cover 
the eleven countries included in the analyses in Guidolin and Mortarino 
(2010) (Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the US) and fifteen additional countries 
(Belgium, China, Denmark, Finland, Israel, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and Turkey) overall 
representing 96.5% of the total worldwide capacity installed up to 
December 2016. Various published sources on national policy targets 
(reported in Appendix) were used to define scenarios for the market size 
for each country considered, as detailed in the next sub-section. 
 
2.2.2  The Bass model for innovation diffusion 
The original Bass model (Bass, 1969) describes an irreversible diffusion 
process where an item (a durable goods, a new technology, a new idea, etc) 
spreads in a fixed population of potential adopters of size m as a 
consequence of the action of the main communications channels. These are 
distinguished into (i) the “internal” channel, following the spontaneous 
communication between individuals as a consequence of their daily social 
“encounters” (be they real or virtual), also termed as word-of-mouth, and 
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(ii) the “external” channel, following the continued individual’s intrinsic 
propensity to adopt from the publicly available information by the media, 
the public system, etc. The model is described by the following differential 
equation in the absolute cumulative number of adopters at time t, Y(t): 
𝑌′(𝑡) = (α +
q
m
Y(t)) (m − Y(t)) (1) 
where α>0 and q>0 represent the innovation coefficient and the imitation 
coefficient respectively, and m is the market potential, representing the 
saturation level of the cumulative curve. In particular, q tunes the intensity 
of the agents’ tendency to adopt following pressures arising spontaneously 
in the social structure i.e., in the absence of media communication or state 
incentive. The prime derivative of the cumulative function S(t)=Y’(t) 
represents the instantaneous adoption rate i.e., the absolute incidence of 
new adoptions per unit of time. Letting F=Y/m to denote the relative 
cumulative adoption curve, the corresponding hazard rate of adoption is 
given by:  
𝜆(𝑡) =
𝐹′(𝑡)
1 − F(t)
= α + qF(t) (2) 
Equation (1) has the “natural” initial condition Y(0)=0, corresponding to the 
situation where no initial adopters exist at the moment where public 
communication starts. The resulting solution of (1) is  
Y(t) = m 
1 − e−(α+q)t
1 +
q
α e
−(α+q)t
 (3) 
Equation (3) depicts a monotonically increasing S-shaped curve for 𝑞 > 𝛼 
and a concave one in the opposite case. In particular in the basic Bass 
model the growth rate 𝑟(𝑡) = 𝑌′(𝑡)/𝑌(𝑡) is monotonically decreasing. In 
particular, for α = 0 the Bass model simplifies into a pure imitation, or 
internal, model. In this case the relative growth rate   𝑟(𝑡) is essentially 
constant in the initial stages of the market, mirroring an underlying 
exponential growth of cumulative adoptions. On the other hand, for q=0, 
the Bass model simplifies into a model driven by media communication 
only, that we also term a purely external model. 
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2.2.3 The “generalized” Bass and internal models 
The GBM extends the basic Bass model by including a general 
multiplicative, time-dependent, component h(t) in the hazard rate, yielding 
to the equation: 
𝑌′(𝑡) = ℎ(𝑡) (α +
q
m
Y(t)) (m − Y(t)) (4) 
To cope with the fact that all diffusion processes typically become known 
only when some individuals have adopted, it is convenient to express the 
general solution of (4) for an arbitrary initial condition Y(0)=Y0, obtaining 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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0
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 (5) 
The initial condition can be taken as a further parameter to be estimated. In 
[GuidolinMortarino2010] a different but equivalent representation was 
used to incorporate a time span, having length d, between the true 
initialisation of the process (for Y=0) and the first positive observed datum 
on adoptions. For practical purposes it is convenient to represent function 
ℎ(𝑡) in the form of additive perturbation i.e., as ℎ(𝑡) = 1 + 𝑔(𝑡) Guidolin 
and Mortarino (2010), where we term function g the “shock” function. For 
g=0 at all times the GBM reduces to the basic Bass model, while the case 
𝑔(𝑡) ≥ 0 (𝑔(𝑡) ≤ 0) over a given time interval describes a positive 
(negative) shock. For negative shocks it is necessary to add the condition 
that the time average of 𝑔(𝑡) must always exceed (-1) to preserve the non-
decreasing character of the cumulative function. Note that for 𝛼 = 0 the 
GBM collapses into the generalised internal model (GIM). The GIM is of 
interest here because it will prove to be the appropriate model for SPP data 
in the countries considered. In particular, the relative rate of growth of the 
GIM model is given by: 
𝑟(𝑡) =
𝑌′(𝑡)
Y(𝑡)
= ℎ(𝑡)q (1 −
𝑌(𝑡)
m
) (6) 
Equation (6) tells that the relative rate of growth is the product of the word-
of-mouth coefficient (q) times the shock function times the “surviving” 
fraction i.e., the fraction that has not yet adopted. For a shock restricted 
over a time interval the pre-shock and post-shock dynamics will 
approximately obey an internal model purely driven by word-of-mouth, 
whose relative growth rate is given by 𝑟(𝑡) = q(1 − 𝑌(𝑡)/𝑚) i.e., it is 
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proportional to the “surviving” fraction multiplied by the word-of-mouth 
coefficient. Therefore, the presence of a persistent (over time) difference 
between the actually observed growth rate and the theoretical growth rate 
which is expected to prevail at that stage of the market, can be taken as a 
crude indicator of the presence of a shock.  
 
2.2.4 The shock function and its parametrization 
For empirical analyses function 𝑔 can be specified by appropriate 
parametric forms depending on a vector of parameters 𝜗 which can be 
estimated jointly with (α, q, m). In Guidolin and Mortarino (2010) both the 
constant shock function (form 1, F1) 
𝑔(𝑡) = 𝐴 ∙ 𝐼{𝑎,𝑏}(𝑡),      𝜗 = (𝐴, 𝑎, 𝑏)   0 < 𝑎 < 𝑏, 𝐴 ∈ 𝑅 (7) 
and the exponential shock function (form 2, F2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , 0 , ,
c t a
a
g t A e I t a A R c R
− −

=      (8) 
were considered, where ( )( )tI ba ,  represents the indicator function of 
interval (a,b). Form F1 mirrors a shock uniformly affecting communication 
parameters (α,q) during a certain interval of time, while F2 describes a 
shock which initiates abruptly and subsequently decays, or inflates, 
exponentially over time. Another convenient form is the following (F3): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 0, 0,
c t a
a
g t A t a e I t a c A R
− −

=  −     (9) 
Form F3 is convenient for shocks (both positive and negative) which 
emerge gradually, rather than abruptly as F2, before being re-absorbed 
with an exponential-like pattern. This mirrors the realistic fact that an 
incentive policy will hardly result in a sudden change in adoption 
parameters, instead it will take time for a number of reasons e.g., for the 
policy to be communicated to the public and subsequently to “materialise” 
the intention to adopt following awareness of incentive into the actual 
decision. 
Forms 1,2,3 represent single shock phenomena but can be readily extended 
to consider generalized shocks functions  𝑔𝑖  over different time ranges 𝐼𝑖  
by considering e.g., 𝑔(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑔𝑖(𝑡)𝐼𝑖(𝑡)𝑖 , where each 𝑔𝑖(𝑡) term represents a 
single shock (Guseo et al., 2007). 
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As noted in Guidolin and Mortarino (2010) the GBM is valuable to provide 
diagnostics of external interventions and to summarize their temporal 
characteristics such as e.g., effectiveness, time persistency, etc. 
 
2.2.5 Parameter estimation, criteria for inclusion of shocks and 
goodness of fit. 
The vector of model unknown parameters β=(𝛼, 𝑞, 𝑚, 𝜗) was estimated 
from available data by nonlinear least squares (NLS) by considering the 
standard nonlinear regression model (Guidolin and Mortarino, 2010; Seber 
and Wild, 1989): 
( ) ( )0, , ( )z t Y t Y t = +  (10) 
where the observed response z(t) is the sum of the deterministic 
component, represented by the GBM cumulative curve (equation (5)) 
evaluated at time t, and the error term ε(t) which is taken as a standard 
white noise error (Seber and Wild, 1989). The white noise hypothesis is of 
course a simplifying one, but we maintained it for sake of simplicity as it 
was also used in Guidolin and Mortarino (2010). 
Computation of estimates was carried out by using Excel solver for a 
“quick and dirty” exploration and nls function of software R for improving 
the results. The market potential (m) was estimated only for some countries 
namely those which showed clear symptoms of slowing down in the 
adoption path, which is necessary to avoid biased estimates (Van den Bulte 
and Lilien, 1997). In the other cases we preferred to consider a minimum 
and a maximum scenario with fixed m. In the minimum scenario we set m to 
the nearest short-term target established for SPP by the underlying state 
Energy Authorities, while in the maximum scenario m was set ad-hoc based 
on available information on long-term energy scenarios, such as EU and 
National Baselines. 
Compared to the data used by Guidolin and Mortarino (2010) over 1992-
2006, when SPP adoption was in most countries still in its early stage, our 
extended data show a number of further “candidate” shocks during 2007-
2016 characterized by a much larger magnitude than those observed before 
2006 (see the Results section). The inclusion of shock terms in the GBM was 
based on the following stepwise procedure : (i) visual inspection of the 
data, (ii) preliminary fit of a basic Bass model and examination of 
regression residuals (over its various «dimensions», primarily the 
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cumulative curve, the annual curve, and the rate of growth of the 
cumulative); (iii) stepwise inclusion of shocks, to maintain parsimony, by 
accepting the next shock based on the incremental values of the squared 
multiple partial correlation coefficient, as in Guidolin and Mortarino 
(2010). Due to the need to include a number of shocks during the period 
2007-2016, and therefore facing a rapidly increasing number of parameters 
to be estimated, we preferred - with a few exceptions (notably Germany 
and Japan) - not to include further shocks in the first stages of SPP lifecycle 
(<2006). This was motivated by the fact that in many countries data on 
growth rates of early cumulative installations indicated a coarsely constant 
trend suggesting the presence of an adoption pattern dominated by word-
of-mouth. And even in those countries showing larger changes in the 
growth rate of cumulative adoptions, thus suggesting the possibility of 
shocks, these changes were not able to substantially perturb the baseline 
constant trend. Said otherwise, we preferred to interpret these deviations 
as a consequence of the large volatility (or other undetectable phenomena 
such as the presence of heterogeneity) which typically characterize early 
growth rates of diffusion curves rather than the consequence of well-
established perturbations. We are aware that this might lead to slightly 
overestimating the true imitation rate. Pairwise, we did not include shocks 
occurring in the last two years of the data window given that all parametric 
forms considered (F1, F2, F3) always include three parameters. This is the 
case for Norway and Thailand. For these countries we only commented the 
estimates of parameters of earlier shocks. 
To measure the improvements during the stepwise procedure from the current 
model (i-1) to the next one (i) the squared multiple partial correlation 
coefficient (SMPCC) was used (Guidolin and Mortarino, 2010; Guseo and 
Guidolin, 2009): 
?̃?𝑖−1,𝑖
2 =  
𝑅𝑖
2 − 𝑅𝑖−1
2  
1 − 𝑅𝑖−1
2  (11) 
where 𝑅𝑖
2 represents the determination index of model i [Seber1989]. The 
measure (11) captures the relative reduction of residual deviance achieved 
through the fitting of the next GBM (Guidolin and Mortarino, 2010). As a 
rule, a model is considered to better explain the SPP trend if ?̃?𝑖−1,𝑖
2  is larger 
than an appropriate threshold (here we set this threshold to 0.5), and the 
number of shocks included in the best model is determined by the stepwise 
inspection of the SMPCC. This rule needs however being used with care 
because the patterns of increment in the SMPCC are not simple. For 
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example, in the presence of two apparent shocks the inclusion of just one 
shock term would only slightly increase the SMPCC because the model 
would detect the best single shock interpolating the two observed shocks, 
so that the relevant improvement in the SMPCC would only occur once 
one correctly includes both shocks into the model. 
 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 General overview 
A summary overview of the known story of SPP diffusion in terms of 
shape and scale of cumulative SPP adoptions (Y) based on data from the 
countries contributing most to the world SPP diffusion up to 2016 is 
reported in the next figures. The scale is represented in two different 
“metrics” namely, as installed MW of SPP per unit population (Figure 2.1), 
and as a share of the total electricity consumption in each country (Error! 
Reference source not found.). Both panels show marked heterogeneities in 
both take-off dates and stages of the SPP lifecycles. Note that among 
Figure 2.1  SPP cumulative Installed Capacity (MW) per 100,000 inhabitants 
2001-2016 in the main countries considered. Own calculation using SPP data 
on Installed Capacity (source: IEA) and Population (source: UN) 
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producers of fossil fuels only Australia, China and the US have reached a 
significant diffusion scale so far. A major point stemming from Figure 2.1 is 
that the three countries that so far represented the world leader in SPP 
adoptions (Germany, Italy and Belgium) are currently showing evidence of 
saturation, partly due to the achievement of short term national targets but 
possibly symptomatic of the exhaustion of the propulsive role of state 
incentive. 
 
2.3.2 GIM fit to country-level data: the minimum scenario 
Here we report summary graphical results of GIM fit to SPP adoption data 
focusing on the “minimum” scenario. We discuss this case in full detail 
because for most countries such minimum scenario corresponded to a well-
defined short-term policy target. At the national level these targets are 
available for most countries considered (see Table A2- 2 in Appendix) and 
only in a few cases the minimum level had to be assumed based on the 
underlying energy framework. Results on the maximum scenario and on 
Figure 2.2 SPP cumulative Installed Capacity as share (%) of total electric 
power consumption 2002-2014 in the main countries considered. Own 
calculation using SPP data on Installed Capacity (source: IEA), Energy use & 
Electric Power Consumption (source: World Bank). 
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the case where the market potential was fitted are presented more briefly 
later by only stressing the main resulting differences. Numerical details on 
best parameter estimates and levels of the goodness-of-fit measure are 
reported in Appendix (see Table A2- 4).  
 
 
Figure 2.3 The GIM fit in the 26 countries considered: observed vs predicted 
annual SPP adoptions during 1992-2016. The fit is carried out based on the 
market potential assigned by the minimum scenario. The legend in each graph 
specifies the type of shock functions selected during model fit e.g., F3+F3 (as in the 
case of Australia) means that the first shock occurred in the data belonged to 
form F3 while the second one belonged to form F3. 
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The best GIM fits to annual data in all countries considered is reported in 
Figure 2.3. Figure 2.4 reports the corresponding fit to the (log-transformed, 
%) growth rates of cumulative adoption. Figure 2.7 shows the same fitted 
curve expanded with the resulting optimal forecast up to 2030. Finally, 
Figure 2.8 reports the fit to cumulative adoption data and future market 
evolution up to saturation under both the minimum and maximum 
scenario. The legend in each graph specifies the type of shock functions (in 
a temporal order) that were selected during model fit. For example, in the 
case of Australia, “F3+F3” means that both the first and the second shock 
occurred in the adoption trend, visually initiated around 2007 and 2012, 
belonged to form F3. 
For ease of exposition we split the results of this sub-section into a number 
of further sections.  
2.3.2.1 Fit by the basic Bass model and the innovation coefficient 
The basic Bass model (equation (1)) resulted always inadequate to 
reproduce the complicate temporal trends of SPP adoptions, as was clear 
both graphically and from the values of the multiple partial correlation 
coefficients ?̃?𝑖−1,𝑖
2 , with the partial exceptions of Turkey and Sweden where 
no evident external shocks were detectable in the graphs and had to be 
identified by the goodness of fit measure. Nonetheless, the fit by the basic 
Bass model supplied useful information fully confirmed by subsequent 
GBM fits, first of all that the external component of adoption resulted 
negligible (α/q <10-4) in all countries, a fact already noted in Guidolin and 
Mortarino (2010). This was confirmed also by subsequent GBM fits, 
actually implying that a generalised internal model (GIM) was fully 
adequate for the data considered. In substantive terms this result suggests 
that the SPP market was initiated without a pre-existing significant support 
from media or public communication sources, thereby implying that the 
effort of initial diffusion was entirely sustained by word-of-mouth 
communication only.  
2.3.2.2 GIM fit: structure of shocks and of adoption patterns 
throughout the different countries 
The combination of internal communication with public incentive in the 
GIM allowed to satisfactorily reproduce the temporal trends of both annual 
adoption data (Figure 2.3) as well as of the annual growth rates in all 
countries (Figure 2.4). As for the number and types of shocks, in four 
64 
 
countries (Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, and Malaysia) a single shock was 
sufficient to achieve an adequate reproduction of the data, in other five 
countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Portugal, and Thailand) three shocks 
were necessary, while in the remaining countries the data were adequately 
fitted by two shock functions.  
 
 
Figure 2.4 The GIM fit in the 26 countries considered: observed vs predicted 
annual (%) growth rates on adoptions of SPP during 1992-2016 (log scale) 
under the minimum scenario on the market potential. The legend in each 
graph specifies the number and type of shock functions selected by model fit. 
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The selected shock functions resulted essentially always positive and 
mostly belonging to forms F2 or F3, with the exception of Belgium and 
Japan, where an F1-shock was detected. No evidence of positive increasing 
shocks was detected for the period 2006-2016 (they were detected in some 
countries in Guidolin and Mortarino (2010) for the epoch pre-2006), as 
intuitively confirmed by inspection of the data. In the case of Belgium and 
Germany evidence of a negative shock initiated in the last epoch in the data 
(Figure 2.7) was found. Though short lasting, these negative shocks caused 
the predicted growth rate of adoptions to temporary fall below the level 
which was expected to occur at the given stage of the lifecycle (given the 
level of the market potential).  
In more substantive terms, the major fitted shocks were associated, in most 
countries, to large adoption waves which initiated with a surprising 
synchrony around 2007, irrespective of the scale achieved at that time. 
These adoption waves occurred after a fairly long epoch where the pattern 
was characterised by oscillations around an essentially constant relative 
growth rate, as is typical of a pure word-of-mouth market in the initial 
phase of its lifecycle. These facts are apparent from annual adoptions 
(Figure 2.3) and especially from the dramatic post-2007 increase in growth 
rates (Figure 2.4) compared to the roughly constant trend prevailing almost 
everywhere prior to 2007. Exceptions to this pattern are (refer to the growth 
rates in Figure 2.4) Germany and Japan on the one hand, which were first 
in setting up robust incentive programs to SPP well before the 2000, later 
followed by Italy, Spain and Korea, and the two “delayers” Turkey and 
Mexico, which the major shock phase initiated a few years later, around 
2010.  
The reason for this synchronous take-off possibly lies in a plurality of 
factors. This certainly includes the documented expansion in the public 
support to SPP, which is discussed in the subsequent section 4. 
Nonetheless it is important to pinpoint the complicate framework within 
which this public support was initiated. For example, in many cases these 
measures were established quite lately under the cogent pressure of the 
deadlines set for 2008 by the Kyoto protocol targets in terms of abatement 
of emissions of greenhouse gases (UNFCCC). This suggests that the public 
intervention was partly carried out to fulfil, by a short-term action, 
standing international commitments, in the absence of a well-established 
long-term plan. It should also be mentioned the dramatic blow-up of the oil 
price (with a 5-fold increase between 2000 and 2007, figure in the 
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appendix), that possibly forced a number of further countries to invest in 
the SPP technology by imitating those countries such as e.g., Germany, that 
acted as true innovators in this field. Specific situations were also affected 
by merely local circumstances, such as the dramatic increase in the Japan 
SPP adoption rate in 2013, the year following Fukushima disaster.  
Some countries (Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Israel, Korea, Portugal, 
Spain and Thailand) clearly showed multiple waves in their annual 
adoption curve after 2007 (Figure 2.3). As also suggested above, there 
possibly is a plurality of underlying factors (see the Table on incentive 
measures reported in the appendix). These included (i) a lack of 
coordination in incentive programs between different districts of the same 
country, as happened in Australia, (ii) a massive sudden adoptions by 
public utilities, as was the case for Denmark, where the secondary peak is 
mostly due to the installation of a single large public solar park), (iii) public 
communication announcing a future reduction in the incentive benefit, 
causing a “run-to-adopt”, as documented for France, (iv) lack of 
coordination and discontinuity in the incentive communication causing 
even in the short term a temporary lack of ability to sustain the adoption 
flow, as has been the case for Italy, where the availability of funding, 
though renewed every new year, was always surrounded by large 
uncertainty (Palmer et al., 2015), and possibly also of the Netherlands 
(Vasseur and Kemp, 2011). 
As for the more recent years the patterns are more articulated. Focusing in 
particular on the early adopting countries included in the work of Guidolin 
and Mortarino (2010), there is a clear decline in the propelling role of 
incentive. This is apparent not only in absolute terms (Figure 2.3) but also 
in relative ones Figure 2.4). In particular, only the US were able to keep a 
growth rate persistently larger than in the pre-2007 period (Figure 2.4), as 
mirrored in an annual adoption curve still fast increasing at 2016 (though it 
should be remembered that the US started relatively late with a rather 
small adoption scale still at 2010). In a number of countries namely, 
Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Japan and the UK, growth rates have 
all returned by 2016 to their pre-2007 levels and show clear evidence of a 
potentially declining trend, with annual adoptions in sharp decline. For 
Germany we already mentioned above the evidence of a negative shock in 
the last phase. Finally, in Spain and Italy the flow of annual adoptions as 
well as the growth rate of the cumulative adoptions fell to negligible levels 
indicating a rapid stall in the adoption process. This stall did not require 
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the inclusion of a negative shock because for both these countries the 
minimum policy target was low enough to allow the post -2007 incentive 
phase to essentially achieve the minimum target providing at the same 
time an excellent fit to the data despite the almost annihilation of 
adoptions. Notwithstanding the goodness of fit, the dramatic fall of 
adoptions in both countries is clearly a worrying phenomenon calling for 
explanations.  We conjecture that, at least in the Italian case, the expectation 
argument cited in the Introduction might have played a key role in 
explaining these phenomena. This effect might be amplified in presence of 
governments’ policies principally aiming at short-term results because 
missing a long-term perspective. A simple game-theoretic formalization of 
the expectation argument is reported in the Appendix. 
As regards more recent adopters i.e., the countries not included in Guidolin 
and Mortarino (2010), it is important to recall that these countries either 
show lower adoption scales (in some cases negligible, as for Norway and 
Finland) because are still in an initial stage of the lifecycle, or are currently 
far more distant from their minimum target (or have set quite “low” 
minimum targets). Nonetheless Turkey, Mexico, Sweden and to a lesser 
extent China, India, Thailand and Korea, are showing by the end of the 
data window in 2016 growth rates that are still larger than in the pre-2007 
period, and no clear evidence of a declining trend, suggesting, overall, a 
more persistent action of intervention compared to early adopters. Instead, 
the other countries with a non-negligible adoption scale (Portugal and 
Denmark among Europeans, and Malaysia) showed little persistence and 
rapid re-alignment to the pre-shock regime. 
2.3.2.3 GIM fit: estimates of the imitation coefficient 
In a GIM with well identified shocks occurring only after the initial phase, 
the estimate of the imitation coefficient q is approximately represented by 
the height of the initial portion of the predicted growth rates (Figure 2.4). 
Our estimates are in good agreement with previous results in Guidolin and 
Mortarino (2010) despite some differences in the computations. Substantial 
inter-country variation - up to an order of magnitude – was observed in q 
estimates (Figure 2.5), ranging from 5% per year in Norway and 6%/y in 
Italy up to a maximum of 47%/y in Belgium. This variation will in turn 
imply a wide variation in the time that would be necessary to saturate the 
market potential m when imitation is the only driving force of adoption. 
For example, the time t_(m,99) necessary to achieve the 99 percentile of the 
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minimum target ranged between 18 years for Belgium and 145 years for 
Italy. As showed in the right panel of Figure 2.5 most countries would 
require at least 40 years to saturate the minimum target under imitation 
only.  
 
Given that the true q values are likely to be over-estimated in many 
countries, because they likely embed the effects of interventions that 
occurred prior to the initiation of the life cycle or during its very early 
phases, which we deliberately ignored, the t_m values are consequently 
under-estimated. This result overall suggests that in SPP markets natural 
communication forces are not effective compared to the time scales which 
are required to respond to the global threats. This provides per se a strong 
motivation for the need for public incentive to SPP markets. Which might 
be the socio- economic and cultural factors underlying these wide 
differences in the imitation rates is currently unclear and an objective of 
future research might be to investigate e.g., by regression models, which 
are the best predictors of the values of the imitation rate across the different 
countries. However, considering that the q values found here come from a 
subset of the richest countries worldwide, also characterised by the largest 
endowments in social capital, it is straightforward to conjecture that 
perspectives might likely worsen in countries departing from less optimal 
conditions. 
Figure 2.5 The GIM fit in the 26 countries considered. Distribution of the 
estimates of the imitation rate q and of the time T_(m,99) which is required to 
reach the 99th percentile of the minimum target in the absence of incentive. 
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2.3.2.4 GIM fit: Relation between intensity and persistence of 
incentive 
A merit of GBM and GIM is that of supplying valuable summary 
information about the effects of shocks on adoption trajectories, through 
the estimates of the characteristic parameters of the shock functions. Unlike 
Guidolin and Mortarino (2010) who found a richer combination of forms of 
the shocks, including negative shocks as well as positive increasing ones, 
we found a good degree of homogeneity of the structural characteristic of 
the large shocks occurred during 2006-2016 i.e., essentially all shocks 
resulted to be positive and not persistent, most of which belonging to 
forms F3 or F2. This allowed us to meaningfully compare the features of 
the shocks in the countries considered by comparing their key 
characteristics namely, the shock intensity, vs its time persistence.  In order 
to investigate the relationship between the key parameters we made a 
number of standardizing hypotheses: 1) we homogenized the type of 
Figure 2.6 The GIM fit in the 26 countries considered. Scatterplot of the best 
estimates of the parameters (A,1/c) (reported in log-scale) of the F3-form shock 
functions that best fitted the data. The black line (=2y) represents the threshold 
of two years persistence of incentives, whereas the y-axe is the threshold of 
one-year persistence. 
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incentive adopted using form F3 only (the only drawback is a slight lack of 
fit when replacing other types of shocks), taking the estimate of parameter 
A as a measure of intensity, and the estimate of parameter (1/c) as a 
measure of time persistence; 2) for countries showing evidence of well-
spaced incentive waves (Germany, Japan, Korea– documenting well 
separated incentive actions) we considered estimates from both incentives; 
3) for countries showing very close adoption waves (e.g. the new wave 
arising just one year after the end of the previous one, suggesting an issue 
of lack of coordination in the policy rather than genuine different policy 
actions), we re-fitted a single shock model just in order to provide a feeling 
of the overall duration of the incentive period; 4) we deliberately 
disregarded incentives arising in the last year because this prevents to 
estimate the parameters of the involved shock component. Figure 2.6 
reports the scatterplot relating persistence (horizontal axis) and intensity 
(vertical axis), showing a marked inverse relationship and therefore a 
trade-off between intensity and persistence. Also notable is the dramatic 
lack of persistence of shocks, whose average duration almost never 
exceeded two years. In fact, in twelve countries the average duration is 
under one year, in nine countries is between one and two years, whereas 
only in few cases the persistence exceeds two years, e.g. Switzerland, 
Canada, Sweden, Japan (second shock), the UK and US.  
2.3.2.5 GIM fit: predicted future adoptions and time to the 
minimum target 
Figure 2.7 reports the forecasted annual adoptions until 2030 based on the 
optimal estimates under the minimum scenario on the assumption that no 
further incentives are provided so that the subsequent dynamics are driven 
by word-of-mouth only. Besides Spain and Italy, whose level reached in 
2016 was very close to the minimum scenario, and therefore just require a 
very few adoptions per year to achieve the target, most other countries 
show a more interesting dynamics. In particular Germany, Belgium, France 
and Korea will have a further local peak in adoptions around 2020-2025 
which is driven by pure word-of-mouth dynamics, before reaching the 
target. On average the countries in the sample reach their targets in 2040, 
twenty years later than the established target (Figure 2.8 and Table A2- 7). 
The countries struggling to achieve their politically established targets are 
Italy, Mexico, France and Israel. Conversely, Belgium, China, Germany and 
Japan will reach their determined targets by 2026.  
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2.3.3 GIM fit to country-level data: fitting the market potential.  
In this subsection we report results of the full fit of the model including 
also the market potential among the parameters to be estimated. Based on 
the warning reported in section 2 about the difficulties in identifying the 
market potential of Bass-type models without sufficient data, we only fitted 
the model on a subset of countries whose adoption curve showed clear 
symptoms of slow-down (i.e., approaching or overtaking a well-defined 
maximum point).  
Thus, for these countries we estimated the optimal saturation level (Figure 
2.7). The findings show that both Italy and Spain are in 2016 very close to 
the market potential which in the case of Italy (21GW) is smaller than the 
political target of 24GW to be reached by 2020, whereas political parties in 
Spain do not sustain the SPP market (Gabaldón-Estevan et al., 2018) and 
consequently did not established a target despite the great irradiation 
potential of the country. On the other hand, Germany and Japan seems to 
overpass the political target respectively of 51.7GW up to 58GW and 53GW 
to 62.5GW of installed capacity. 
For countries such as France, Israel, Switzerland and the UK we observe 
that the estimated market potential is close to the minimum target (either 
slightly above or below). Moreover, Canada and Korea show evidence of 
market in mature stages since the optimal market saturation is estimated 
far under the minimum target. In fact, in Canada the drop in adoptions 
registered in the last period leads the model to estimate a saturation level 
close to the last estimated observation (3GW) whereas the political target 
was set at 6GW, twice higher. Instead, Korea has a general target, such as 
to reach 11% electricity from RES, thus assuming a minimum target of 
20GW. On the contrary, the Netherlands although have set a target three 
times the installed capacity by 2016 (2GW vs 6GW), the market potential is 
estimated to exceed 15GW. 
In other words, Canada, Italy, Korea, Spain and to a minor extent France, 
need further incentives in order to boost SPP adoptions. Without further 
incentives the target most likely will not be reached. In contrast, Germany, 
Japan, the Netherlands, the UK and Israel developed an SPP market in line 
with their targets, thus well sustained by the current incentives. 
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However, among all eleven considered countries, significant 
improvements in the SMPCC are found for Canada, France, the 
Netherlands and Korea, the countries with higher differences between 
market potential estimates and minimum target.  
 
Figure 2.7 The GIM fit in the 26 countries considered: observed vs optimal 
forecasted annual SPP adoptions curves until 2030. The fit is carried out based 
on the market potential assigned by the minimum scenario. The legend in each 
graph specifies the number and type of shock functions selected during model 
fit. The predicted adoption curve is smoother than in Figure 2.3 because it has 
been drawn with a more accurate resolution (in Figure 2.3 we only reported 
observed vs predicted annual figures). 
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2.3.4 GIM fit to country-level data: the maximum scenario. 
This scenario differs from the minimum scenario simply because the 
market potential is kept fixed and set to a higher level based, whenever 
possible, on long-term energy planning in the various countries. This 
scenario does not produce substantial changes in terms of estimates of key 
parameters and therefore we only briefly comment about the time lapse 
necessary for the market to reach this target given the current conditions, 
as shown in Figure 2.8 and Table A2- 7.  
The choice of the market saturation level for the maximum scenario (Table 
A2- 2) is mainly chosen as three times the minimum scenario but it is also 
based on the energy framework, the total electricity consumption, the 
availability of different energy sources and the main political believes in 
each country. In fact, for some countries with insignificant targets but with 
high potential due to large levels of solar irradiance, such as Portugal and 
Malaysia, the maximum scenario was selected up to 18 times the 
minimum. 
The parameter estimates are not necessarily the same as in the minimum 
scenario. What happens is that: a) q is always estimated effectively from 
the early exponential phase and its estimate is stable, b) the vector ϑ of 
shock parameters – which is estimated from the temporal profiles of shocks 
– is estimated in a stable manner only if the shock has been fully observed 
that is it disappeared before the of the observed period. In the opposite for 
shocks that were just appeared at the end of the data period the estimate of 
shock pars can be unstable.  
Therefore, the additional information from the maximum scenario mainly 
regards the time necessary to saturation given the stage of the market at the 
end of the observed period, the level of the imitation rate, and on whether 
the last shock was still ongoing or not. For low values of the imitation rate 
additional incentives are required to reach the higher level of market 
saturation. On average, the maximum target will be reached by 2055, with 
an additional 14 years compared to the minimum scenario. The models 
estimated for the maximum scenario are mainly worse than the minimum 
scenario (Table A2- 6). Exception is the case of Netherlands where the 
maximum scenario performs better and is to be reached by 2031. This is in 
line with the fact that the optimal market potential has been estimated as 
almost three times the minimum target as highlighted in the previous 
section.  
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Figure 2.8 The GIM fit in the 26 countries considered: observed vs predicted 
SPP cumulative adoption data and subsequent evolution of the best-fit curves 
up to market saturation to the fixed potential level m under both the minimum 
(orange line) and maximum (purple line) scenarios (see Table A2- 7 for more 
details). 
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2.4 Individual countries discussion 
In this section we discuss our analyses presented in section three by 
crossing our findings on the main determinants of SPP diffusion, with the 
available information on the corresponding main incentives actions 
adopted in each country considered as reported in Table Y in the 
Appendix. Incentives summary. We will also refer to Table A2- 4 for the 
parameter estimates and in Figure 2.3. This discussion principally relies on 
the findings from the minimum scenario analyses (section 3.2) and follows 
the classification adopted in Chapter 1, where we clustered the countries 
considered based on the underlying energy framework and on the 
availability of different types of energy sources in each country. We include 
Thailand and Malaysia in the first group because these countries mainly 
produce electricity from domestic fossil fuel reserves. 
 
2.4.1  Countries with energy mainly provided by domestic fossil 
fuel  
The first group consists of countries with large fossil fuel reserves and 
hydropower as main RES (Australia, China, India, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Thailand and USA). In 2016 all countries registered less than 2% share of 
electricity produced from SPP, except for China with a 5.5% share. 
However, all the countries, apart from Mexico, have production related 
incentive policies (FIT or similar). In particular, China and India have 
ambitious targets, i.e. over 11% of the electricity output produced from SPP 
in the medium-term (Table A2- 2). 
Australia implemented from 2008 both local- and state-level FIT schemes 
for residential systems, which gradually covered the entire country by 
2010. The resulting best-model showed a below average imitation 
coefficient (q = 16% [a]5) and 2-shocks (F3+F3), both short-lasting (1/c1, 1/c2 
≈ 1.03), with a stronger effect in the first wave (A1 = 18, A2 = 2.4). The 
presence of the second shock is likely due to the delayed implementation of 
fit amongst different geographic areas (the issue we termed “lack of policy 
coordination” in the previous section). The minimum target, planned to be 
reached by 2020, is predicted by the model to be reached by 2040 only 
suggesting the need for further interventions.   
                                                          
5 [a] = Results in line with G&M (2010)’s findings. 
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In China in 2010 were in act both FIT and investment subsidies schemes 
through the implementation of the “Solar Photovoltaic building project” 
and the “Golden Sun project”. Later, in 2015, the Chinese government 
approved the Five Year Plan which outlines targets, strategies and policy 
mechanisms to support the SPP adoption. The best model showed an 
above average imitation effect (q = 28%) and 2 shocks (F3+F3), one 
persistent for more than one year (A1=7.6, 1/c1 = 1.33) followed by another 
persistent for almost two years and a half (A2=3.2, 1/c2 = 2.44). As pointed 
out in Chapter 1, the efforts of China to increase SPP domestic adoption 
were also a consequence of the over-production and the anti-dumping 
restrictions that affected SPP exports. Additionally, they established a 
162GW target to be reached by 2020. Our findings show that China is the 
only country that will achieve the target in time.  
Another ambitious country is India which aims at installing 175GW of RES 
by 2022, eventually reaching 100GW from solar energy of which 40GW 
from rooftop SPP (Goel, 2016; Kar et al., 2016). To do so, India focused on 
the construction of 25 huge solar parks (Kar et al., 2016) and offered 
production related incentives within the “Smart cities” project which 
supports the installation of RE up to 10% of total electricity production in 
selected cities. In India we estimated 2 short-lasting shocks (F3+F3) with a 
stronger effect in the first one (A1=27, 1/c1 = 0.8; A2=4, 1/c2 = 1.12) and a 
coefficient of imitation (q = 25%) similar to China. Our results point out the 
in absence of further incentives the Indian target will be reached in 2040. 
The sample includes also countries with simple SPP adoption trends, with 
only one positive shock in the period after 2006. Malaysia is among these 
countries with a high word-of-mouth impact on the SPP trend (q = 31%) 
and with a four-month period of intense shock (A1=43, 1/c1 = 0.34) in 2012, 
after the implementation of a FIT scheme through the Renewable Energy 
Act 2011. 
In Mexico the SPP installed capacity is still at very low levels. Only 
recently, due to the decrease in oil production and increase in energy 
consumption, Mexico showed interest in investing in RES (Mundo-
Hernández et al., 2014). The SPP pattern estimate consists of two similar 
shock waves (F2+F2), both lasting around two years (A1=7.8, 1/c1 = 2.6; 
A2=8.5, 1/c2 = 1.85). The starting point of the first shock is in 2013 after the 
introduction of the General Law of Climate Change based on an RPS 
strategy, whereas the second shock from 2016 reflects the introduction of 
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the Clean Energy Certificates. These efforts confirm the Mexican 
Government willingness to make fundamental changes to the current fossil 
fuel dependent energy framework. In fact, the Mexican government plans 
to add 5.4GW by 2020. However, our findings show that Mexico is among 
the countries that mostly struggle to reach their target. Without strong 
incentives which should to contrast the low imitation effect (q = 10%), the 
achievement is estimated for 2076.  
Thailand adopted the FIT scheme in 2007, revised twice in 2009 and in 
2013. The scheme was focusing especially on rooftop and community 
ground-mounted systems. In Thailand we find a 3-shock model (F3+F3+F3) 
with a low word-of-mouth impact (q = 11%), but with two short-lasting 
very intense incentives (A1=163, 1/c1 = 0.5; A2=182, 1/c2 = 0.24). 
Furthermore, the recent Alternative Energy Development Plan (AEDP 
2015-2036) expands the RES target up to almost 20GW by 2036. 
The USA has no national plan, however, there are several incentives at 
local or state level. For example, states such as California, Hawaii and 
Michigan, have in act production related policies, sometimes combined 
with investment subsidies and/or RPS. The latter policy was present in 29 
states as in 2016, whereas 38 states implemented NMS. The USA is a 
particular case, with a 2-shocks (F3+F2) and a medium imitation effect (q = 
19% [a]). Here we estimated the longest persistence of the sample for the 
first shock, lasting almost four years at low intensity (A1=1.6, 1/c1 = 3.85) 
from 2010. The political targets in US are established at state level and not 
at national level.  
 
2.4.2  Countries with energy mainly provided by domestic and 
imported fossil fuel 
The second group includes countries with a medium dependency on 
foreign fossil fuel (Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Turkey, UK), and a 
share of electricity production from SPP ranging from 1.6% (for Turkey) to 
11% (for Germany) in 2016. Nevertheless, all the countries are making 
efforts to reduce the dependency from foreign fossil fuel through the 
implementation of FIT policies and the pursuit of ambitious targets.  
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Germany is one of the SPP market pioneers, which put in act the FIT 
scheme for the first time back in 2000 called the EEG Program6. In 2004 it 
followed a revision which increased the value of FIT up to 0.57EUR/kWh. 
Another revision of the tariff took place in 2009. We estimated in Germany 
two well-separated shocks. Indeed, the first wave of incentives occurred 
long before 20057 [a]. For the best model we estimated 3-shocks (F2+F2+F3). 
The first is a very short-lasting positive shock with high intensity (A1 =8.2, 
1/c1 = 0.3) starting in 2004, followed by a second long-lasting positive shock 
of a smaller intensity (A2 =0.95, 1/c2 = 3.3) from 2009. These suggests that 
the 2009 FIT scheme changes increased the policy efficiency.  The third is a 
negative two-year lasting shock (A3 = -1.07, 1/c3 = 2.1) from 2012, after the 
FIT reduction.  After the disappearance of the negative shock arisen in 
2012, Germany will experience a further adoption wave, sustained by the 
recovery of the growth rate to its normal “imitation” speed (q = 40% [a]). 
However, this negative shock increased the time needed to reach the 
51.7GW target set for 2020 by 5 years. 
The lack of coordination seems to be also a problem in Israel which faced a 
highly intense one-year shock (F2) (A1=42, 1/c1 = 0.94), followed by a 
second (F2) less intense but more persistent one (A2=5.4, 1/c2 = 1.6). The 
peak in the SPP growth was reached in 2009 thanks to the implementation 
of FIT in 2008. The value of FIT was of 0.197NIS/kWh and decreased 
considerably over time but the growth continued to be sustained by the 
introduction in 2013 of NMS directed to all RES up to 5MW (IEA, 2016, p. 
67). In the past few years the adoption rate returned to the low pre-
incentive levels (q = 13%) probably because policymakers continued to 
support fossil fuel, especially after the discovery of large natural gas 
reserves in 2009. This also led to the defunding of the national climate 
change engagement plan (Michaels and Tal, 2015). At this pace Israel will 
reach the 10% energy from SPP, programmed for 2020, only in 2056. 
Conversely, in the Netherlands we observe a significant imitation effect (q 
= 33%). (Guidolin and Mortarino, 2010) detected a large positive shock and 
concluded that the SPP market had by then largely overtaken its peak and 
                                                          
6 The EEG (Renewable Energy Sources Act) Program is a FIT scheme implemented 
in 2000 which caused an initial “peak” highlighted in Guidolin and Mortarino (2010) 
but omitted in our research due to the low level of adoptions in the first stages. 
7 A detailed framework of the incentive schemes is described in Chowdhury et al. 
(2014) 
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was very close to saturation. The analysis of the extended dataset showed 
further shocks starting from a large negative shock over 2004-2008, 
documenting that the fall in the growth rate diagnosed by Guidolin and 
Mortarino (2010) as symptom of saturation was instead the aforementioned 
large negative shock probably caused by lack of coordination and limited 
success of some demonstration projects. Thus, we focused on the second, 
most significant, shock which is just over one-year lasting with average 
intensity (A1=4.8, 1/c1 = 1.1). The shock appears around 2011 when a 
significant amount of money was made available for the national FIT 
scheme (Stimulering Duurzame Energie +). 
Turkey put in act the FIT scheme in December 2010 with a tariff of 
0.133$/kWh for household for 10 years and 0.08-0.12EUR/kWh for industry 
(Dinçer, 2011). The resulting best model shows a high imitation effect 
(q=30%) and only one year and five months shock with a high intensity 
(A1=8.8, 1/c1 = 1.4). Although we estimate a delay in the achievement of the 
2023 target of 5GW solar energy, i.e by 2031, recent efforts increased 
considerably the SPP cumulative installed capacity up to 3.4GW in 
December 2017.  
For the case of UK, we estimated a 2-shock model (F3+F3) with a high 
imitation effect (q = 31% A1=33, 1/c1 = 0.57; A2=23, 1/c2 = 0.41). The public 
incentives that mostly impacted the SPP diffusion are the FIT scheme and 
the ROC. The FIT scheme was implemented in April 2010 leading to the 
sharp growth rate increase in 2011 up to 120 times higher than the previous 
year. The reduction in tariff the following year discouraged especially 
project developers of large solar installations who faced financial barriers 
due to the high cost of the system (Balcombe et al., 2014, 2013; Dusonchet 
and Telaretti, 2015). The ROC, addressed only to systems larger than 50kW, 
shows effects in the following years as we will highlight in detail in the 
next chapter. The UK established a target of 20GW by 2020. Our results 
show a delay in achieving the target until 2029 in absence of other 
incentives. 
 
2.4.3  Countries with energy mainly provided by imported fossil 
fuel 
The third group consists of countries strongly dependent on foreign fossil 
fuel for the energy production (Italy, Japan, Korea), but also with 
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significant investments in SPP. For example, Italy ranks second among the 
countries considered in terms of share in total electricity produced from 
SPP in 2016 (9%), whereas Japan is a pioneer in the SPP adoption.  
The structure of the Italian adoption trend is analogous to the Mexican one, 
including the low word-of-mouth impact (q = 10%). Italy has two very 
similar shock waves, both lasting nearly one year with strong intensity 
(A1=70.93, 1/c1 = 1.03; A2=53.4, 1/c2 = 0.9). The imitation effect among the 
lowest in the sample (q = 6% [a]) highlights the need of incentives. In fact, 
the technology had its true deployment in the years after 2005 with the 
introduction of the FIT scheme “Conto Energia”. The fluctuations are even 
more consistent with the five phases of the scheme at monthly level and 
highlight that almost all of the installations benefitted from public support 
(Palmer et al., 2015). As the FIT ended in 2013 the diffusion returned to 
extremely low levels of growth rate sustained only by small programs such 
as net billing systems, electricity sales and later by the income tax 
deduction. In these conditions, the 24GW target set for 2020 will be 
achieved only in 2066. 
Similar to Germany, also Japan follows a 2-shock model to estimate well-
separated shocks (F1+F3) with a medium effect of word-of-mouth (q=23%8). 
The constant shock is extended over a period of five years during the 
investment subsidy program Residential SPP Monitor Program which 
minimized some financial constraints for small systems. The second 
incentive wave lasts two years and a half (A2=3.18, 1/c2 = 2.44) and started 
in 2012 with the replacement of the RPS by the FIT scheme when it became 
mandatory for the electric companies to acquire renewable energy at a 
fixed price for a certain amount of time. The forecast indicates a decreasing 
trend of adoptions until the reach of the 99th percentile of the minimum 
target after around 2023. 
In the case of Korea, the 100,000 roof-top program allowed the installation 
of 2452 systems of an average capacity of 2.47kW with a 70% initial cost 
reduction, while the FIT scheme was applied until the achievement of a 
100MW cumulative installed capacity. The resulting best model estimated 
two short-lasting shocks (F3+F3) (A1 = 48.6, 1/c1 = 0.66 = 8 months, A2 = 5.2, 
1/c2 = 1.28), with a high intensity in the first shock, and a below average 
                                                          
8 Whereas Guidolin and Mortarino (2010) estimated a model with parametric origin 
with a double value for the coefficient of imitation. 
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“imitation” effect (q = 16%). The second incentive results from substitution 
of FIT scheme for RPS (Chen et al., 2014). Although the FIT scheme had a 
higher impact on the growth rate, its effect was only temporary, whereas 
the RPS seems to have influenced more significantly the diffusion of RES in 
Korea along with the international increase in oil prices (Lee and Huh, 
2017). Korea has no specific target for the SPP technology, but it is 
preparing a substantial plan to increase its energy produced by RES. 
However, without further proper incentives 5% of its electricity produced 
from SPP (mainly 20GW) is to be will be achieved only after 2050. 
 
2.4.4  Countries with energy mainly provided by nuclear power 
The countries which produce electricity mostly from nuclear power are 
France (80% of total electricity from nuclear) and Belgium (50%). Unlike 
France, Belgium increased significantly the production from RES in the last 
decade with shares of electricity production from SPP respectively equal to 
2.1% and 6.5%. 
In Belgium, the SPP regulation is different across regions. The first shock 
corresponds to the green certificate adoption in the Flemish region, which 
is a combination between a FIT scheme and RPS (Jäger-Waldau, 2007). 
Local incentives include premium amounts for investment costs and tax 
deduction (Huijben et al., 2016).  Since 2012 there has been a reduction in 
support in all three regions induced by the decline in SPP price and the 
financial constraints of public services. The case of Belgium presents a 
mixture of shocks comparable to both Germany and Japan, thus a 3-shock 
model (F1+F3+F3) with the highest imitation effect in the sample (q = 47%). 
The findings show an initial constant shock which lasted 3 years and 5 
months, followed by a short-lasting gradually increasing shock (1/c1 = 0.24) 
with strong intensity (A1 = 21.3) and a two-year-lasting negative shock 
(A3= -1.12, 1/c3 = 2.12) in the last period of the adoption trend. 
Furthermore, similar to Germany, also Belgium will experience a further 
adoption wave, sustained by the recovery of the growth rate to its normal 
“imitation” speed. Despite the high impact of word-of-mouth, the negative 
shock delays the 2020 target achievement of 5GW by six years (2026). 
The French SPP market started growing significantly from 2006 when a 
new FIT and income tax credit were implemented, along with various 
support from local authorities (Guidolin and Mortarino, 2010; Solangi et al., 
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2011). Because of the fear of abusive practices, the French government 
announced the revision of FIT for 2010 which boosted demand and 
resulted in the SPP growth rate peak in 2010. After the reduction in 
incentives since September 2010 a limit to annual installed capacity was set 
at 500MW (Jacobs, 2012) and slowed market growth. In France (F3+F3+F3) 
the parameters increase progressively from more to less persistence and 
from weak to strong intensity (A1=14.2, 1/c1 = 1.18; A2=55.34, 1/c2 = 0.46; 
A3=106, 1/c3 = 0.1; q = 16%). Recent target established by the Decree of 24th 
April 2016 and set to 18.2 GW by the end of 2023, (Duan et al., 2014), is 
estimated to be achieved only by 2048.  
2.4.5  Countries with energy mainly provided by RES  
The fifth group includes countries with energy mainly produced from 
hydropower (Austria, Canada, Norway, Switzerland), hence less 
stimulated to massively adopt other types of RES. The SPP share in 
electricity in 2016 is negligible for Norway, small for Canada (1.3%) and 
Austria (2.6%), whilst in Switzerland we observe a higher share (3.9%). 
A 2-shock model was estimated for Austria (F3+F3) with an above average 
imitation effect (q = 26% [a]). The first shock presents a high persistency 
(1/c1 = 1.58) starting from 2009 and a low intensity (A1 = 2.2), 
corresponding to the implementation of the FIT scheme in February 2009, 
revised in 2010 and 2012. The second shock persists only for one month 
(1/c2 = 0.1) in 2013 with a remarkably high intensity (A2 = 272). The last FIT 
revision as well as investment subsidies for small SPP systems in 2013 
might have influenced the SPP trend. The SPP target in Austria was of only 
1.25GW which was almost exceeded in 2016. However, the new assumed 
target of 2GW will be reached only in 2032.  
In Canada, at the country level the government does not directly invest in 
solar power but supports the interested provinces in doing so (Moosavian 
et al., 2013). In fact, approximately 98% of the SPP installed capacity is 
concentrated in Ontario [26]. Here the FIT scheme offered a very high 
payment for the electricity production, of 0.802 CAD/kWh in 2009 [27] 
which explains the registered peak. On one hand, the scheme attracted 
many local consumers but, on the other hand, it faced political oppositions. 
(Stokes, 2013). The resulting best model has a two-year-lasting of medium 
intensity first shock (F2) (A1=9.7, 1/c1 = 2.04), whilst the second shock (F3) 
is short-lasting and of high intensity (A2=162, 1/c2 = 0.12). The coefficient of 
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imitation is at medium levels (q=19% [a]). Nevertheless, the 6GW target 
establishes din 2012 for 2020 is to be achieved only after 2040. 
The low SPP adoptions in Norway are caused both by low levels of 
imitation effect (q = 0.5%) and lack of significant incentives. Only in the last 
few years the presence of Green Certificates increases adoptions, producing 
a positive shock at the end of the period. 
Various important policies help the deployment of SPP in Switzerland. 
First, the Government set in 2007 a target of 20% reduction in fossil fuel 
consumption by 2020. Second, in 2008 a CO2 tax on stationary fuels was 
introduced and further increased in 2010 and 2016. Third, a FIT scheme 
was adopted in 2008 (Weibel, 2011), regularly revised over time until it 
phased out in 2014 when a direct subsidy for small installations up to 
30kW was launched. Finally, allowing self-consumption draws numerous 
commercial installations (Karneyeva and Wüstenhagen, 2017). In 
Switzerland only one shock was needed (q = 15%, A1=5.5, 1/c1 = 2). The are 
no political targets regarding the SPP diffusion in Switzerland and only 4% 
of the total electricity was produced from SPP in 2016.  
 
2.4.6  Countries with mixed portfolios  
For countries without a prevailing energy source (Denmark, Finland, 
Portugal, Sweden, Spain) the SPP installed capacity in 2016 is minor with 
SPP shares in total electricity below 3.4%.  
In Denmark was put into act a NMS scheme (Dusonchet and Telaretti, 
2010) meant to support Denmark ambitious goal announced in 2011, i.e. to 
produce energy only from renewable sources by 2050 (Ratinen and Lund, 
2015). This policy along with the global decrease in SPP price led to the 
extraordinary SPP diffusion in 2012 (Pyrgou et al., 2016). Consequently, the 
government considered the scheme unacceptable and revised it in 
November 2012, slowing the growth in the following year. The resulting 
best model (F3+F3) estimated two very short-lasting shocks (1/c1, 1/c2 ≈ 0.3) 
with an extremely high intensity for the first shock (A1=840, A2=53). The 
second shock corresponds to the opening of the WIRSOL solar park, the 
largest in north Europe with 61.5MW equal to one third of the installed 
capacity in 2015. Although the previous target of 200MW for 2016 was 
achieved in advance, Denmark has a low word-of-mouth impact (q = 8%) 
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reason for which it will struggle to reach even only 2GW (equivalent to less 
than 8% share in electricity consumption), estimated after 2070.  
Like Norway, also Finland has few SPP adoptions caused by low levels of 
imitation effect (q = 13%) and lack of significant incentives. In fact, SPP was 
excluded from the FIT scheme implemented in 2010 which caused a 
negative constant shock, with no adoptions from 2012 to 2014. Only 
recently, Finland implemented investment subsidies and tax credit for SPP.  
The FIT scheme implemented in Portugal in 2005 and revised in 2007 [29], 
continued for years, but it was not constantly effective due to reduction of 
tariffs over time (i.e. Decree 284/2011, Portarias 430/2012 and 431/2012). 
This limited the SPP installed capacity (Dusonchet and Telaretti, 2010). In 
the best model (F2+F3+F3) we estimated one-month-period of highly 
intense incentive (A2=154, 1/c2 = 0.1) between two shocks more persistent, 
yet with weaker intensities (A1=15, 1/c1 = 0.7; A3=11, 1/c3 = 0.5). Despite the 
extremely low target (670MW equivalent to only 1.2% of total electricity 
output), without further incentives Portugal is not going to achieve it 
before 2029.  
In Sweden no specific target was set for SPP, but a general target of 63% 
share of electricity demand generated by RES is sustained by the 
acquisition of Green Certificates, capital subsidies and the introduction of a 
carbon tax (Dusonchet and Telaretti, 2010). A capital subsidy of 60% of the 
SPP costs was introduced in 2009 and later lowered between 20% and 30%, 
due to the decline in SPP price. Starting from 2016, an additional capital 
subsidy was introduced for self-consumption. The imitation effect is 
relatively small (q = 15%) and we observe an above average persistence, 
but a lower intensity (A1=3.4, 1/c1 = 2.6).   
In Spain, the implementation of a high FIT value (Royal Decree 661/2007) 
resulted in a demand spike, which was unexpected by the Spanish 
government. With the 2008 crisis, the government faced difficulties in 
supporting the large demand and it eventually reduced the subsidies, 
causing the collapse of the SPP market (Dusonchet and Telaretti, 2010; 
Movilla et al., 2013). Spain presents an extremely intense first shock (F3) 
which persisted for less than two months (A1=2122, 1/c1 = 0.125, q=16%). 
After the significant revision of the FIT value (Royal Decree-Law 14/2010), 
there is a second smaller shock (F3) (A2=7, 1/c2 = 0.96). Spain is one of the 
countries estimated to be close to saturation (m=5500) in absence of further 
incentives.  
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2.5 Discussion and concluding remarks 
In the present chapter we have applied the generalised Bass model to an 
extended dataset on installed SPP capacity in the 26 countries that mostly 
contributed to SPP worldwide adoptions between 1992 and 2016 with the 
goal to offer perspectives on the future evolution of the market based on an 
improved understanding of the main determinants of diffusion. In other 
words, this work attempted at disentangling the contributions to SPP 
adoptions due to the main drivers of diffusion processes, namely the 
mediatic vs word-of-mouth communication vs external perturbing factors, 
including the incentivating actions from the public system. In particular, 
the analysis paid special attention on the major shocks occurred over the 
decade 2007-2016, during which the installed SPP capacity worldwide 
experienced an unprecedented growth, possibly stemming from a period of 
major policy effort aimed to sustain the domestic SPP demand. 
This work has drawn much inspiration from a previously published work 
by Guidolin and Mortarino (2010), who applied the GBM to describe and 
forecast SPP adoptions in the eleven countries that represented the major 
SPP adopters worldwide up to 2006. In that paper, besides characterising 
the rich nature of the shocks occurred in the various national SPP markets, 
it was found, among other things, that some SPP markets, for example 
Japan, the Netherlands and the UK, had already entered their maturity 
phase. This conclusion, which was perfectly correct based on the adopted 
model structure, was soon denied by reality, which already since 2007 
showed a dramatic growth in SPP adoptions in all countries considered, 
possibly corresponding to large effective incentive schemes introduced 
quite synchronously in most countries. We therefore believed that this, far 
from representing a forecasting failure of the Bass model, was instead 
evidence of the complexity prevailing in the SPP market, which deserved 
an upgrade of their work with the purpose to add further insight and 
understanding of the main determinants, and possible barriers, to SPP 
adoptions. 
Our principal findings in this chapter were the following. First, in all 
countries considered the media communication proved to have no relevant 
effect in “pushing” the SPP market, suggesting that this technology started 
its lifecycle without the support of public media. This finding, that 
confirms on our extended dataset a previous result by Guidolin and 
Mortarino (2010), consequently implied that the growth of SPP markets 
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was completely sustained by word-of-mouth communication only. 
However, the magnitude of word-of-mouth communication proved to be 
generally small that is, resulted in most countries insufficient to ensure the 
achievement of any target of market development within the time frame 
indicated by international protocols and agreements. The previous two 
findings show that the communication forces acting on the SSP market are 
weak or insufficient, thereby calling for the need for external interventions. 
Further, most of the growth in the market adoption curves has occurred 
everywhere in the form of massive positive shocks which took place 
initiated in a synchronous manner in 2007, possibly following incentive 
measures in the various states. Nonetheless, inspection of the parameter 
estimates describing the temporal pattern of the shocks showed, as a rule, a 
lack of temporal persistence of the effects of incentive, as well as a sharp 
trade-off between intensity and persistence of the actions that is to say, the 
more intense actions were also those lasting short.   
From the individual country discussion, we generally observed that mainly 
the production related policies, present in 20 out of 26 analysed countries 
either in FIT or NMS form, impacted the most on SPP diffusion, as their 
initiation, or the implementation of drastic changes in their rules, 
corresponded to the main estimated shock waves. However, the lack of 
ability of shocks to persist occurred despite the fact that in most cases 
incentives were based of FIT which typically should ensure an enduring 
benefit. 
Crossing our model-based results with the available information about 
public incentive programs in the countries considered, our findings overall 
suggest a number of points that might be useful for future policy 
interventions in both the countries analysed in this work as well as in 
countries where the adoption of this technology is in its infancy. A first one 
regards the generalised lack of media support in the different countries 
during the early SPP lifecycle, in turn mirrored by the slow early growth of 
SPP markets, which is in fact characteristic of diffusion processes mostly 
driven by word-of-mouth only. Indeed, in Bass-type diffusion models, 
sustained media communication is of importance especially in the initial 
stages of the market, by rapidly creating an initial cohort of adopters which 
subsequently allow to “initialise” the word-of-mouth component from a 
much larger contingent of spreaders. Therefore, a target of public policy in 
countries where the SPP lifecycle is still to be initiated or is in its early 
phase might be that of relevantly supporting private communication on the 
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media in order to encourage the development of this initial cohort of true 
“innovators” (Mahajan and Muller, 1998). While this had completely failed 
is, to the best of our knowledge, still unclear.  
A second main point regards the nature of the SPP market and the role of 
public incentive. The SPP market appears from our results as a frail and 
complicate one where public incentive were a necessary resource to allow 
the market full take-off but, at the same time, showed little temporal 
persistency, thereby failing in going beyond their direct short-term effect 
and in providing a sustained momentum to the market in the medium and 
long-term. Indeed, the characteristic temporal trend of the market, 
dominated by consecutive incentive-forced waves followed, in many 
countries, by much lower, sometimes negligible post-incentive adoptions 
until the next shock – besides removing any predictive ability of the model 
- suggests that the use of incentive was often badly designed i.e., aimed to 
produce fast results in the short-term but under a lack of awareness of the 
possible detrimental consequences over the longer term. This is 
documented for instance with the timing with which all countries launched 
their main intervention phase in 2007, which appears to be completely 
correlated with the need to “document an effort” to fulfil Kyoto protocol 
targets (though of course other factors concurred, including the fact that in 
the same epoch the oil price reached its maximum over the last 50 years). 
This in turn leads, as a further point, to better identify the current key 
barriers to adoptions. In relation to this, a straightforward but possibly 
critical consequence of such discontinuous badly planned policies, seems to 
be the emergence of a deleterious role of expectations. Indeed, the dramatic 
drop in adoptions observed in many countries in the periods in between 
subsequent incentive actions really seems to mirror the situation where no-
one will adopt in an incentive-free period while waiting for (and forcing, 
thanks to their non-adoption behaviour) the next incentive wave. A simple 
game-theoretic formalization of the expectation argument providing a 
simple explanation to our findings has been reported in the Appendix. We 
also remark that the expectation effect might be amplified in presence of 
governments’ policies principally aiming at short-term results (i.e., 
fulfilling the targets of international agreements) because missing a long-
term perspective.  
Strictly related to the latter point is the issue of the SPP market as a 
complex one, which emerges from the comparison of our results with those 
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in the work of Guidolin and Mortarino (2010). In the same way they 
inferred in their study - from the evidence of market slowing-down 
suggesting the achievement of its long-term equilibrium - that in some 
countries the SPP technology already entered its maturity phase, we might 
conclude from the current evidence that the market has finally entered 
maturity e.g., in countries as Italy, Spain and Germany. We are surely 
wrong. Indeed, what we now expect is that this market will proceed 
through a number of “pulsations”, mostly related to the pumping of 
further resources and incentive measures, unless the vicious cycle of 
expectations is broken-down. This is an instance of the dichotomy between 
shapes and scale in diffusion processes. Since the publication of Bass model 
much of the emphasis of the research on diffusion models has been placed 
on the temporal trends of diffusion (and the role of its determinants) i.e., on 
the “shape” issue, disregarding the “scale” issue. This is simply the 
consequence of interpreting the model-based estimate of the market 
potential as the true underlying size of the population of potential 
adopters. However, in complex markets as the SPP one there is a critical 
scale issue. In all countries considered the achieved share of energy 
consumption provided by SPP is still dramatically low (just above 10% in 
Germany) meaning that the market has large space for further 
development. The possibility to occupy this space by reaching the larger 
scale that would be required for successfully confronting with the current 
global challenges in a reasonable time-horizon obviously depends, other 
things being equal, on future ability to remove the current barriers. 
The present results and conclusions suggest a number of future research 
directions. A first one is about the determinants of the magnitude and 
variability of imitation rates as the key baseline trigger of SPP markets. The 
socio- economic and cultural factors underlining the variation in q are 
currently unclear i.e., might them depend on the ability of different 
communities to favour such processes in view of e.g., a more developed 
environmental sensibility, or to a deeper social capital endowment? The 
increasing number of countries adopting the SPP technology might allow 
to investigate this issue e.g., by regression models, looking at the best 
predictors at the aggregate level of the values of the imitation rate across 
the different countries.  
A second one deals with the causes underlying the full failure of media 
communication in supporting SPP markets. We feel that this depended on 
the lack of systematic public support to the sector which did not supply the 
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resources to encourage domestic firms (for example, potential importers of 
SPP) in taking the risk to investing in a costly technology. An 
understanding of this issue might offer better perspectives to future 
newcomer countries that are still doubtful on investing in the SPP market. 
Another interesting issue lies in the fact that the evolution of SPP markets 
has been characterised, before the large incentive epoch, by a long early 
phase primarily driven by word-of-mouth with an essentially constant 
growth rate, notwithstanding the marked decline in the price of the 
technology. We conjecture that this might be consequence of the initial 
presence of more active individuals (that is, a heterogeneity effect) who 
adopted first and were subsequently replaced by new, less active, cohorts, 
which were still prone to invest but required easier financial conditions.  
Also, our main conjecture about the key role of expectations should 
possibly be expanded beyond the toy model reported in the appendix, and 
appropriately grounded against data.  
We wanted to conclude this discussion by a short remark on the main 
limitations of this work. Given the criticality of the issue of the fast 
development of RE worldwide, a major disappointing problem lies in the 
quality and availability of public data. This study could only rely on 
aggregate data on total installed power because, with a few exceptions, no 
publicly available harmonized international data disaggregated by type of 
agent (households vs firms vs public enterprises) are currently available. 
The next chapter of this thesis will analyse in more depth the case of the 
UK where data on installations disaggregated by type of agents are 
available. 
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Chapter 3. Patterns of sectoral 
diffusion of solar photovoltaics: a 
comparative analysis in UK 
 
        Abstract 
This chapter aims at deepening the analysis of chapter 2 to a disaggregated 
level comparing adoption trajectories based on installation vs capacity 
data, and distinguishing between household vs firms vs public utilities 
adoptions. Hence, to understand how the government efforts towards the 
different sectors influenced the diffusion over the years. Consistently, we 
focused on the UK as a case study providing highly disaggregated monthly 
data, to characterise adoption patterns among household, firms and 
utilities, still by the aid of the generalised Bass model, in order to 
understand how the government efforts towards the different sectors 
influenced the diffusion over the years. Results broadly confirm the pattern 
detected in chapter 2. However, a number of interesting issues appear 
when disaggregating by type of agents. The estimated magnitude of the 
word-of-mouth effect in the residential market appeared to be dramatically 
low, suggesting a non-vital market, capable to grow only as a consequence 
of public support. The situation is quite different for the utilities and 
commercial sectors where the size of the word-of-mouth effect resulted an 
order of magnitude higher than for residentials. By correlating the 
temporal trends of the two main types of incentive adopted for the SPP 
market in the UK in this phase, we argue that the UK incentive policy for 
households is an example of a badly handled policy that should never be 
used in the same way in a strategic market as the one for SPP. 
Keywords: diffusion of residential solar photovoltaics, household 
adoptions, commercial photovoltaic adoptions, feed-in tariff, renewable 
portfolio standards, industrial photovoltaics 
JEL: O13, O38, Q48, Q58 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
The planet increasing population and consumption brought critical threats 
regarding global climate change. In recent decades, these pressures gained 
the attention of important international agencies which encouraged 
numerous countries to search for mitigation alternatives that better suit 
their needs in terms of electricity production. In this regard, the solar 
photovoltaic power (SPP) is considered the most attractive solution among 
the renewable energy sources (RES), especially for households (Schleicher-
Tappeser, 2012; Strupeit and Palm, 2016). In fact, the SPP market has 
experienced a great expansion globally, being present in 178 countries in 
2016 (IRENA, 2017), reaching 303GW installed capacity (Sawin et al., 
2017)with nearly 33% growth compared to the previous year. The growth 
was mainly driven by five countries (China, USA, Japan, India and UK), 
counting for 85% of SPP installed capacity in 2016 (IEA PVPS, 2016). 
In this Chapter, we focus on the UK as a case study as it is one of the top 
countries in terms of SPP installed capacity (2.1 GW in 2016). In 2016, the 
UK ranked sixth globally in terms of SPP cumulative installed capacity, 
seventh in terms of number of MW installed per capita, whereas in terms of 
share of electric power consumption provided by SPP it ranked fourth with 
almost 3% in 2014 (see Chapter 2). 
Though the UK still makes predominant use of fossil fuel for generating 
electricity, the RES have made significant progress in the last two decades 
reaching 21% share of total electricity output in 2016. The solar power had 
a later deployment compared to the wind power, but it increased 
considerably from 2010 covering 31% of total RES installed capacity in 2016 
(see Chapter 1). 
The main goal of this Chapter is to understand how the UK government 
efforts influenced the SPP diffusion across sectors (households, firms and 
utilities) in terms of persistence and intensity of adoption shocks, 
highlighting the differences between two communication channels, i.e. the 
spontaneous communication among individuals and the publicly available 
information supplied by the media. In addition, we test how the aggregate 
information of installed capacity is predictive of the adoptions in the 
different sectors. 
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To do so, we apply the generalised Bass model (GBM), as presented in 
Chapter 2, exploiting a highly disaggregated dataset from the UK 
government, with information on both installed capacity and number of 
installations from January 2010 to May 2018. The use of GBM allows to deal 
also with large utilities adoptions still by appropriate shocks.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the first section we review the 
literature on SPP in the UK. In the second section we briefly present the 
SPP policies and targets in the UK. In the third section we describe the 
data, followed by fourth section where we highlight the methodology 
adjustments to monthly data and shock inclusion in contrast to the 
previous chapter. We present the results in the fifth section. Finally, we 
provide concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
This Chapter adds to the growing literature on SPP technology diffusion, 
considering several sectors in the UK country-case. Country-specific 
research on SPP diffusion in the UK is still limited (Balcombe et al., 2014, 
2013; Balta-Ozkan et al., 2015; Hammond et al., 2012; Keirstead, 2007a, 
2007b) but there are several cross-country studies, which encompass the 
UK, being one of the leading countries in SPP technology (Dusonchet and 
Telaretti, 2015; Guidolin and Mortarino, 2010; Olaniyan and Evans, 2014).  
In order to reduce carbon emission and meet renewable energy targets, the 
UK government has fostered the uptake of SPP microgeneration, that is 
energy generation within the home. Keirstead (2007a) highlights the 
importance of households’ awareness and monitoring systems for the 
effectiveness of microgeneration. In fact, they find that domestic SPP can 
improve overall efficiency through reduction in energy consumption and it 
can also lead to demand shifts in energy use to times of peak generation. 
Household attitudes to renewable energy, residential consumption 
behaviour as well as lifestyle and cultural factors play a key role in the 
design of successful policies and the diffusion of SPP technologies 
(Olaniyan and Evans, 2014). However, extant research efforts agree that the 
deployment of the SPP market in the UK necessitates considerate and 
stable adoption incentives to compensate the sunk costs of the investments 
and relax financial constraints. 
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Though British households value renewable energies significantly, a 
market development policy based only on technology subsidies is 
insufficient to reduce financial barriers. Relying on surveys, Faiers and 
Neame (2006) identify several barriers to technology diffusion (financial, 
economic and aesthetic) and argue that grants are not sufficient to 
stimulate a widespread adoption of domestic SPP among households. In 
fact, installation costs of microgeneration technologies of renewable energy 
are substantially higher than household willingness-to-pay for them. 
Scarpa and Willis (2010) estimate that household willingness-to-pay for 
solar photovoltaics is less than 30% of total installation investments (GBP 
2,831 compared to GBP 10,638, on average). Moreover, both from a 
household and societal perspective, the payback period of the investment 
exceeds 25 years, that is the average guaranteed functioning period of the 
SPP technology (Hammond et al., 2012). Larger incentives could facilitate 
the uptake of SPP among households, if the financial benefits from the 
adoption of microgeneration more than compensate its sunk costs. 
Applying a generalized Bass model, Guidolin and Mortarino (2010) results 
show that the SPP diffusion process in the UK reached a mature stage in 
2007, with a peak of installations just below 30MW. In fact, the market was 
mostly supported by the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligations with minor impact on 
SPP diffusion. They forecast a consistent reduction in subsequent years in 
the absence of further government measures. As emphasised in the 
previous chapter, the SPP market is frail and complicated being driven 
mostly by public incentives. Thus, any significant increase in incentives, 
e.g. the adoption of the FIT scheme, might (re)boost the SPP diffusion, 
causing a difficulty in forecasting the market.  
Before 2010, the UK policymakers have stimulated the adoption of SPP 
technology mostly through government grants. Starting from April 2010, 
the Feed-in-Tariffs (FIT) incentivisation scheme was introduced. The early 
stage of the FIT incentives was studied by (Balcombe et al., 2014, 2013). In 
their earlier paper they analyse the motivations and barriers to adoption 
after the introduction of FIT in 2010. They conclude that capital costs still 
represent a major obstacle especially for younger adopters. Nevertheless, in 
their more recent work, using a best-worst scaling survey, they find clear 
evidence that FIT stimulated financially-motivated groups to adopt 
microgeneration technologies. Dusonchet and Telaretti (2015) argue that 
diffusion and profitability of large SPP installations in the UK are lower 
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compared to smaller residential and commercial installations, due to less 
FIT incentives for large-scale systems (above 250kW). 
The SPP diffusion in the UK after the introduction of FIT schemes have 
been analysed under socio-economic and spatial aspects. Richter (2013) 
suggests that social effects, such as imitative behaviour, have influenced 
the SPP installation rate moderately. Adding to that, Balta-Ozkan et al. 
(2015) use a spatial econometric approach (Durbin model) to identify the 
drivers of SPP adoption at a regional level. Demand for electricity, 
population density, pollution levels, education and housing types are 
found to be significant determinants of adoption patterns. 
Incentive persistence as well as policy and environment stability are 
particularly crucial for the development of SPP technologies in the UK. 
Keirstead (2007b) argues that policy complexity and poor coordination of 
resources and process streams among different UK government actors and 
industry stakeholders restrict the potential of support mechanisms and 
effective policy promotion. Moreover, policy coordination with other 
initiatives matters. Though alternative renewable technologies in several 
countries are mutual beneficial to each other, the diffusion of solar 
technology in the UK is hindered by a predatory-prey relationship with the 
wind technology. The UK is considered one of the best locations for wind 
power worldwide, which contributes to wind’s role of predator (Duan et 
al., 2014). 
Our work adds to the SPP literature an analysis at the sectoral level which 
highlights the different impact of the main policies on the residential, 
commercial and utility sectors. Furthermore, the availability of data just 
before the launch of the FIT scheme in 2010 until 2018, the year before 
phasing out (2019) [10], offers valuable information on the impact of this 
type of policy overtime, from launch until almost the end. 
 
3.3 SPP policies in UK 
In the UK in the very beginning the indirect policies were the only 
incentives supporting the SPP market. Substantial RD&D were dedicated 
to solar technologies, especially from 2000 with peaks in 2005 and 2010 
(Figure 3.1). In the latest decade the RD&D trend remained for 4 years 
around 10 million GBP, following a slow increase in the last 2 years.  
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Other indirect incentives were in the form of projects, demonstration and 
field programmes. Among the numerous programmes, the most successful 
was the Low Carbon Building Programme (LCBP) (IEA, 2009, p. 11) which 
started in 2006 and ended in 2010. The programme was presenting the 
relationship between microgeneration RES technology efficiency with low 
carbon buildings and it was dedicated to households, community 
organisations, schools and public sector. The main goal of these kind of 
programmes is to increase technology awareness among the possible 
adopters, especially in early stages (Yamaguchi et al., 2013).  
The third indirect incentive is a type of the Renewable Portfolio Standards, 
first in act under the “Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation” since 1990 [11] and 
replaced by “Renewable Obligation Certificates” (ROC) in 2002. The policy 
aims at encouraging firms and suppliers to invest in systems larger than 
50kW so as to produce “clean” electricity above a yearly pre-established 
minimum target in terms of share in total electricity. The obligation share 
increased from 3% in 2002, at a slower pace until 2012 (1 p.p./year on 
average), to 46.8% in 2019, with a faster rate (5 p.p./year on average) (see 
Table A3- 1 in Appendix) [7].  
In order to meet their obligations, suppliers need to provide the certificates 
with the amount of energy produced from RES. The suppliers that not 
achieve the required share must pay a fixed price per MWh to a buy-out 
fund, which will consequently be paid by the consumers through higher 
energy costs.  On the contrary, the successful suppliers will receive a direct 
Figure 3.1 Annual RD&D investments for solar power in Million GBP (nominal) 
from 1974 to 2016. Data from IEA Online Data Service1. 
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proportional fund with their share in total number of certificates submitted 
in a certain period which decreases their consumers’ electricity tariff. The 
obligation period starts from 1st April until 31st March of the following year 
(UK Government [12]). Although the ROC is in act since 2002, the 
neutrality of the scheme in the first decade, i.e. without distinguishing 
between the various types of RES, led only to the adoption of the more 
economic technologies (UK Government [13]). Consequently, overall the 
RES market did not develop as expected and put at risk the achievement of 
the long-term carbon emissions reduction targets. Due to this issue, the 
government revised the policy in 2012 focusing the technologies that 
mostly needed the incentives to develop a market, such as SPP (UK 
Government [14]).  
The ROC scheme for new SPP systems larger than 5MW is due to an end 
by 1st April 2015, while for new smaller systems the deadline is set for 1st 
April 2016 [5], following one-year grace period. The ROC is gradually 
replaced by Contracts for Difference (CfD) starting from 2013 to 2017 as 
announced in the Energy Act 2013 (UK Government [15]). The latter is a 
system of reverse auctions9 aiming at creating certainty among the RES 
market investors through fixed electricity prices (Uk Government [16]). 
However, the government considers the SPP an already developed 
technology and excluded it from the auctions (PV Magazine, 2016 [17]). 
The UK government provides also direct incentives in terms of production 
related policies. The FIT consists of the payment of a pre-established tariff 
for the electricity generated by an implant usually until the warranty of the 
plant expires, mainly after 20-25 years. The incentive is directed only to 
plants smaller than 5MW for three levels of the tariffs (high, medium and 
low) based on the commissioned date and overall number of installations 
(UK Government). The high values are presented in Figure 1. We observe 
that the value of the tariff is generally decreasing from small installations to 
large systems. Indeed, this is in line with Dusonchet and Telaretti (2015) 
which highlight the unprofitability of utility-scale systems in early stages. 
                                                          
9 In a reverse auction the roles of the buyer and the seller are reversed. 
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There have been two dramatic reductions in the value of FIT, at the 
beginning of 2012 and in January 2016 due to the excessive number of 
installations compared to the government expectations and to the 
technology decreasing price. Indeed, the module price for the systems 
under 4kW decreased from £15,000 in 2010 to £6,000 in 2016 [3]. The FIT is 
forecasted to phase out to new applicants on 1 April 2019 [4]. 
The UK government also set a target to adopt 20GW of SPP by 2020 [2]. 
The goal aims at reducing carbon emissions by 35% in 2020 and to further 
achieve a 80% reduction by 2050 compared to the 1990 baseline (Dusonchet 
and Telaretti, 2010; Hammond et al., 2012). 
 
3.4 SPP adoptions data 
We use monthly UK government data on cumulative installed capacity 
(Figure A3. 2) and cumulative number of installations (Figure A3. 3) from 
January 2010 to May 2018. [1]10. Although the SPP launch occurred in the 
early 1990s, the time span of our dataset is fit for the purpose of our 
analysis as 2010 represents the starting year of the rapid SPP diffusion. 
                                                          
10 The number in brackets refer to the sitography of Chapter 3 at the end of the 
document 
Figure 3.2 Standard Solar FIT values (high rate) by capacity range in kW from Aprile 
2010 to September 2018. Source: UK Government Statistics 
98 
 
Based on previous classifications of the SPP market (CEBR, 2014; 
International Finance Corporation, 2015; Keirstead, 2007b) we classify 
installations in terms of capacity size as follows: installations with less than 
10kW are considered residential sector, installations between 10kW and 
5MW are considered commercial sector11 while installations above 5MW 
are considered utility sector.  
Although SPP installations go back to 1992, it was not until the beginning 
of this decade that the technology started a fast growth deployment going 
from 26MW of cumulative capacity in 2009 to almost 1GW in 2011. The 
yearly peak of installations was only recently achieved, in 2015, counting 
for 4.2GW (IEA data). The cumulative installed capacity in May 2018 was 
of 12.8GW while the number of installations was just under 940,000 [1]. 
 
3.5 Methodology 
For this study we use the generalized Bass model (GBM) as in the previous 
chapter. 
The estimation of the market potential “m” raises many issues due to 
potential bias (Van den Bulte and Lilien, 1997) given the fact that the SPP 
markets mainly develop due to public incentives (as explained in Chapter 
2). Consequently, this particular market is unpredictable and difficult to 
forecast. For this reason, we will not focus on the estimated market 
potential.  
The monthly patterns, compared to the yearly trends in the previous 
chapter, present numerous short-lasting oscillations, especially in the case 
of commercial and utility sectors, which require the application of 
instantaneous rectangular shocks (form F1). Thus, the procedure for the 
inclusion of shocks is the following. First, we visualise the data and 
determine the number of instantaneous shock. Second, we fix the 
parameters of the beginning (a) and the end (b) of the instantaneous shock. 
Third, in the preliminary phase we choose the same value of intensity (A) 
for all the rectangular shock, gradually adding other values to the model 
                                                          
11 According to a different classification by IEA (2016, p.45), installation 
capacity for commercial scale ranges from 10kW to 500kW. 
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until the analysis based on the multiple squared partial correlation 
coefficient (SMPCC) detects the number of different intensity parameters 
(A) which better fit the model (last SMPCC > 0.5). In the case of long-lasting 
shocks, we proceed, as in Chapter 2, by gradually including one shock at 
the time. 
 
3.6 Results 
The first stage of the UK SPP adoption, between 1992 and 2010, was 
analysed in Chapter 2. In this initial phase the growth rate was essentially 
constant (31%/year) under the presence of low intensity incentives (LCBL) 
with few adoptions which overall did not exceed 26MW (5736 systems).  
At the disaggregated level, considering the number of installations, the 
residential sector is vastly dominant with a constant share above 96% 
(Figure A3. 3). On the contrary, in terms of installed capacity the 
framework changed dramatically over time. The first significant change 
occurred after the announcement in March 2011 that cuts into the value of 
FIT would be made to standalone systems starting from August 2011 [8]. 
This affected especially the commercial sector which pushed many 
companies to apply for the higher FIT before the reduction. The utility 
sector began its growth from 2012 with the SPP technology price reduction 
and increased considerably up to a 56% share at the beginning of 2015. The 
SPP market seems to have become more stable during 2017 when the 
shares of the residential, commercial and utility sectors in total installed 
capacity were respectively 22%, 33%, and 45% (Figure A3. 4).  
The findings from the previous chapter show how all the SPP markets 
developed in absence of any relevant mediatic support. From this point of 
view the UK makes no exception. To further support this statement, we 
applied the “classical” Bass model (Figure A3. 5) and obtained sufficiently 
low values of the coefficient of innovation (α) in all sectors (Table A3- 2). 
Therefore, following Chapter 2 methodology, we applied a Generalized 
Internal Model (GIM) instead of the Generalized Bass Model (GBM).  
For the estimation of the best fit model we needed at least 3 different 
shocks to predict the SPP curves, with significant variations among sectors. 
The results are reported in   and can be visualised in Figure 3.3.  
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3.6.1 Residential sector 
In January 2010, the first month available, the residential time series data 
starts from 5500 systems, a very low number considering the almost 
920,000 systems registered by May 2018. The patterns for the installed 
capacity and number of installations are very similar and can both be 
interpreted in the following way. 
The resulting best model of the residential sector presents 3 shocks ( ). First 
of all, a constant shock (F1) at the beginning of the series. This is in line 
with the fact that the FIT incentive started in April 2010 and remained 
constant for 2 years (Figure 3.2). The introduction of FIT yields a monthly 
growth rate around 18% which indicates a 550% growth per year, a 
significant increase compared to 37% from the previous period.  
The second incentive is an exponential one (F2) with starting point in 
November 2011, highly intense (A = 145) lasting more than two months (1/c 
= 2.2). The shock was clearly caused by the government’s announcement of 
FIT cuts during October 2011 [6], thus the spike is the consequence not of a 
positive incentive but of the announcement that the FIT will be reduced by 
February 2012 and therefore of the «run» to install taking profit of the 
reduction of the single installation cost.  Following the drastic cuts by 
August 2012, successive gradual small reductions were frequently made. 
Hence, the presence dramatic short-term increase in monthly growth rate 
up to almost 50% with subsequent dramatic decline to very low levels, 2-
3%, by August 2012. Therefore, we note that the positive effect of the 
reduction in the cost is clearly secondary to the negative effect of the 
announcement of the FIT reduction.   
 Although estimated with a constant long-lasting shock, in the period 
between August 2012 and December 2016 the monthly adoption (and also 
the growth rate) curve shows evidence of several (4) very small shocks 
lasting about 1-year until Dec 2016. These temporary annual phases of 
growth might for example reflect the presence of small groups of adopters 
which have already decided to adopt but fear the possibility of a further 
reduction of the FIT. None of the shock forms (F1, F2, F3) from the previous 
chapter manage to capture the pattern of the small shock. Therefore, an ad-
hoc form that gradually increases until a sudden drop might have been 
more appropriate.  
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Starting from January 2016 until May 2018 growth rate falls to negligible 
levels (< 0.3%) despite the presence of incentive (FIT still around 15%) 
compared to 45% at the beginning. Estimating q from 2010 to 2016 data 
indicates a dramatically low level of the imitation rate given that the 
monthly observed GR of 0.2-0.3% (yearly 3-4%) still reflects the presence of 
incentive at a non-negligible rate.  
 
Figure 3.3 Cumulative, Monthly and Growth rate (in log scale) observed versus 
fitted curves for both Installed Capacity and Number of Installations by type 
of sector: Residential, Commercial, Utility and Aggregated level. 
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3.6.1 Utility sector 
The SPP diffusion among the utility sector started later compared to the 
other sectors. In 2012 the first system of 6MW was installed in January, 
followed by other two in June and August. The absence of installations 
prior to 2012 might be explained by the high installation cost, as pointed 
out also by Hammond et al (2012) along with the revision of the ROC 
scheme which brought the share to 15.8% (3.4 p.p. compared to 2011) and 
increased the buy-out price to 0.64p/kWh (see Table A3- 1). Moreover, in 
2012 was registered a dramatic drop in SPP technology price. 
The adoption pattern in the utility sector required a 5-shock model in both 
installed capacity and number of installations, with no 4 different 
persistence values (the first and the last instantaneous shocks are similar A 
= 91). In fact, we notice an identical shape patterns for the cumulative 
curves (Figure 3.3). All five shocks are positive rectangular and repetitive 
as they are “detached” observations which occur at the beginning of each 
year, just before March (Figure 3.3). The visible shape of a stairway in the 
case of utility sector is explained by the fact that the ROC’s obligation 
period goes from 1 April to 31 March of the following year [7], thus it 
seems that many electricity suppliers postpone the installations until just 
before the deadline instead of gradually fulfil their obligations.  
The highest growth rate has been registered in March 2013 with 980%. In 
fact, the buy-out price from the 2012-2013 obligation period increased by 
0.16p/kWh, 33% compared to the previous period. The next peak occurred 
in March 2014 although with only 138% increase in growth rate, represents 
the month with most adoptions: 147 installations counting for more than 
2GW. In this period the buy-out price grew substantially by 36%. Another 
interesting remark is the absence of adoptions in 2018: only two systems 
with respectively 26MW and 6MW installed capacity. This suggests that 
the end of the ROC scheme along with the government’s decision to block 
SPP from the CfDs [18] brought the market to a stall. Moreover, the “word-
of-mouth” effect in the utility sector is above 4.4%/month (52%/year), much 
higher compared to the residential sector. 
 
103 
 
3.6.1 Commercial sector 
Considering the installed capacity, the commercial sector appears to have a 
unique trend shaped as a combination between residential and utility 
sectors. This is explained by the fact that this particular sector benefits from 
both FIT and ROC (>50kW) incentives. On the contrary, in the case of the 
number of installations we notice a shape more comparable to the 
residential sector because systems with capacity between 10 and 50kW 
eligible only for FIT, counted on average for approximately 90% of the 
commercial installations. Consequently, the significant differences between 
the shape of the capacity and number of installations led to estimations of a 
respectively 10-shock and 7-shock models in both cases with an initial two-
year lasting constant shock during the first stage of the FIT scheme, 
followed by only instant rectangular shocks with respectively 4 and 3 
variable A values. 
The analysis of the installed capacity pattern shows a highly intense shock 
(A1 = 31) corresponding to the highest growth rate (515%) in July 2011 after 
the announcement of the dramatic drop in FIT value for standalone panels 
from August 2011 [8]. The shock is followed by 4 smaller shocks (A3,4,5,6 = 
3.4): in July 2012, before a further FIT reduction in August and September; 
and around March of each year from 2013 to 2015 consistent to the ROC 
deadline. Other shock follows in December 2015 before another drop in the 
FIT value, again in March before the 2016 and 2017 ROC deadlines. On 
average, the growth rate caused by the ROC deadline lies around 13%. 
Similar instant spikes can be observed also considering the number of 
installed capacities, again consistent with dramatic changes in FIT and 
ROC deadlines, with the difference that the latter registered lower growth 
rate spikes.  
The low levels of medium-large commercial installations prior to 2012 
might be explained by the low FIT values for medium-large systems unable 
to cover for the high installation cost (Hammond et al., 2012). This 
emphasize the fact that both FIT and ROC schemes have significantly 
impacted the commercial sector over the years. In fact, the stairway 
pattern, although smoother than in the utility sector, is consistent with both 
FIT reduction announcements and ROC deadlines. Another similarity with 
the utility sector is the value of the imitation rate, above 3.5%/month 
(42%/year). 
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Table 3-1 Estimated values of GIM parameters for Installed capacity and number 
of installations by sector: Residential (R), Commercial(C), Utility (U) and 
Aggregated (Agg) level. The best model describes the type and number of shocks, 
e.g. “10 F1 (4 A)” refers to 10 instant rectangular shocks (form F1) estimated with 4 
different intensities (A) 
105 
 
3.6.2 Aggregate level 
At the aggregate level, our findings show that considering the cumulative 
number of installations the residential sector is representative with very 
similar results (F1+F2+F1) for the parameter estimates. If we consider the 
cumulative installed capacity the residential sector is no longer 
representative. Instead, the best fit model consists of 12 shocks (a two years 
lasting constant shock followed by eleven instant shocks with only 3 
diverse intensity parameters (A)). The similarities are also reflected in the 
imitation rate estimates: 0.4%/ month (number of installations) compare to 
4.3%/month (installed capacity). 
 
3.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter aims at deepening the analysis of chapter 2, by coping with a 
major drawback of the data used therein, namely the fact that adoption 
data publicly provided by IEA are available only in an aggregate form as 
total installed capacity per year. This aggregation does not allow to 
distinguish between household adoption vs those attributable to firms and 
the public utilities. In fact, the argument has not been stressed in the 
literature, to the best of our knowledge.  
Consistently, we focused on the UK as a case study providing highly 
disaggregated monthly data, to characterise adoption patterns among 
household, firms and utilities, still by the aid of the generalised Bass model, 
in order to understand how the government efforts towards the different 
sectors influenced the diffusion over the years. In addition, we aimed at 
testing how the aggregate information of installed capacity is predictive of 
the adoptions in the different sectors.  
Results broadly confirm the pattern detected in chapter 2 regarding the 
absence of media support in all the sector and the key role of incentives as 
main drivers of the SPP diffusion. Additionally, the estimated magnitude 
of the imitation effect in the residential market appeared to be dramatically 
low, suggesting a non-vital market, capable to grow only as a consequence 
of public support. The situation is quite different for the utilities and 
commercial sectors where the world-of-mouth effect is ten times larger. 
This might be explained by the fact that companies make more rational 
decisions based on economic factors rather than being led by perception. 
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By correlating the temporal trends of the two main types of incentive 
adopted for the SPP market in the UK in this phase, are an example of a 
badly handled policy.  
Therefore, it seems that the SPP market in UK suffers not only the 
structural difficulties of this sector, but also the consumer perception of 
relative penalisation compared to the past cohorts who benefited high rates 
of FIT. The value about 0 of the imitation rate (q) suggest that in absence of 
incentives the market is essentially dead possibly because agents believe in 
the expectation of further future increasing in the value of FIT and 
therefore in the return of the investment. 
A more effective and easy to implement solution for a successful policy 
might be the creation of individual customized policies which should take 
into account the real price of the initial investment paid by each individual 
and the actual material and maintenance costs, instead of an estimated 
price based on past dynamics. This solution would allow a better 
government control over the continuously occurring market changes and 
could avoid excessive demand stimulated by high profitability caused by 
the gap between a sudden decrease in price and the slow adjustments in 
FIT tariff as it occurred during the Chinese overproduction. 
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Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
The main goal of this thesis is to use the diffusion models to improve our 
understanding of SPP markets, with special focus on (a) identifying the 
main determinants of the diffusion of solar photovoltaic panels worldwide, 
particularly the role played so far by public incentives, (b) characterising 
the scale and temporal profiles of the major domestic shocks in SPP 
markets which mostly occurred after 2007, (c) discussing the resulting 
perspectives, and the involved role of public policies, for the future 
development of the market. 
Chapter 1 is introductory and preparatory for subsequent ones. In 
particular, this chapter was useful to pinpoint that (a) the presence of 
shocks is an intrinsic and often dominating feature of energy markets, 
thereby motivating the use of tools as the GBM, (b) only a few countries 
have developed long-term energy plans towards which to manage 
consistently their short-medium term policies, as documented in the 
proposed analyses by the evidence that a number of public interventions 
were carried out as mere responses to external stimuli, such as the 
deadlines of Kyoto protocol; (c) the concept of energy framework was 
useful to inform the discussion on individual countries SPP adoption 
trajectories reported in subsequent chapters, which indicated a number of 
commonalities e.g., countries with oil and gas reserves developed a market 
for the SPP generally later compared to countries lacking such reserves 
(while availability of coal reserves seems not to have delayed the SPP 
diffusion). 
Chapter 2 contains the main work of the thesis, which led to the following 
concluding remarks. First, in all countries considered the media 
communication proved to have no relevant effect in “pushing” the SPP 
market, suggesting that this technology started its lifecycle without the 
support of public media. However, the magnitude of word-of-mouth 
communication proved to be generally small that is, resulted in most 
countries insufficient to ensure the achievement of any target of market 
development within the time frame indicated by international protocols 
and agreements. The previous two findings show that the communication 
forces acting on the SSP market are weak or insufficient, thereby calling for 
the need for external interventions. Further, most of the growth in the 
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market adoption curves has occurred everywhere in the form of massive 
positive shocks which took place initiated in a synchronous manner in 
2007, possibly following incentive measures in the various states. 
Nonetheless, inspection of the parameter estimates describing the temporal 
pattern of the shocks showed, as a rule, a lack of temporal persistence of 
the effects of incentive, as well as a sharp trade-off between intensity and 
persistence of the actions that is to say, the more intense actions were also 
those lasting short.   
From the individual country discussion, we generally observed that mainly 
the production related policies, present in 20 out of 26 analysed countries 
either in FIT or NMS form, impacted the most on SPP diffusion, as their 
initiation, or the implementation of drastic changes in their rules, 
corresponded to the main estimated shock waves. However, the lack of 
ability of shocks to persist occurred despite the fact that in most cases 
incentives were based of FIT which typically should ensure an enduring 
benefit. 
A second main point regards the nature of the SPP market and the role of 
public incentive. The SPP market appears from our results as a frail and 
complicate one where public incentive were a necessary resource to allow 
the market full take-off but, at the same time, showed little temporal 
persistency, thereby failing in going beyond their direct short-term effect 
and in providing a sustained momentum to the market in the medium and 
long-term. Indeed, the characteristic temporal trend of the market, 
dominated by consecutive incentive-forced waves followed, in many 
countries, by much lower, sometimes negligible post-incentive adoptions 
until the next shock – besides removing any predictive ability of the model 
- suggests that the use of incentive was often badly designed i.e., aimed to 
produce fast results in the short-term but under a lack of awareness of the 
possible detrimental consequences over the longer term. This is 
documented for instance with the timing with which all countries launched 
their main intervention phase in 2007, which appears to be completely 
correlated with the need to “document an effort” to fulfil Kyoto protocol 
targets (though of course other factors concurred, including the fact that in 
the same epoch the oil price reached its maximum over the last 50 years). 
The present results and conclusions suggest a number of future research 
directions. A first one is about the determinants of the magnitude and 
variability of imitation rates as the key baseline trigger of SPP markets. The 
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socio- economic and cultural factors underlining the variation in q are 
currently unclear i.e., might them depend on the ability of different 
communities to favour such processes in view of e.g., a more developed 
environmental sensibility, or to a deeper social capital endowment? The 
increasing number of countries adopting the SPP technology might allow 
to investigate this issue e.g., by regression models, looking at the best 
predictors at the aggregate level of the values of the imitation rate across 
the different countries.  
A second one deals with the causes underlying the full failure of media 
communication in supporting SPP markets. We feel that this depended on 
the lack of systematic public support to the sector which did not supply the 
resources to encourage domestic firms (for example, potential importers of 
SPP) in taking the risk to investing in a costly technology. An 
understanding of this issue might offer better perspectives to future 
newcomer countries that are still doubtful on investing in the SPP market. 
Chapter 3 aims at deepening the analysis of Chapter 2. Consistently, we 
focused on the UK as a case study providing highly disaggregated monthly 
data, to characterise adoption patterns among household, firms and 
utilities. 
Results broadly confirm the pattern detected in chapter 2 regarding the 
absence of media support in all the sector and the key role of incentives as 
main drivers of the SPP diffusion. Additionally, the estimated magnitude 
of the imitation effect in the residential market appeared to be dramatically 
low, suggesting a non-vital market, capable to grow only as a consequence 
of public support. The situation is quite different for the utilities and 
commercial sectors where the world-of-mouth effect is ten times larger. 
This might be explained by the fact that companies make more rational 
decisions based on economic factors rather than being led by perception. 
By correlating the temporal trends of the two main types of incentive 
adopted for the SPP market in the UK in this phase, are an example of a 
badly handled policy. 
Therefore, it seems that the SPP market in UK suffers not only the 
structural difficulties of this sector, but also the consumer perception of 
relative penalisation compared to the past cohorts who benefited high rates 
of FIT. The value about 0 of the imitation rate (q) suggest that in absence of 
incentives the market is essentially dead possibly because agents believe in 
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the expectation of further future increasing in the value of FIT and 
therefore in the return of the investment. 
A more effective and easy to implement solution for a successful policy 
might be the creation of individual customized policies which should take 
into account the real price of the initial investment paid by each individual 
and the actual material and maintenance costs, instead of an estimated 
price based on past dynamics. This solution would allow a better 
government control over the continuously occurring market changes and 
could avoid excessive demand stimulated by high profitability caused by 
the gap between a sudden decrease in price and the slow adjustments in 
FIT tariff as it occurred during the Chinese overproduction. 
The following part of the discussion section is a reply to the points raised 
by the referees after their evaluation. 
The suggested paper of Meade and Islam (2015) regarding the possible 
determinants of the differences in growth rates of RET usage in European 
countries is very useful to understand the renewables’ market from 
different points of view, using different approaches. In fact, they study the 
determinants by analysing the sample of countries as a hole, and not 
separately, maintaining the non-linear S-shaped characteristic of the RE 
curves. Among the determinant variables of the renewable energy 
technologies, Meade and Islam (2015) highlight the fact that in presence of 
other variables the increase in latitude negatively affected the growth in RE 
usage, a point not addressed in the thesis. Similar effect has the amount of 
carbon-free electricity generation within a country, point stressed also in 
Chapter 1 as the substantial presence of nuclear power in countries like 
France and Belgium does not leave much space for RE. Meade and Islam 
(2015) also show how the differentiation among countries by the use of 
different incentive schemes (with binary variables) was not as explanatory 
as dividing by the velocity with which the countries adopted the renewable 
energy technologies. This is in line with the choice of combining the 
countries by the usage of different energy sources and not by types of 
incentive schemes, which after a preliminary analysis of the individual 
countries resulted in no marked similarities. 
The point raised by the reviewer regarding the technological, economic and 
behavioural aspects is a fascinating and quite far-reaching one, going at the 
roots of both the concept of technology lifespan and its interplay with the 
adopters’ lifespan, but also at those of the Bass model and its usage (i.e., 
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explanation & learning vs forecasting). Perhaps the point is also very 
complicate to respond. Abstractly, renewables considered as energy 
production technology produced “globally” (i.e, by large scale plants, as 
opposed to “local” i.e., plants used by a single household for her own 
consumption) might have a very long life span going far beyond the 
lifespans of humans (an obvious example is hydro-electric power). 
However, the individual (or anyhow, low-scale) nature of the photovoltaic 
technology combined with its medium –term duration (a solar panel is 
guaranteed for a physical life of at most 25 years at current scientific 
knowledge) makes it – from practical purposes – quite similar to a durable 
investment good (though possibly one with a longer payback time, that is 
more similar to houses than other durables as e.g., cars). Moreover, there 
has not been much innovation differentiation within the photovoltaic 
market and, additionally, state incentives were mainly directed to 
photovoltaic technologies in general, without any differentiation between 
the different types of technologies. We believe that, putting the problem 
this way, provided one looks at the evolution of the market over horizons 
that are comparable to those of the duration of the physical life of the 
durable (this is certainly the case for our minimum scenario where the 
resulting horizons are shortly longer than the time series of data, which 
was exactly 25 years), then the use of the Bass model shouldn’t 
substantially violate the basic hypothesis of being a “first-purchase” model. 
However, over time horizons longer than those considered in this thesis – 
which might well appear in the future when longer time series will become 
available, or even right now if policy might like to use models for longer-
term projections - things will obviously be different. In this case models for 
repeated purchases (still, in a finite number during lifetime) or models for 
different generations of the technology (say, along the strain originated by 
the Norton-Bass model) would be necessary. We note however that such 
refinements, though of interest, would still need more refined recipes for 
handling the complicate issues of the competition between different 
renewable technologies exactly as we are missing for simple models. 
In addition, but still related to this, there is the issue of “who is m” in the 
SPP market. The basic classical Bass model is an amazingly simple cohort 
model describing diffusion over time in a fixed cohort of size m (: the 
“market potential”) where the m final adopters were already 
“programmed” since the very beginning of the product lifecycle. Clearly, 
the process model for determining the market size in SPP markets seems to 
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be far more complicate compared to the basic Bass model. First, given the 
long characteristic time scales of the market, there are necessarily 
demographic effects related to the fact that the population of potential 
adopters has a number of renewal mechanisms. Second, and more 
important, in the SPP market there has been a substantial competitive 
pressure over time on the price of the technology, which has dramatically 
reduced the unit price, therefore weakening budget constraints and 
eventually contributing to gradually expand the size of the population of 
potential adopters. This would clearly call for a more complicated 
modelling representation, including a temporal trend (say, m(t)) for the 
size of the population of potential adopters, be this exogenous (see e.g., 
Centrone et al., 2007 and references therein) or endogenous e.g., related to 
the trend of the price of the technology. Both latter alternatives, though 
interesting, would have however implied the need to resort to a further 
complicate model, therefore sacrificing further degrees of freedom for 
estimating the parameters representing the function m(t) in addition to the 
many parameters representing the temporal dynamics of shocks. Our final 
choice in relation to this has been to go along Occam’s razor, and therefore 
to use the simplest hypotheses for the market potential namely, (i) to take it 
as a constant determined by the SPP policy targets in the different 
countries, (ii) to take it as a parameter to be estimated only for countries for 
which evidence was available suggesting that the parameter could be 
estimated appropriately. 
The basic classical Bass model is an amazingly simple cohort model 
describing diffusion over time in a fixed cohort of size m (: the “market 
potential”) where the m final adopters were already “programmed” to 
adopt since the very beginning of the product lifecycle. Clearly, the process 
model for determining the market size in SPP markets seems to be far more 
complicate compared to the basic Bass model. First, given the long 
characteristic time scales of the market, there are necessarily demographic 
effects related to the fact that the population of potential adopters evolved 
over time through its renewal mechanisms. Second, and more important, in 
the SPP market there has been a substantial competitive pressure over time 
on the price of the technology, which has dramatically reduced the unit 
price, therefore weakening budget constraints and eventually contributing 
to gradually expand the size of the population of potential adopters. This 
would clearly call for a more complicated modelling representation, 
including a temporal trend (say, m(t)) for the size of the population of 
113 
 
potential adopters, be this exogenous (Centrone et al., 2007) or endogenous 
e.g., related to the trend of the price of the technology. Both latter 
alternatives should be seriously considered in future research work. 
However, though interesting, both alternatives would have implied the 
need to resort to a more complicate model, therefore sacrificing further 
degrees of freedom for estimating the parameters representing the function 
m(t) in addition to the many parameters representing the temporal 
dynamics of shocks. Our final choice in relation to this has been to go along 
Occam’s razor, and therefore to use the simplest hypotheses for the market 
potential m namely, (i) to take it as a constant (the “minimum” vs the 
“maximum” scenario reported in Chapter 2) determined by the SPP policy 
targets in the different countries, (ii) to take it as a parameter to be 
estimated only for countries for which evidence was available suggesting 
that the parameter could be estimated appropriately, namely those which 
showed – disregarding shocks - clear symptoms of slowing down in the 
adoption path (Van den Bulte and Lilien, 1997).  
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Appendix A1 – Chapter 1 
 
Part A 
 
  
115 
 
Part B  
  
Figure A1. 1 Part A & B Production versus Imports versus Exports of Coal 
(coal, peat and oil shale), Oil (crude oil, NGL and feedstocks) and Natural gas. 
Own calculation based on data from IEA Headline Global Energy Data 2017: 
all three variables are computed as share of Production + Imports 
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Figure A1. 2 Share in RD&D by type of main energy source 1974 - 2016. Own 
calculation based on data from IEA Online Data Service. The total amount of 
RD&D included also the following categories: energy efficiency, hydrogen and 
fuel cells, other power and storage technologies, other cross/cutting tech & 
research and unallocated 
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Figure A1. 3 Share in total RD&D dedicated to RES technologies by category, 
period: 1974 - 2016. Solar includes all technologies (i.e. photovoltaic, thermal, 
etc). Own calculation based on data of Total RD&D in Million of UDS (2016 
and PPP) from IEA Online Data Service 
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Appendix A2 – Chapter 2 
 
Supplementary Materials 
This appendix reports a number of details on the data used and various 
further results supporting the analyses reported in the main text. These 
further analyses are listed in the following index of contents: 
1. The expectations argument as a barrier to SPP adoptions and the 
optimal design of incentive policies: a simple game-theoretic 
interpretation 
2. Trend oil price 
3. A note on the data 
4. The minimum and maximum scenarios 
5. Figures and graphics 
6. Numerical details on GIM estimates for all countries. 
 
1. The expectations argument as a barrier to SPP adoptions and the 
optimal design of incentive policies: a simple game-theoretic interpretation 
We have systematically observed during the development of this thesis the 
strict dependency of SPP diffusion on economic incentives, namely the fact 
that SPP adoptions mostly occurred in the presence of subsidies and they 
tended to regress, or even to stop (e.g., in the cases of Italy and Spain) 
when incentives decline (as showed in the UK case in chapter 3), as also 
pointed out in Guidolin and Mortarino (2010).  
This phenomenon could be explained rather easily in the case in which the 
fuel parity of renewable sources of energy is only realized thanks to 
government subsidies, so that SPP installations can only take place in the 
presence of appropriate government incentive policies.  
It might well be the case, however, that subsidies make the private sector 
"addicted" to them and that the expectation of future incentives and 
subsidies prevents current private sector's RES investments.  
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This mechanism will be shown formally below with the help of a simple 
game-theoretic representation. It is easy, however, also to explain it first in 
plain words. The comparison that the private sector makes, when deciding 
to undertake an investment, may not be between the payoff obtained when 
doing it, compared to the one obtained when not doing it, in which case, 
being the difference positive, the investment would be undertaken with 
certainty. As a matter of fact, knowing that subsidies can be expected in the 
future, the comparison may well be between the payoff obtained when not 
undertaking the investment initially, but waiting to do it at a later stage 
(when some government subsidies will be granted), and the payoff 
obtained when undertaking the investment immediately without enjoying 
any subsidy. The conclusion would be that it is preferable to undertake 
investments only at a later stage, when they will be further encouraged by 
the expected economic incentives. 
For this to happen, however, the Stackelberg leadership will have to be in 
the hands of the private sector, with the government playing as follower. 
This is the case any time the government cannot commit firmly to its 
actions, but it is subject to re-optimize them, in which case it will prevent, 
or at least delay the undertaking of SPP installations.  
On the contrary, when it is the government that takes the Stackelberg 
leadership, the private sector has no chances to force it to change action, 
given the credible commitment that has been taken initially. 
What precedes explain with clarity some facts. It explains, for example, the 
success of the long term (20 years) German FIT policy. Chowdhury et al. 
(2014) underline the fact that “a long-term policy with incentive can make a 
countries domestic market grow bigger” since it affects agents’ 
expectations. Moreover, the German FIT reduces the pay-back period to 
just a few years, thereby extending the number of SPP adopters beyond 
those who install SPP systems because of environmental concerns.  
Such policy, however, does more than that, since it has clearly outlined the 
future slow digression rate (5% per year or in any case depending on the 
rate of growth of the market, Solangi et al., (2011) of the tariff, devised in 
order to accommodate for the technological progress. The rational of such a 
policy is quite clear: by announcing credibly, in the year 2000 that the FIT 
would be reduced by 5% per year, there is no incentive for economic agents 
to wait and install the SPP system in the future in order to enjoy the 
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reduced cost made possible by technological progress, since such a lower 
cost would be compensated by the lower subsidy.12  
Also in Japan, since 2011, the FIT system has helped the relaunching of SPP 
installations. 
This is what would be necessary in order to develop a self-sustained 
market that would not need any support anymore (Chowdhury et al., 
2014). 
The examples of Spain and Austria show clearly how a FIT policy that is 
not clearly spelled out in the long term, not being part of a clear 
communication strategy, produces totally different results: in those 
countries the unexpected reduction of subsidized FITs had a negative 
impact on adoptions, precisely because of the expectation of a higher future 
subsidy that induces the perception of a current loss in the case in which an 
investment is undertaken, so as to hinder the SPP diffusion.  
A similar conclusion can be reached by comparing the policy followed by 
the Italian government, with the one of the German government. The 
Italian economic incentives for the installation of SPP systems have been 
repeated over time, have been characterized by a short span and have not 
been presenting any clear time outline nor regularity (applying today to a 
sector, and tomorrow to a different one).  
The importance of state financial incentives is also stressed by Sarzynski et 
al. (2012). The role of expectations emerges also by considering the fact that 
in presence of policies that target off-grid applications, people may prefer 
to wait for the grid extension, rather than installing SPP systems that are 
off-grid.  
Trappey et al. (2008) consider the role of pessimists, who think that 
technology will improve significantly in the future, so that it would not 
make sense to adopt its current version given that once the “sunk cost” of 
investment is undertaken it will not be possible to go back.  
                                                          
12 An alternative interpretation is provided by CPI, 2011, arguing that the 5% digression 
rate should provide an incentive to the solar industry to develop more cost-effective 
panels, in order to grant to the customers, the same real price year after year). Once more, 
this shows the relevant role played by the expectations of the private sector in deciding to 
install a solar plant. 
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This also confirms the intuition provided by Karakaya and Sriwannawit 
(2015), according to whom perceived costs are as important as effective 
costs.  
Public communication might reduce the share of pessimists and favour a 
positive word-of-mouth transmission mechanism. An important question 
to ask, then, is whether it would be more efficient to provide direct 
monetary incentives and subsidies or to strengthen the channels of public 
communication and information.  
What precedes can be shown in a very simple and intuitive way. Let us 
start by considering the case in which the installation of SPP may be 
convenient even without subsidies, but in which economic agents 
anticipate the possible availability of future government subsidies, like 
those that had taken place in the past: the apparently counter-intuitive and 
paradoxical result that we obtain is that if the private sector (economic 
agents) plays as a Stackelberg leader, it may decide not to install SPP but 
rather wait, so as to force the government to reintroduce the subsidies.  
Let us consider a simple normal form game (therefore played 
simultaneously) between the government and the private sector that for 
simplicity we consider as an atomistic player. The government can 
subsidize or not the installation of SPP that are installed by the private 
sector, and the private sector can install them or not. The first of the two 
numbers reported in the boxes of the matrix is the (positive) payoff of the 
government, while the second number is the payoff of the private sector.  
The highest payoff for the government (4) is the situation in which the 
private sector installs SPP without any subsidy, namely (NS, I); the second 
best (3) can be assumed as the one in which SPP are installed, although 
with subsidy (S, I);  the third one (2) is obtained in the case in which, when 
the private sector does not install, subsidy is paid, so as to favour a future 
installation (S, NI), and the worst one (1) is when no subsidies are paid, so 
that no panels will be installed (NS, NI).  
Let us analyse now the payoffs of the private sector.  The first best (4) can 
be assumed as the one in which the private sector installs SPP and receives 
a subsidy (S, I), assuming therefore that the subsidy is such as to produce a 
profit. The second best (3) can be assumed to be the one in which the 
government pays a subsidy, but the private sector does not install 
immediately SPP but waits to do it in the future (S, NI); the third best (2) is 
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the one in which no subsidy is paid but panels are installed (NS; I) and the 
worst case (1) can be reasonably assumed to be the case in which no 
subsidies are received and no SPP are installed (NS, NI).  
The situation described above is represented in Figure 1. As it is easy to 
verify by simple inspection, the outcome of this simultaneous game is a 
unique Nash equilibrium (that in the matrix below is indicated with a *), in 
which the private sector installs SPP without the encouragement of a 
subsidy. 
 
 
Private Sector 
 
Install Not Install 
Government 
Subsidize 3, 4 2, 3 
Not 
Subsidize 
4, 2 * 1, 1 
Table A2- 1 A normal form game in which the government and the private 
sector move simultaneously and in which SPP installation is convenient even 
without subsidies 
The situation might change, however, if we consider an extensive form 
game, in which the two players move sequentially, rather than 
simultaneously (the first payoff refers to the player who moves first).  
Let us see what the equilibrium of the game is when investors move first, 
so that they can force the government to cope with their action. The private 
sector knows that if it invests, the government’s optimal response will be 
not to subsidize (in which case the payoff of the latter will be 4, against 3 
obtained when subsidizing). Private sector’s payoff, then, will be 2. If the 
private sector does not invest, however, the government will have the 
option of subsidizing, in which case the former will get a payoff of 3, and 
not subsidizing, in which case still the former will get 1. The payoff of 
economic agents, then, will be 3. Given that the private sector will prefer to 
get 3 rather than 2, the only subgame perfect equilibrium of this extensive 
form game, then, is the one in which economic agents do not invest and the 
government will be forced to provide economic incentives.  
It is easy to see instead that in the case in which the leader of the game is 
the government, namely the government decides its best action by moving 
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(irrevocably) first and taking into account the actions of the private sector, 
the equilibrium goes back to the one identified in the simultaneous moves 
game, as we are going to show below.  
The private sector will find it convenient to install SPP both if the 
government subsidizes and if it does not do it (it gets 4, rather than 3, in the 
first case, and 2 rather than 1 in the second case), so that the latter will have 
the convenience not to subsidize. 
 
Figure A2. 1 An extensive form game with the government moving second, or 
not being able to commit credibly to a given action, so that it is expected to re-
optimize after the move of the private sector. 
 
Figure A2. 2 An extensive form game with the government being able to commit 
credibly to a given action 
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To summarize, focusing on the role played by expectations, we have 
provided an explanation to the fact that long term and credible policies, 
like the 20-years span German FIT, would prove more effective than not 
clearly announced nor spelled out like those adopted by the Netherlands or 
Spain, even if similar in the content.  
We have also explained why subsidy policies may actually prevent the self-
deployment of investments in SPP systems. This may well be due to the 
fact that technological market developments are still insufficient to reach 
the fuel parity. However, it might also be due to the fact that a non-credible 
government may allow the private sector to gain Stackelberg leadership, in 
which case the only equilibrium that would realize in the market would be 
the one in which the private sector waits for the introduction of economic 
incentives. We have concluded, then, that in order to increase the efficiency 
of public policies, the government should carefully guide the expectations 
of the private sector. 
 
2.                Trend in the oil price 
 
Figure A2. 3 Oil price trend from 1940 to 2016. Source: Trans FS  
https://www.transfs.com/should-you-invest-in-oil/  
 
 
3. A note on the data 
125 
 
As pointed out in the main text the data were principally drawn from the 
Trends, Snapshots and Annual Reports of the International Energy Agency 
(IEA). During data collation we found some discrepancies in the data reported 
in the Trend Reports with earlier reports containing more detailed data than 
more recent ones which in some cases included trivial approximations or even 
missing values. For such situations, other sources (IRENA, UN, World Bank, 
OECD, EUROSTAT, and national energy agencies) were used to check and fill 
the missing data. 
 
4.                   The minimum and maximum scenario 
The minimum and maximum scenario adopted in this paper for each 
country considered are reported in the table below with related sources.  
Country 
Minimum 
Scenario 
Maximum 
Scenario 
Source for minimum target 
Australia 12000 36000 
http://reneweconomy.com.au/australian-solar-capacity-
now-6gw-to-double-again-by-2020-2020/ 
Austria 2000 6000 No political target - assumption 
Belgium 5350 16050 
IRENA:http://irena.org/remap/IRENA_REmap_RE_tar
gets_table_2014.pdf 
Canada 6300 12000 
http://www.cansia.ca/uploads/7/2/5/1/72513707/cansia_
roadmap_2020_final.pdf 
Switzerland 3000 6000 No political target - assumption 
China 162000 486000 
IRENA:http://irena.org/remap/IRENA_REmap_RE_tar
gets_table_2014.pdf 
Germany 51700 258500 
IRENA:http://irena.org/remap/IRENA_REmap_RE_tar
gets_table_2014.pdf 
Denmark 2000 6000 
Assumption, because it surpassed the political target 
https://www.solarguide.co.uk/denmark-to-smash-2020-
solar-energy-target 
Spain 5800 17400 
No political target - assumption  
http://www.idae.es/eu/node/12480 
Finland 500 1500 
Assumption - No SPP taget, only general 
http://www.vtt.fi/inf/pdf/technology/2015/T217.pdf 
France 18200 54600 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte
=JORFTEXT000033312688&dateTexte=&categorieLien=i
d 
UK 20000 60000 
https://www.bre.co.uk/filelibrary/nsc/Documents%20Li
brary/Not%20for%20Profits/KTN_Report_Solar-PV-
roadmap-to-2020_1113.pdf 
India 100000 300000 
India Solar Mission: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jawaharlal_Nehru_Natio
nal_Solar_Mission 
Israel 3500 17500 https://www.pv-magazine.com/2017/05/19/israel-to-
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hold-tender-for-over-150-mw-of-distributed-
generation-pv-in-july/ 
Italy 24000 72000 
IRENA:http://irena.org/remap/IRENA_REmap_RE_tar
gets_table_2014.pdf 
Japan 53000 265000 
http://www.univergy.com/en/mercados/japon/15-
privacidad 
Korea 20600 103000 
Assumption and IRENA: 
http://irena.org/remap/IRENA_REmap_RE_targets_tabl
e_2014.pdf 
Mexico 5720 28600 
https://www.pv-magazine.com/2017/01/02/mexico-
targets-addition-of-5-4-gw-of-pv-in-next-3-years/ 
Malaysia 854 15000 
http://www.irena.org/remap/RE%20Targets_Summary
%20REmap_14mar2016.pdf 
Netherlands 6000 20000 
http://transrisk-project.eu/sites/default/files/page-
files/JIQ%20Magazine%20on%20Climate%20and%20Su
stainability%2C%20Special%2C%2017%20November%
202016.pdf 
Norway 500 5000 No political target - assumption 
Portugal 670 10000 
https://www.pv-magazine.com/2014/09/05/portugal-
adds-33-mw-of-pv-for-330-mw-cumulative-solar-
capacity_100016340/ 
Sweden 1000 5000 
No target -
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2016/1
0/sweden-set-to-launch-residential-energy-storage-
scheme.html 
Thailand 6000 30000 
http://thailand.ahk.de/fileadmin/ahk_thailand/Projects/
PV-
Solar/2016/9.45_20160523_Thailand_PV_Policy_AHK.p
df 
Turkey 5000 15000 
https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2015/10/Renewab
le%20Energy%20Turkey.pdf 
USA 60000 180000 
No target: 
http://www.irena.org/remap/RE%20Targets_Summary
%20REmap_14mar2016.pdf 
 
Table A2- 2 Minimum and maximum scenarios and related sources in 26 
considered countries 
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 5.            Figures and graphics 
 
 
Figure A2. 4 GIM fit of SPP adoptions during 1992-2016 with forecast up to 
2030 in the 26 countries considered. The graph reports observed vs predicted 
average monthly figures (instead of the annual figures). 
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Comparison between GIM and BM fits 
Figure A2. 5 compares the fit by the GMB with that provided by the basic Bass 
model (BM). To appreciate differences the comparison is carried out using   in 
terms of the graphic reproduction of the shocks experienced in the adoption 
paths is reported in Figure_SM 1 (details on the improvement in goodness of fit 
are postponed to the subsection on “Numerical details”. 
 
Figure A2. 5 GIM fit of SPP adoptions during 1992-2016 in the 26 countries 
considered compared with the corresponding best fit by the basic Bass model 
under the minimum scenario on the market potential. The legend in each graph 
specifies the number and type of shock functions selected by model fit. 
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The maximum scenario 
 
 
Figure A2. 6 GIM fit of SPP adoptions during 1992-2016 in the 26 countries 
with forecast up to 2030 considered under the maximum scenario on the market 
potential. The graph reports observed vs predicted average monthly figures 
(instead of the annual figures) in order to depict a smoother temporal profile. 
The legend in each graph specifies the number and type of shock functions 
selected by model fit. 
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The minimum scenario 
 
 
Figure A2. 7 The GIM fit in the 26 countries considered: observed vs predicted 
annual (%) growth rates on adoptions of SPP during 1992-2016 (in natural 
scale) under the minimum scenario on the market potential. The legend in each 
graph specifies the number and type of shock functions selected by model fit. 
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6.      Numerical details on GIM estimates for all countries 
  
R2 Bass Best Model R2 Best model SMPCC 
AUS 0.996805943 F3+F3 0.999978 0.993201 
AUT 0.994352412 F3+F3 0.999779 0.960906 
BEL 0.998131094 F1+F3+F3 0.9999986 0.999267 
CAN 0.997786959 F2+F3 0.9991066 0.596284 
CHE 0.998810612 F3 0.9998458 0.870354 
CHN 0.996353251 F3+F3 0.9997044 0.918935 
DEU 0.99869749 F2+F2+F3 0.9999682 0.975556 
DNK 0.978947293 F3+F3 0.9999488 0.997569 
ESP 0.984451734 F3+F3 0.9997668 0.985003 
FIN 0.903685498 F1+F3 0.9965364 0.964039 
FRA 0.993735394 F3+F3+F3 0.9999446 0.991159 
GBR 0.996825472 F3+F3 0.9998456 0.951375 
IND 0.986320924 F3+F3 0.9999336 0.995145 
ISR 0.997968846 F2+F2 0.9996171 0.811496 
ITA 0.998361828 F3+F2 0.9999531 0.971381 
JAP 0.99363425 F1+F3 0.9998285 0.973066 
KOR 0.995212601 F3+F3 0.9997888 0.955882 
MEX 0.92184071 F2+F2 0.9995842 0.994680 
MYS 0.98856044 F3 0.9987969 0.894831 
NLD 0.997349815 F3+F3 0.9996921 0.883804 
NOR -0.70168166 F3+F3 0.9996104 0.999771 
PRT 0.995806055 F2+F3+F3 0.9998023 0.952865 
SWE 0.995908702 F3 0.9997855 0.947574 
THA 0.984482043 F3+F3+F3 0.9996265 0.975929 
TUR 0.999620618 F3 0.9999890 0.970981 
USA 0.998352283 F3+F2 0.9999708 0.982258 
Table A2- 3 Squared multiple partial correlation coefficient (SMPCC) between 
Bass and the resulting best model values for the minimum scenario in the 26 
considered countries. 
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Table A2- 4 Parameter estimates for the Bass and Best fit Model in the 
26 considered countries  
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Country Model 
Installed 
capacity 
by 2016 
Minimum 
target 
m* 
(estimate) 
R2 Optimal R2 Best 
Fit 
SMPCC 
DEU F2+F2+F3 41186 51700 58484 0.9999734 0.999968 0.166 
ESP F3+F3 5483 5800 5500 0.9998091 0.999767 0.181 
ITA F3+F2 19279 24000 21049 0.9999566 0.999953 0.074 
CAN F2+F3 2780 6300 3005 0.9997991 0.999107 0.775 
FRA F3+F3+F3 7164 18200 15432 0.9999876 0.999945 0.776 
GBR F3+F3 11830 20000 21818 0.999853 0.999846 0.048 
JAP F1+F3 42041 53000 62583 0.9998524 0.999829 0.139 
CHE F3 1664 3000 3671 0.9998562 0.999846 0.067 
ISR F2+F2 1016 3500 3500 0.9996172 0.999617 0.000 
NLD F3+F3 2085 6000 15237 0.999965 0.999692 0.886 
KOR F3+F3 4397 20600 5747 0.9999508 0.999789 0.767 
Table A2- 5 Estimated market saturation (m*) for selected countries where the 
peak of adoptions has been overcome 
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Model 
R2 Best Fit 
MIN 
R2 Best 
Fit MAX 
SMPCC 
AUS F3+F3 0.999978 0.999955 0.514663 
AUT F3+F3 0.999779 0.998257 0.873321 
BEL F1+F3+F3 0.9999986 0.999977 0.939244 
CAN F2+F3 0.9991066 0.998315 0.469722 
CHE F3 0.9998458 0.999813 0.176993 
CHN F3+F3 0.9997044 0.999663 0.122574 
DEU F2+F2+F3 0.9999682 0.999678 0.901086 
DNK F3+F3 0.9999488 0.999931 0.259867 
ESP F3+F3 0.9997668 0.998955 0.776919 
FIN F1+F3 0.9965364 0.996587 -0.01489 
FRA F3+F3+F3 0.9999446 0.999458 0.897853 
GBR F3+F3 0.9998456 0.999087 0.830861 
IND F3+F3 0.9999336 0.999934 -0.00668 
ISR F2+F2 0.9996171 0.999554 0.141145 
ITA F3+F2 0.9999531 0.999029 0.951719 
JAP F1+F3 0.9998285 0.999594 0.577538 
KOR F3+F3 0.9997888 0.999752 0.147468 
MEX F2+F2 0.9995842 0.999583 0.003574 
MYS F3 0.9987969 0.997716 0.47331 
NLD F3+F3 0.9996921 0.999884 -1.65632 
NOR F3+F3 0.9996104 0.999562 0.110392 
PRT F2+F3+F3 0.9998023 0.998516 0.866759 
SWE F3 0.9997855 0.99979 -0.02133 
THA F3+F3+F3 0.9996265 0.999586 0.096992 
TUR F3 0.9999890 0.999987 0.148089 
USA F3+F2 0.9999708 0.999899 0.71123 
Table A2- 6 Squared multiple partial correlation coefficient (SMPCC) between 
the minimum and the maximum scenarios 
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99% 
min 
target 
Year 
MIN 
target 
99% of 
max 
target 
Year 
MAX 
target 
GW to 
cover 
elect. 
cons. 
MW 
in 
2016 
% 
elect. 
from 
SPP in 
2016 
% 
elect. 
from 
SPP 
in 
MIN 
% elect. 
from 
SPP in 
MAX 
AUS 11880 2043 35640 2053 272 5985 2.2 4.4 13.2 
AUT 1980 2032 5940 2039 43 1108 2.6 4.7 14.0 
BEL 5296 2026 15889 2032 53 3423 6.5 10.1 30.3 
CAN 6237 2041 11880 2046 208 2779 1.3 3.0 5.8 
CHE 2970 2041 8910 2055 43 1664 3.9 7.0 21.0 
CHN 160380 2020 481140 2027 1412 78070 5.5 11.5 34.4 
DEU 51183 2025 255915 2036 381 41186 10.8 13.6 67.9 
DNK 1980 2074 5940 2091 26 858 3.4 7.8 23.5 
ESP 5742 2026 17226 2055 266 5483 2.1 2.2 6.5 
FIN 495 2070 1485 2079 55 37 0.1 0.9 2.7 
FRA 18018 2048 54054 2057 335 7164 2.1 5.4 16.3 
GBR 19800 2029 59400 2035 199 11830 6.0 10.1 30.2 
IND 99000 2040 297000 2046 836 9658 1.2 12.0 35.9 
ISR 3465 2056 17325 2071 29 1015.6 3.5 12.2 60.8 
ITA 23760 2066 71280 2103 222 19278 8.7 10.8 32.5 
JAP 52470 2023 262350 2043 1156 42041 3.6 4.6 22.9 
KOR 20394 2052 101970 2065 360 4397 1.2 5.7 28.6 
MEX 5662.8 2076 28314 2094 140 322 0.2 4.1 20.4 
MYS 845.46 2032 14850 2043 75 332.5 0.4 1.1 20.0 
NLD 5940 2031 19800 2036 68 2085 3.1 8.9 29.5 
PRT 663.3 2029 9900 2079 56 517 0.9 1.2 17.9 
SWE 990 2050 4950 2065 81 205 0.3 1.2 6.2 
TUR 4950 2031 14850 2037 54 850 1.6 9.2 27.5 
USA 59400 2020 178200 2030 4112 40658 1.0 1.5 4.4 
Table A2- 7 First four columns: estimates of the year in which the 99% of the 
minimum and maximum targets are reached. Next five columns: the cumulative 
installed capacity in 2016 vs the necessary capacity (in GW) to provide 
electricity only from SPP, share in total electricity output (%) for installed 
capacity in 2016, minimum and maximum target. 
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Table A2- 8 Description of incentives during the shock periods in the 26 
considered countries 
 First incentive 
Country Year 
Shock 
Form 
Type Info Source 
AUS 2009 F3 
Investment 
subsidy 
Solar Homes and Communities Plan: 2000- June 
2009 refund up to AUD 8 000 for 1 kWp of PV 
installed on residential buildings and up to 50% of 
the cost of PV systems up to 2 kW installed on 
community buildings. Nat Rep AUS 2009; 
1 
FIT 
State and territory FIT: Began from 2008 but in 2010 
had covered most of the states, directed to the 
residential sector. 
2 
AUT 2009 F3 FIT 
New FIT were determined in February 2009 for RES. 
In the case of SPP the rates were up to 5kWp: 45.98; 
5-10kWp: 39.98; over 10kWp: 29.98 cents/kWh. The 
tariff was recalculated in 2010 and 2012. 
3 
BEL 
2006- 
2009 
F1 
Investment 
subsidy 
Investment subsidy in Flanders: Between 
29/10/2004 and 16/05/2007, but replaced in October 
2007 and ended on 31th January 2011. It provided 
40% of additional costs for SMEs, and 20% for large 
enterprises, with variations over the years.  
4 
Target 
 Flemish Government Second Climate Policy Plan 
in 2006: Funding 1522million, covers the 2006-12 
period and aims at achieving the Flemish Kyoto 
target and establishing the short, medium and long 
term strategies for Flanders;  
5 
CAN 2009 F2 FIT 
Increased rate of FIT from 0.42CAD/kWh in 2006 to 
0.802CAD/kWh in 2009 in Ontario (98% of the SPP 
market). 
6 
CHE 2011 F3 
FIT + 
Investment 
subsidy 
Feed-in Tariffs for RES and Investment Aid for Small 
PV. Small photovoltaics plants are being promoted 
from 2014 with investment aids. The tariff is 
applicable for 20 years (10 years for biomass 
infrastructure power plants) and is regularly 
reviewed. 
7 
CHN 2010 F3 
FIT + 
Investment 
subsidy 
Solar PV building project: 91MWp, subsidy 15-
20Yuan/kWp; FIT at the price of sulfur coal-fire 
generation unit. 
8 
Golden Sun project: 632MWp, subsidies 50-70% of 
investment cost, FIT; Also FIT for utility-scale 
1.15Yuan/kWh in 2011 and 1.0Yuan/kWh in 2012 
China Power Investment Corporation Huanghe 
Hydropower PV station: 500MW 2013-2014.  
9 
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DEU 2004 F2 FIT 
EEG Program: The FIT scheme was implemented in 
2000 and paid 0.52EUR/kWh with a 5% decrease 
every year. The rates were revised in 2004 and 
increased to 0.57EUR/kWh 
10 
DNK 
2011-
12 
F3 
NMS In 2012 NMS of 0.08EUR/kWh; Only generators 
under 6 kW are eligible to participate in the scheme.  
11 
Target 
Danish 2050 Energy Strategy: achieve 100% 
independence from fossil fuel in the national energy 
mix by 2050. 
12 
ESP 2007 F3 FIT 
Royal Decree 661/2007. In September 2008, new 
tariffs and a new cap were established for solar PV. 
Systems registered prior to 29 September 2008 are 
eligible for a feed-in tariff of between approximately 
EUR cents 23/kWh and EUR cents 44/kWh. 
13 
FIN 
2011-
12 
F3 
(negative) 
FIT for 
other RES 
Solar is excluded for the FIT scheme implemented in 
2010. Only wind, bioenergy, timber chip and wood-
fuelled power plants are eligible.  
14 
FRA 2007 F3 
Investment 
subsidy  
In 2006 the Financial Act subsidy program 
reimbursed to household rooftop or façade up to 
50% of the costs of the materials (installation costs 
are excluded). 
15 
FIT 
FIT was implemented in 2005 and had a rate 
increased in 2006. 
16 
GBR 2010 F2 FIT 
In act from April 2010. Had higher values until 2012 
when the tariffs were revised and decreased 
drastically.  
17 
IND 
2010-
11 
F3 FIT 
In 2008 Production related incentives for grid 
connected solar: promoted systems above 1 MW of 
capacity at a single location. The scheme was limited 
to 5 MW per developer across India and a maximum 
of 10 MW per state 5% decrease each year for new 
installations. In 2011 State level initiatives: Solar 
parks, FIT different by region.  
18 
ISR 2009 F2 FIT 
FIT scheme from 2008 to 2012 for small and medium 
systems. The tariff slightly decreased in 2009 at 
0.197NIS/kWh 
19 
ITA 2006 F3 FIT Conto Energia: divided in 5 stages. 20 
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JAP 
1996-
2001 
F1 
Investment 
subsidies 
Residential SPP Monitor Program:  covered 50% of 
the cost from 1994 to 1996 and one third of the cost 
from 1997 to 1999. In 2000 the subsidy rate was JPY 
270 000 per kW in the first half of the year, up to 
10kW and JPY 180 000 per kW, up to 4kW in the 
second half of the year. It was further reduced to JPY 
150 000 per kW, (up to 4kW) before the end of the 
fiscal year. In 2001 the subsidy was reduced to JPY 
120 000 per kW. In 2002 the subsidy was further 
reduced to JPY 100 000 per kW. The subsidy rate 
continued to decline, and was JPY 20 000 per kW 
when the programme ended in 2006. 
21 
KOR 
2005-
2006 
F3 
Investment 
subsidies 
100,000 roof-top program: 2452 systems with a total 
capacity of 6469kW were for single-family houses, 
the average capacity being 2,47kW. General 
Deployment Program: the government supports 
70% of installation cost. 
22 
FIT 
 FIT Scheme: rate per kW-hr changed from 716,40 
KRW to 677,38 KRW for systems larger than 30 kW 
with a ceiling of cumulative 100 MW since Oct. 2006 
guaranteed for 15 years for the PV system over 3 
KW 
MEX 2013 F2 RPS 
General Law of Climate Change (Ley General de 
Cambio Climático) on 10th October 2012: The Law 
defines several GHG mitigation targets that directly 
incentivise the development of renewable energies. 
These are: 1) To generate at least 35% of power with 
clean technologies by 2024. 2) To reduce emissions 
by 30% by 2020, and 50% by 2050 compared to 2000. 
23 
MYS 2012 F3 FIT 
The Renewable Energy Act 2011 was enforced on 
1st April December 2011. Costs of the system are 
transferred onto electricity consumers who pay an 
additional surcharge of 1% on top of their electricity 
bills collected by the distribution licensees and 
deposited into the RE Fund. Existing RE power 
plants under the existing Small Renewable Energy 
Programme (SREP) under the RE Act 2011 are 
allowed to convert to the current FiT system. FITs 
are for over a 21 year period for PV. 2014 - new, 
lowered FIT announced; 2015 - lowered FIT for solar 
PV announced entering into force on 1st of January 
2016; 
24 
NLD 
2010-
12 
F3 FIT 
Feed-in Premium Programme SDE (Stimulering 
Duurzame Energie +): Grant scheme available for 
solar panels buyers in a private sector. 
EUR 50.000.000 were made available for this 
scheme. From 2011 to 20th December 2013. Small 
and large systems. FIP contracts are signed for 15 
years. 
25 
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NOR 2014 F3 
Green 
Certificates 
(GC) 
Norway-Sweden Green Certificate Scheme for 
electricity production: 1 January 2012 a common 
Norwegian-Swedish certificate market for renewable 
electricity production was established. The overall 
target for new renewable electricity production in 
the common electricity certificate market is 28.4 
TWh by the year 2020. The certificate scheme is an 
important measure in the strategy to reach Norways 
national energy target in accordance with the 
renewables directive, which is 67.5 % renewable 
energy by 2020. 
26 
PRT 2007 F2 
FIT 
(increase) 
Decree Law 33- A/2005 establishes FIT for 
Photovoltaics less or equal to 5 kW 44.4 euro 
cents/kWh for the first 21 GWh/ MW injected in the 
grid or 15 years whatever comes first. For 
installations bigger than 5 kW 31.7 euro cents/kWh 
for the first 21 GWh/ MW injected in the grid or 15 
years whatever comes first. Decree Law No. 
225.2007 of 31 May 2007, revised the feed-in tariffs 
established by the previous Decree Law No. 33 
A/2005. Photovoltaic Up to 5 kW: EUR 450/MWh 5 
kW to 5 MW: EUR 317/MWh Above 5 MW: EUR 
310/MWh micro-generation photovoltaic Under 5 
kW: EUR 470/MWh Between 5 and 150 kW: EUR 
355/MWh. 
27 
SWE 2011 F3 
Target 
Renewable energy target for Sweden is to have at 
least a 50 % of share of energy generated from 
renewable sources in gross final energy 
consumption. Also, the electricity goal for renewable 
energy by 2020 is 63% of electricity demand met by 
electricity generated from renewable energy sources; 
28 
GC (see Norway) 26 
THA 2009 F3 FIT 
In 2007, feed-in premiums or "adders" on top of the 
regular electricity tariff of THB 2.0-2.5/kWh (THB 35 
= USD 1). The aim is to add 2 GW of large solar 
installations by 2021. Above was modified in March 
2009 to BHT 1.00/kWh for all technologies, except 
wind and solar for which they reach BHT 1.50/kWh. 
29 
TUR 2014 F3 
Targets 
Renewable Energy Law 2010. In a move to meet its 
target of reaching 30% of its power from renewable 
sources by 2023, Turkey implemented a long-
awaited renewable energy law. 30 
FIT 
The law first adjusts and increases the Turkish Feed-
in tariffs, fixed for all system sizes at 0.133USD/kWh 
for solar for PV. Also other RES obtained FIT.  
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USA 2009 F3 
Various: 
Incentives 
to 
companies 
+ FIT & 
RPS at 
local level 
No national program. The incentives are at local or 
state level. Examples of incentives: Section 1603 
grants: gives federal grants to solar companies for 30 
percent of investments into solar energy. The federal 
government has given solar companies over $25 
billion in grant money through this program until 
2011. California enacted a feed-in tariff which 
began on February 14, 2008. Washington state has a 
feed-in tariff of 15 ¢/kWh which increases to 54 
¢/kWh if components are manufactured in the state. 
Hawaii, Michigan, and Vermont also have feed in 
tariffs. 
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 Second incentive 
Country Year 
Shock 
Form 
Type Info Source 
AUS 2015 F3 FIT 
Victoria State offered a tariff of 6cent/kWh (1Jan 2013 - 
31Dec 2015) and 5cent/kWh (1 Jan 2016 - 30Jun 2017) 
for systems <100kW.  
32 
AUT 2013 F3 
Investment 
subsidy 
Investment subsidy for SPP <5kW peak from 12th 
April to 30th November: EUR 36 million is available to 
be distributed as an investment subsidy to the 
individuals owning small solar PV installations 
33 
BEL 2011 F3 Target 
National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP) in 
2010: Belgium 2020 targets: Electricity: 21% of 
electricity demand met by electricity generated from 
renewable energy sources; Support for renewables 
offered in Belgium (federal level only): Green 
Certificates schemes; Tax reduction on energy-saving 
investment for individuals; Tax deductions for 
investments for the benefit of companies. 
28 
CAN 2014 F3 
FIT 
reduction 
FIT unchanged from 2013 to 2015, then reduction in 
2016. The FIT scheme ended in 2017 
6 
CHN 2016 F3 Target 
Five Year Plan: defined the short term PV 
development goals, positioning and focus points, 
especially policy adjustment mechanism and direction 
of innovation 
34 
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DEU 2009 F2 
FIT 
(reduction) 
2009 Amendment of the Renewable Energy Sources 
Act (EEG 2009) : For solar PV, tariffs under the new 
law decreased for all capacity sizes. 
10 
DNK 2015 F3 Solar park 
WIRSOL: the largest solar park in the north Europe 
was created with 61.5MW (out of 181.4MW installed 
that year).  
35 
ESP 
2010-
11 
F3 
FIT 
(reduction) 
Correction of the tariff deficit in the electricity sector 
(Royal Decree-Law 14/2010): reduce the tariff deficit 
currently burdening the electricity sector with 
emergency measures ranging form 2011 to 2013. 
36 
FIN 
2015-
16 
F3 
Investment 
subsidy 
Investment subsidy: 30 % investment subsidy of the 
total costs of grid-connected PV projects. At the 
beginning of 2016, the subsidy level decreased to 25%.  37 
Tax Credit 
Tax credit: 45% of the total work cost, including taxes, 
component of the PV system. 
FRA 
2009-
10 
F3 
FIT 
reduction 
The change was announced in 2009 therefore many 
rushed into applying for the old FIT which actual 
installations in 2010. Decrease of 12% in FIT due to the 
fall of prices 
38 
Target 
National Renewable Energy Action Plan: 27% of 
electricity demand met by electricity generated from 
renewable energy sources by 2020; 
28 
GBR 
2013-
14 
F3 FIT + RPS 
The FIT scheme continues and the Renewable 
Obligation Certificates (ROC is a sort of RPS) is 
implemented for systems above 50kW.  
17 + 39 
IND 2015 F3 Target (RPS) 
"Smart cities" project: Installation of solar energy up to 
10% of the total electricity of selected cities 
40 
ISR 2013 F2 NMS 
From 2013, for RES systems. Max. 400 MW capacity. 
For the use of the grid by the consumer, a tariff charge 
for "Grid integration costs" (e.g. NIS 0.013-0.014/KWh 
for high-voltage consumers) will be reduced from the 
value of credit to the consumer in accordance with the 
consumer's grid voltage line (high/low), and the time 
of grid-use. 
41 
ITA 
2010-
11 
F2 FIT Another stage of Conto energia 20 
JAP 
2012-
13 
F3 FIT 
From July 2012, replacing RPS. Electric power 
companies are obliged to purchase electricity 
generated from renewable energy sources on a fixed-
period contract at a fixed price. Cost for purchasing is 
paid by electricity users in the form of a nationwide 
equal surcharge. Purchase price is re-examined and 
published in each year. 
42 
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KOR 2012 F3 RPS 
In January 2012 the Renewable Portfolio Standard 
(RPS) replaced previously in place feed-in tariff system 
in order to accelerate Korea’s renewable energy 
deployment with a goal to create a competitive market 
environment for the sector. RPS programme requires 
13 largest power companies (with installed power 
capacity larger than 500 MW) to steadily increase their 
renewable energy mix in total power generation in 
period of 2012-2024. 
22 
MEX 2016 F2 RPS 
Clean Energy Certificates: The government 
determines the requirements for clean energy 
certificates on a yearly basis three years in advance of 
the compliance period. The first compliance period 
will be 2018. As of 31st of March 2015, the Clean 
Energy Quota for this period is set at level of 5% of 
total electricity consumption. Penalty for non-
compliance is between USD 30-250/ MWh. The first 
long-term auction were be held in 2016. 
43 
NOR 2016 F3 GC Same policy (Green certificates) 26 
PRT 2012 F3 FIT 
Renewable micro-generation Tariffs (Decree 284/2011): 
As of 2012, the reference tariff for renewables micro 
generation will be reduced from the planned EUR 
360/MWh to EUR 326/MWh. Micro generation tariffs 
are awarded for a 15 year period, devided between the 
first eight years and the subsequent seven years. 
44 
THA 
2012-
13 
F3 FIT (revised) 
On 16 July 2013 the National Energy Policy 
Commission (NPS) of Thailand adopted new feed-in 
tariff scheme supporting rooftop and community 
ground-mounted solar installations. The goal of the 
scheme is to support installation of 1 GW of new, 
small-scale solar systems in Thailand by 2014. 
29 
USA 2016 F2 
FIT, NMS,  
Investment 
subsidy, 
RPS 
FIT was present in 3 states, FIP was present in 20 
states, 30% Investment subsidies are offered by at least 
14 states, 10 states have GC, 29 states have RPS, 38 
states have NMS. 
45 
 
 Third incentive 
Country Year Shock Form Type Info Source 
BEL 2013 
F3 
(negative) 
Reduction 
in support 
2011-2013: Introduction of a fixed tariff 
for all PV owners. This tariff varies 
from 55 to 83 €/kVA installed. Tax 
credits (40% of investment) were 
cancelled by the federal authority. 
Installers filled their order books for 
almost 6 month after the 30th 
November 2011 so that their clients 46 
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could still benefits from this tax credit. 
The green certificates (GC) system was 
revised in the 3 regions to adapt to the 
lowering prices of PV and the financial 
constraints of public services 
DEU 2012 
F3 
(negative) 
FIT 
(reduction) 
EEG 2009 is continued, but with 
decreases in tariffs: on 1 January tariffs 
decrease between 1.5 per cent and 24 
per cent. To limit the increase of total 
feed-in-payments an amendment 
referring to PV facilites ('PV-Novelle') 
was agreed on end of June 2012, but 
effective 1 April 2012. Main 
components: overall target of 52 
Gigawatt of PV power, an extra 
decrease of tariffs by 1% monthly, the 
introduction of a new category for roof-
top facilities and the limitation of the 
total power of a facility to 10 Megawatt. 47 
FRA 
     
PRT 2014 F3 FIT 
Feed-in tariffs for micro and mini 
generation for 2013 (Portarias 430/2012 
and 431 /2012): On 31st December 2012 
Feed-in tariff rates for micro and mini 
renewable electricity generators were 
announced. In comparison to rates from 
2012, 2013 rates are lowered by 30%. 
Further reductions occured for 2014 
through Feed-in tariffs for micro and 
mini generation for 2014. 44 
THA 2016 F3 RPS 
The Alternative Energy Development 
Plan (AEDP 2015-2036) increases targets 
for installed alternative energy to 19.635 
MW in 2036. 
48 
 
Sources for incentives: 
1. http://www.tai.org.au/sites/defualt/files/PB%2021%20SHCP%20final_4.pdf 
2. IEA PVPS & Australian PV Association (2011) National Survey Report 
Australia 2010 
3. https://www.e-control.at/de/recht/bundesrecht/oekostrom-
energieeffizienz/verordnungen#p_p_id_56_INSTANCE_10305A20243_ 
4. http://www.agentschapondernemen.be/maatregel/ecologiepremie-ep-plus 
5. https://www.vlaanderen.be/nl/publicaties/detail/the-flemish-climate-policy-
plan-2006-2012-the-climate-is-changing-are-you-changing-too 
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6. http://www.ieso.ca/en/sector-participants/feed-in-tariff-program/fit-archive 
7. https://www.admin.ch/opc/it/classified-compilation/19983485/index.html 
8. National Survey Report of PV Power Applications in China - 2011 
9. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huanghe_Hydropower_Golmud_Solar_Park 
10. http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/EE/Navigation/DE/Recht-
Politik/Das_EEG/das_eeg.html;jsessionid=75CEA3F43B6C393EA2AF774CF549
AD56 
11. https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=158132 
12. http://www.kebmin.dk/sites/kebmin.dk/files/news/from-coal-oil-and-gas-to-
green-energy/Energy%20Strategy%202050%20web.pdf 
13. http://www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/2007/BOE-A-2007-10556-consolidado.pdf 
14. http://www.emvi.fi/files/Feed_in_tariff_summary_6_2013.pdf 
15.  IEA PVPS & André Claverie, Bernard Equer, National Survey Report France - 
2006 
16. http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Quels-sont-les-tarifs-d-
achats.html 
17. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/feed-in-tariff-statistics 
18. http://wgbis.ces.iisc.ernet.in/biodiversity/sahyadri_enews/newsletter/issue45/bi
bliography/Solar%20energy%20in%20india%20strategies%20policies%20persp
ectives.pdf 
19. http://www.wind-
works.org/FeedLaws/Israel/renewable%20tariffs%20Israel%202009.pdf 
20. https://www.gse.it/servizi-per-te/fotovoltaico/conto-energia 
21. http://www.nef.or.jp/english/index.html  
22. http://www.kemco.or.kr/new_eng/pg02/pg02040602.asp 
23. http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/lgcc.htm 
24. http://seda.gov.my/go-
home.php?omaneg=00010100000001010101000100001000000000000000000000&
s=146 
25. http://www.agentschapnl.nl/sites/default/files/bijlagen/Maak%20kennis%20me
t%20de%20SDE%202012.pdf 
26. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Subject/energy-in-norway/electricity-
certificates.html?id=517462, 
27. http://www.min-
economia.pt/innerPage.aspx?idCat=51&idMasterCat=13&idLang=2 
28. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/action_plan_en.htm 
29. http://www.egat.co.th/en 
30. http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/infocenter/news/Pages/301210-turkish-
renewable-energy-law-approved.aspx 
31. IEA PVPS & National Renewable Energy Laborato, National Survey Report 
United States of America, 2009 
32. https://www.energy.vic.gov.au/renewable-energy/victorian-feed-in-tariff 
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33. http://www.klimafonds.gv.at/foerderungen/aktuelle-
foerderungen/2013/photovoltaik-foerderaktion/ 
34. http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/ 
35. https://wirsol.com/en/wirsol-opens-largest-solar-park-in-scandinavia/ 
36. http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2010/12/24/pdfs/BOE-A-2010-19757.pdf 
37. http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/79247 
38. National Survey Report France - 2009 
39. https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/renewables-obligation-
ro-buy-out-price-and-mutualisation-ceilings-2018-19-ro-year 
40. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2468025716300231 
41. https://pua.gov.il/English/Documents/The%20Israeli%20Net%20Metering%20S
cheme%20%20lessons%20learned.pdf 
42. http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2016/0318_03.html 
43. http://www.gob.mx/cenace 
44. http://www.renovaveisnahora.pt/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=7c5b754a-
90b2-433d-b519-a16974575d9c&groupId=13360 
45. IEA PVPS D. Boff, D. Feldman, L. Tinker , National Survey Report of PV 
Power Applications in USA - 2016 
46. National Survey Report of PV Power Applications in Belgium - 2013 
47. https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/germany/name-25107-
en.php?s=dHlwZT1yZSZzdGF0dXM9T2s,&return=PG5hdiBpZD0iYnJlYWRjcn
VtYiI-PGEgaHJlZj0iLyI-
SG9tZTwvYT4gJnJhcXVvOyA8YSBocmVmPSIvcG9saWNpZXNhbmRtZWFzd
XJlcy8iPlBvbGljaWVzIGFuZCBNZWFzdXJlczwvYT4gJnJhcXVvOyA8YSBocm
VmPSIvcG9saWNpZXNhbmRtZWFzdXJlcy9yZW5ld2FibGVlbmVyZ3kvIj5SZ
W5ld2FibGUgRW5lcmd5PC9hPjwvbmF2Pg,, 
48. http://www.eppo.go.th/PDP_hearing/PDP2015_PH_RealPresentation.pdf 
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R – Code for the nonlinear estimation 
Gauss-Newton algorithm  
In order to find the optimal value for the parameters of the general Bass 
model we used the nls function within the R-project program which uses 
the Gauss-Newton algorithm as default.  
The Gauss-Newton algorithm is an interactive computational method often 
used. The algorithm is based on approximations of the first order function 
f(t,θ) in Taylor series which lead to θ1, θ2, ... θm estimates gradually closer 
to ?̂? in regular cases (Draper and Smith, 1998). 
Near the value of the real parametric vector θ* the following expression is 
true: 
𝑓(𝑡𝑖 , 𝜽) ≈ 𝑓(𝑡𝑖 , 𝜽
∗) + ∑ [
𝜕𝑓(𝒕𝒊,𝜽)
𝜕𝜃𝑗
]
𝜽=𝜽𝟎
𝑝
𝑗=1 (𝜃𝑗 − 𝜃𝑗
∗)    (A2.1) 
The same equation can be written in vectoral form with initial value θ0 : 
𝒓(𝜽) = 𝒀 − 𝒇(𝜽) ≈ 𝒓(𝜽𝟎) − 𝑭. (𝜽𝟎)(𝜽 − 𝜽𝟎)  (A2.2) 
for the approximation of the Jacobean 𝐅. = 𝐅. (𝛉) = [
𝛛𝐟(𝐭𝐢,𝛉)
𝛛𝛉𝒋
]
𝛉=𝛉𝟎
which plays 
a similar role as the X matrix in the linear least-square models.  
Generally, the error sum of squares is described by the formula:  
𝑆𝑆(𝜽) = ‖𝑌 − 𝑓(𝜽)‖2 ≈ ‖𝒓(𝜽∗) − 𝑭. (𝜽∗)𝜷‖2    (A2.3) 
where β = θ – θ*.  
Considering the initial value, it follows the equation:  
𝑆𝑆(𝜽) = (𝜽 − 𝜽𝟎)
′𝑭.′ (𝜽𝟎)𝑭. (𝜽𝟎)(𝜽 − 𝜽𝟎) − 2𝒓
′(𝜽𝟎)𝑭. (𝜽𝟎)(𝜽 − 𝜽𝟎) +
𝒓′(𝜽𝟎)𝒓(𝜽𝟎)   ......................................                                               
     (A2.4) 
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Minimising the error sum of squares by equalling the Jacobean with 
respect θ to zero, a better solution is obtained13. The general process 
follows:   
𝒃 = 𝜽𝒎+𝟏 − 𝜽𝒎 = (𝑭.
′ (𝜽𝒎)𝑭. (𝜽𝒎))
−𝟏
𝑭.′ (𝜽𝒎)𝒓(𝜽𝒎)   (A2.5) 
where m+1 is the maximum number of repetitions needed to stop the 
algorithm.  
 
Example for Switzerland 
plot(X$t,X$Switzerland) 
#######  1.1 Generalized Bass Model   ############# 
V=Z[1,1]  #adoptions at time 0 = also with X$Switzerland[1] 
m=Z[2,1]  #minimum target 
a=Z[3,1]   #shock starting point 
Y_GBMCHE<-c() 
t=c(0:24) 
Y_GBMCHE<-YGIM(q=0.1547,c=0.907,a=17.42,A=12.5) 
plot(X$Year,X$Switzerland) 
plotfit(GBMCHE) 
#Applying the values obtained with the Excel Optimization Procedure 
preview(formula=Switzerland~ifelse(test= t<17, yes=V*m/(V+(m-V)*exp(-q*t)),                               
                                                          
13 F. is the n-dimensional normalized vector of the partial derivatives of the 
function f(t,θp) with respect to θp parameters. 
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                                   no= V*m/(V+(m-V)*exp(-q*(t+A/c*(1/c*(1-exp(-c*(t-a)))-(t-
a)*exp(-c*(t-a))))))), 
        start=c(q=0.15,c=0.907,a=17.4,A=12.5), data=X) 
preview(formula=Switzerland~ifelse(test= t<17, yes=4.18*5350/(4.18+(5350-
4.18)*exp(-q*t)),                               
                                   no= 4.18*5350/(4.18+(5350-4.18)*exp(-q*(t+A/c*(1/c*(1-exp(-
c*(t-a)))-(t-a)*exp(-c*(t-a))))))), 
        start=c(q=0.15,c=0.907,a=17.4,A=12.5), data=X) 
 
 
#Nonlinear optimization function 
GIBMCHE=nls(formula=Switzerland~ifelse(test= t<17.4, 
yes=X$Switzerland[1]*m/(X$Switzerland[1]+(m-X$Switzerland[1])*exp(-q*t)),                               
                                      no= X$Switzerland[1]*m/(X$Switzerland[1]+(m-
X$Switzerland[1])*exp(-q*(t+A/c*(1/c*(1-exp(-c*(t-a)))-(t-a)*exp(-c*(t-a))))))), 
           start=c(q=0.1547,c=0.907,a=17.42,A=12.5), data=X) 
 
GBMCHE=nls(formula=Switzerland~ifelse(test= t<17.4, 
yes=4.18*5350/(4.18+(5350-4.18)*exp(-q*t)),                               
                                      no= 4.18*5350/(4.18+(5350-4.18)*exp(-q*(t+A/c*(1/c*(1-exp(-
c*(t-a)))-(t-a)*exp(-c*(t-a))))))), 
           start=c(q=0.1547,c=0.907,a=17.42,A=12.5), data=X) 
#parameter registration 
parGBMCHE<-summary(GIMCHE) 
#plotting the estimated curve 
plotfit(GBMCHE, smooth=TRUE) 
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### Creating the GBM cumulative estimates 
t<-c(0:24) 
Y_GBMCHE<-c() 
Y_GBMCHE<-YGBM(q=summary(GBMCHE)$parameters[1,1], 
c=summary(GBMCHE)$parameters[2,1], 
a=summary(GBMCHE)$parameters[3,1], 
A=summary(GBMCHE)$parameters[4,1]) 
 
 
### Creating the annual fitting 
S_GBMCHE<-c(0:0) 
for (t in 1:25)  
 {S_GBMCHE[t-1]=Y_GBMCHE[t]-Y_GBMCHE[t-1] 
  t=t+1 
} 
#I have to add the 0 at the beginning of the period, or "NA" value 
S_GBMCHE<-append(S_GBMCHE, 0,after=0) 
plot(X$AnnSwitzerland) 
lines(S_GBMCHE, col="green", lwd=2) 
 
 
######## 1.2 Classic Bass model ######### 
 
#Searching for initial values 
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preview(formula=Switzerland~m*(1-exp(-(alfa+q)*t))/(1+q/alfa*exp(-(alfa+q)*t)), 
start=c(alfa=0.00008,q=0.34,m=3000), data=X) 
#Applying NLS estimation with the initial values found at the previous step 
BSCHE=nls(formula=Switzerland~m*(1-exp(-(alfa+q)*t))/(1+q/alfa*exp(-
(alfa+q)*t)), start=c(alfa=0.00008,q=0.34,m=2500), data=X) 
#Estimation curve vs. true values 
plotfit(BSCHE, smooth=TRUE) 
parBSCHE<-summary(BSCHE) 
 
###Creating the estimated values for each period 
t<-c(0:24) 
Y_BSCHE<-c() 
Y_BSCHE<-
YBass(alfa=parBSCHE$parameters[1,1],q=parBSCHE$parameter[2,1],m=parBS
CHE$parameter[3,1]) 
 
###Estimated annual installed capacity 
S_BSCHE<-c(0:0) 
for (t in 1:25)  
{S_BSCHE[t-1]=Y_BSCHE[t]-Y_BSCHE[t-1] 
t=t+1 
} 
##I have to add the 0 at the beginning of the period, or "NA" value 
S_BSCHE<-append(S_BSCHE, 0,after=0) 
plot(X$AnnSwitzerland) 
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lines(S_BSCHE, col="blue") 
 
###Estimated growth rate 
GR_BSCHE<-c() 
for (t in 1:25)  
{GR_BSCHE[t-1]=((Y_BSCHE[t]-Y_BSCHE[t-1])/Y_BSCHE[t-1]) 
t=t+1 
} 
GR_BSCHE<-append(GR_BSCHE, NA,after=0) 
GR_BSCHE[2]<-NA 
plot(X$GRSwitzerland, ylim=range(0:2.1)) 
lines(GR_BSCHE, col="red", lwd=2) 
##I have to add the 0 at the beginning of the period, or "NA" value 
 
########## 1.3 Residuals Bass  ########### 
### Computing residuals for Bass cumulative installed capacity 
RES_Y_BSCHE<-Y_BSCHE-X$Switzerland 
plot(RES_Y_BSCHE, main="Residuals Bass Cumulative") 
abline(h=0) 
###Computing the residuals for the annual installed capacity 
RES_S_BSCHE<-S_BSCHE-X$AnnSwitzerland 
plot(RES_S_BSCHE,main="Residuals Bass Annual") 
abline(h=0) 
###Computing the residuals for the growth rate 
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RES_GR_BSCHE<-GR_BSCHE-X$GRSwitzerland 
plot(RES_GR_BSCHE, main="Residuals Bass Growth Rate") 
abline(h=0) 
 
########## 1.4 Forecast t=50  ############ 
#Forecasting until t=50 
t<-c(0:50) 
 
Y_GBMCHE<-YGBM(alfa=summary(GBMCHE)$parameters[1,1], 
q=summary(GBMCHE)$parameters[2,1], 
m=summary(GBMCHE)$parameters[3,1], 
c=summary(GBMCHE)$parameters[4,1], 
a=summary(GBMCHE)$parameters[5,1], 
A=summary(GBMCHE)$parameters[6,1], 
V=summary(GBMCHE)$parameters[7,1]) 
 
Y_BSCHE<-
YBass(alfa=parBSCHE$parameters[1,1],q=parBSCHE$parameter[2,1],m=parBS
CHE$parameter[3,1]) 
 
#Plotting GBM and BS with the true values 
plot(X$Switzerland, xlim=range(1:50), ylim=range(1:3500), main="Forecast PV 
in Switzerland", ylab="Cumulative PV installed capacity (MW)", xlab="t(0) = 
t(1985)") 
lines(Y_GBMCHE, col="purple", lwd=2) 
lines(Y_BSCHE, col="orange",type="l",lwd=2) 
legend(x=2,y=3000,legend=c("GBM" , "BS"), col=c("purple","orange"), lwd=2) 
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############  1.5 GIM   ############# 
V=Z[1,1] 
m=Z[2,1] 
a=Z[3,1] 
# Applying the initial values found with Excel procedure 
preview(formula=Switzerland~ifelse(test= t<a, yes=V*m/(V+(m-V)*exp(-q*t)),                               
                                   no= V*m/(V+(m-V)*exp(-q*(t+A/c*(1/c*(1-exp(-c*(t-a)))-(t-
a)*exp(-c*(t-a))))))), 
        start=c(q=0.19,c=0.907,a=17.4,A=12.5), data=X) 
# Nonlinear estimation  
GIMCHE=nls(formula=Switzerland~ifelse(test= t<a, yes=V*m/(V+(m-V)*exp(-
q*t)),                               
                                      no= V*m/(V+(m-V)*exp(-q*(t+A/c*(1/c*(1-exp(-c*(t-a)))-(t-
a)*exp(-c*(t-a))))))), 
           start=c(q=0.19,c=0.907,a=17.4,A=12.5), data=X) 
 
parGIMCHE<-summary(GIMCHE) 
plotfit(GIMCHE, smooth=TRUE) 
 
### Creating the GIM cumulative estimates 
t<-c(0:24) 
Y_GIMCHE<-c() 
Y_GIMCHE<-YGIM(V=4.18,m=2000,q=summary(GIMCHE)$parameters[1,1], 
c=summary(GIMCHE)$parameters[2,1], 
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a=summary(GIMCHE)$parameters[3,1], 
A=summary(GIMCHE)$parameters[4,1]) 
 
plot(X$Switzerland,axes=FALSE,main="Cumulative SPP in 
Switzerland",xlab="Year", ylab="MW", mgp=c(2,2,1), font.lab=2) 
lines(Y_GIMCHE, col="red") 
axis(side=1,at=c(5,10,15,20,25),labels=c("1996","2001","2006","2011","2016")) 
axis(side=2,at=c(0,500,1000,1500),labels=c("0","500","1000","1500")) 
box() 
 
### Creating the annual fitting 
S_GIMCHE<-c(0:0) 
for (t in 1:25)  
{S_GIMCHE[t-1]=Y_GIMCHE[t]-Y_GIMCHE[t-1] 
t=t+1 
} 
#I have to add the 0 at the beginning of the period, or "NA" value 
S_GIMCHE<-append(S_GIMCHE, 0,after=0) 
 
plot(X$AnnSwitzerland, axes=F, main="Annual SPP in 
Switzerland",xlab="Year", ylab="MW", mgp=c(2,2,1), font.lab=2) 
lines(S_GIMCHE, col="green") 
axis(side=1,at=c(5,10,15,20,25),labels=c("1996","2001","2006","2011","2016")) 
axis(side=2,at=c(0,50,100,200,300),labels=c("0","50","100","200","300")) 
box() 
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R- Code for the confidence interval 
# Assigning the initial values 
ftCHE=vector(length=25) 
q_ott=as.numeric(CI[1,1]) 
c1_ott=as.numeric(CI[2,1]) 
a1_ott=as.numeric(CI[3,1]) 
A1_ott=as.numeric(CI[4,1]) 
m = as.numeric(CI[5,1]) 
V = as.numeric(CI[6,1]) 
t=c(1:25) 
 
# Cumulative values computation for the cumulative adoption curve with the 
nls values  
 
for (i in 1:25) {ftCHE[i] <-   
  ifelse(test= i<a1_ott, yes=V*m/(V+(m-V)*exp(-q_ott*i)),                               
         no= V*m/(V+(m-V)*exp(-q_ott*(i+A1_ott/c1_ott*(1/c1_ott*(1-exp(-c1_ott*(i-
a1_ott)))-(i-a1_ott)*exp(-c1_ott*(i-a1_ott))))))) 
} 
 
# Computation of the partial derivatives 
i=c(1:25) 
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dY_dq<-function (q,c1,a1,A1) ifelse(test= i<a1, yes= (m*i*(m-V)*V*exp(-
q*i))/(((m-V)*exp(-q*i)+V)^2),  
                                    no= - (V*m*(m-V)*(-i-A1/c1*((1-exp(-c1*(i-a1)))/c1-(i-
a1)*exp(-c1*(i-a1))))*exp(-q*(i+A1/c1*(1/c1*(1-exp(-c1*(i-a1)))-(i-a1)*exp(-c1*(i-
a1))))))/((V+(m-V)*exp(-q*(i+A1/c1*(1/c1*(1-exp(-c1*(i-a1)))-(i-a1)*exp(-c1*(i-
a1))))))^2) ) 
 
dY_dc1<-function (q,c1,a1,A1) ifelse(test= i<a1, yes= 0,  
                                     no= (V*m*(m-V)*q*exp(-q*(i+A1/c1*(1/c1*(1-exp(-c1*(i-
a1)))-(i-a1)*exp(-c1*(i-a1)))))*(A1/c1*(-1/c1*(a1-i)*exp(-c1*(i-a1))-(a1-i)*(i-
a1)*exp(-c1*(i-a1)) - 1/(c1^2)*(1-exp(-c1*(i-a1)))) - A1/(c1^2)*(1/c1*(1-exp(-c1*(i-
a1))) - (i-a1)*exp(-c1*(i-a1)))))/((V+(m-V)*exp(-q*(i+A1/c1*(1/c1*(1-exp(-c1*(i-
a1)))-(i-a1)*exp(-c1*(i-a1))))))^2) ) 
dY_da1<-function (q,c1,a1,A1) ifelse(test= i<a1, yes=0,  
                                     no=(-V*m*(m-V)*A1*q*(i-a1)*exp(-q*(i+A1/c1*(1/c1*(1-
exp(-c1*(i-a1)))-(i-a1)*exp(-c1*(i-a1))))*(-c1*(i-a1))))/((V+(m-V)*exp(-
q*(i+A1/c1*(1/c1*(1-exp(-c1*(i-a1)))-(i-a1)*exp(-c1*(i-a1))))))^2) ) 
 
dY_dA1<-function (q,c1,a1,A1) ifelse(test= i<a1, yes=0,  
                                     no=(V*m*(m-V)*q*exp(-q*(i+A1/c1*(1/c1*(1-exp(-c1*(i-
a1)))-(i-a1)*exp(-c1*(i-a1)))))*(1/c1*(1-exp(-c1*(i-a1))) - (i-a1)*exp(-c1*(i-
a1))))/((V+(m-V)*exp(-q*(i+A1/c1*(1/c1*(1-exp(-c1*(i-a1)))-(i-a1)*exp(-c1*(i-
a1))))))^2) ) 
 
# Creation of the Jacobean matrix 
jacob<-matrix(nrow=4,ncol=length(i)) 
provaq<-dY_dq(q=q_ott, c1=c1_ott, a1=a1_ott, A1=A1_ott) 
provac1<-dY_dc1(q=q_ott, c1=c1_ott, a1=a1_ott, A1=A1_ott) 
provaa1<-dY_da1(q=q_ott, c1=c1_ott, a1=a1_ott, A1=A1_ott) 
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provaA1<-dY_dA1(q=q_ott, c1=c1_ott, a1=a1_ott, A1=A1_ott) 
jacob<-cbind(provaq,provac1,provaa1,provaA1) 
 
# Estimation and Taylor expansion 
CHE<-as.vector(X$CHE[1:25]) 
z=CHE - ftCHE 
stima_beta = solve ( t(jacob) %*% jacob, tol=3.031e-38 ) %*% t(jacob) %*% z 
teta_ott_CHE <- matrix(c(q_ott,c1_ott,a1_ott,A1_ott),nrow=4,ncol=1) 
teta_Taylor_CHE = stima_beta + teta_ott_CHE 
f_Taylor_CHE = ftCHE + sum (jacob %*% stima_beta) 
 
# Estimation of the Jacobean matrix 
stima_jacob=cbind(dY_dq(q=teta_Taylor_CHE[1,1],c1=teta_Taylor_CHE[2,1],a1
=teta_Taylor_CHE[3,1],A1=teta_Taylor_CHE[4,1]),dY_dc1(q=teta_Taylor_CHE[
1,1],c1=teta_Taylor_CHE[2,1],a1=teta_Taylor_CHE[3,1],A1=teta_Taylor_CHE[4,
1]), 
                  
dY_da1(q=teta_Taylor_CHE[1,1],c1=teta_Taylor_CHE[2,1],a1=teta_Taylor_CHE
[3,1],A1=teta_Taylor_CHE[4,1]),dY_dA1(q=teta_Taylor_CHE[1,1],c1=teta_Taylo
r_CHE[2,1],a1=teta_Taylor_CHE[3,1],A1=teta_Taylor_CHE[4,1]) ) 
# Computation of variance/covariance matrix and of the idempotent matrix PF 
C = t(stima_jacob) %*% stima_jacob 
PF = stima_jacob %*% solve( t(stima_jacob) %*% stima_jacob, tol=7.7e-28) %*% 
t(stima_jacob) 
# Creation of the identity matrix 
I25 <- diag( rep(1,times=25) ) 
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# Estimation of the standard error 
s.2 <- (t(z) %*% (I25 - PF) %*% z) / ( length(i) - 4) 
C.inv = solve(C, tol=7.7e-28) 
ss.2 = as.vector (s.2) 
cov.mat = ss.2 * C.inv 
diagonal = diag(cov.mat) 
sigma.est = sqrt(diagonal) 
 
# Computation of the confidence intervals for the parameters q, c1, a1 e A1 for 
95% confidence level. 
q_i95_CHE=teta_ott_CHE[1,1]-1.96*sigma.est[1] 
q_s95_CHE=teta_ott_CHE[1,1]+1.96*sigma.est[1] 
c1_i95_CHE=teta_ott_CHE[2,1]-1.96*sigma.est[2] 
c1_s95_CHE=teta_ott_CHE[2,1]+1.96*sigma.est[2] 
a1_i95_CHE=teta_ott_CHE[3,1]-1.96*sigma.est[3] 
a1_s95_CHE=teta_ott_CHE[3,1]+1.96*sigma.est[3] 
A1_i95_CHE=teta_ott_CHE[4,1]-1.96*sigma.est[4] 
A1_s95_CHE=teta_ott_CHE[4,1]+1.96*sigma.est[4] 
 
Confidence Interval results for the best fit model 
The computation of the confidence intervals reveals for the countries with 
one shock and adequate number observations the model performs well and 
the confidence interval limits at 95% confidence level for the parameters are 
relatively close the estimated values. From this point of view, we highlight 
Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey. Since for Malaysia there were available 
only 11 observations, the parameters’ estimation is not significant.  
For the countries with more shocks the confidence interval computation 
show different results. Denmark (F3+F3) and Mexico (F2+F2) are some 
examples for which all the estimated parameters are significant in a model 
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with two shocks. In other cases, such as Australia, the imitation and the 
persistence coefficients are significant whereas the intensity is not.  
The shocks at the end of the observed periods were eliminated for the 
reasons already mentioned while stating the hypothesis for the choice of 
the shock to be inserted in the persistence versus intensity graphic: despite 
the clear evidence of a shock at the end of the observed period the model 
cannot correctly estimate the shock based on two or three observations. For 
this reason, we eliminated the last observations and computed the 
confidence intervals for the first two shocks. Here we highlight the case of 
USA where after the elimination of the second shock the estimation of the 
parameters is significant.  
The results also highlight the difficulty to estimate especially the intensity 
parameter for the last shock in the case of models with more than one 
shock. Whereas for models with three shocks the difficulty is extended also 
to the other parameters. 
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M
odel
q_i
q_s
c1_i
c1_s
A1 or b1_i
A1 or b1_s
c2_i
c2_s
A2_i
A2_s
AU
S
F3+F3
0,0812
0,2469
0,9641
0,9710
-31,5919
67,5670
0,6354
1,2958
-20,0610
24,9
AU
T
F3+F3
0,2466
0,2759
-3,6111
4,8674
-5,4623
9,8355
10,4493
10,4513
-1,78E+13
1,78E+13
BEL
F1+F3+F3
0,3209
0,6191
0,6729
5,1071
2,5318
5,9082
-10,5392
53,3
CAN
F2+F3
0,1553
0,2210
0,4410
0,5456
-5,6646
25,1479
CHE
F3
0,1394
0,1656
0,4225
0,5409
2,0158
8,9176
CHN
F3+F3
-0,1246081
0,6917421
0,6991846
0,7960167
-99,50536
114,68
-0,2950996
1,108596
-37,93892
44,28074
DEU
F2+F2+F3
0,1641
0,6359
2,9158
3,4842
3,7821
12,6179
-1,5232
2,1232
-4,8529
6,8
DN
K
F3+F3
0,0677017
0,0942078
2,980188
3,028495
839,8409
840,7354
3,234907
3,412977
47,82624
57,63318
ESP
F3+F3
-0,1224
0,4426
7,9170
8,06
1597,3
2647,03
-2,9724
5,0535
-1325,3
1339,4
FIN
F1+F3
-0,6805128
0,9399651
-44,8297
42,8297
-448,1094
458,6052
-18629,68
19132,59
FRA
F3+F3+F3
0,0572
0,2568
0,3052
1,3904
1,5642
26,80366
-14,5629
18,9287
-620,5180
731,2
G
BR
F3+F3
0,1
0,5
1,7
1,8
-398,2
464,3
-0,8685
5,7264
-1071,65
1118,018
IN
D
F3+F3
-0,7456693
1,248579
-11,39559
13,89637
-80,13926
135,3143
-50,8005
52,57684
-5039,678
5047,471
ISR
F2+F2
-0,5676
0,8337
-3,5553
5,6764
-1585,9750
1670,8990
0,6259
0,6259
-62,2602
73,1275
ITA
F3+F2
-0,0072
0,3892
-0,5149
1,0445
-137,1393
140,2901
JAP
F1+F3
-0,5746103
1,030916
-8,945491
11,03066
-41,95742
42,78644
-119,9961
126,3587
KO
R
F3+F3
-0,2916384
0,6026775
1,414871
1,59848
-354,441
451,7089
-3,450505
5,008559
-63,7972
74,26057
M
EX
F2+F2
0,0897
0,1010
0,1547
0,5976
3,0311
12,5452
M
YS
F3
-0,3448
0,9550
-174,7655
180,6805
-673 2,7570
6818,7310
N
LD
F3+F3
0,2807384
0,3855867
0,3676089
0,4869809
-2, 046659
-0,3048216
0,4231204
1,376425
-23,0267
32,675
N
O
R
F3+F3
0,04818478
0,0514478
-6733,741
6736,311
-14934,34
14958,92
-401786
401786
-280220826
280220864
PRT
F2+F3+F3
-1,8351
2,3351
-5,3971
8,3571
-50,3885
80,4885
-105,5440
1 28,3840
-1052,2243
1360,1243
SW
E
F3
0,1414
0,1495
0,3015
0,4883
1,7165
5,1632
THA
F3+F3+F 3
-10,5693
10,7893
1,3290
2,8310
-306,2994
632,3594
-12,7731
21,0931
-442,5000
805,7200
TU
R
F3
0,2869
0,2959
0,6828
0,7577
7,6981
9,9417
U
SA
F3+F2
0,1853
0,1917
0,16 62
0,3634
0,1044
3,0464
First shock
Second shock
Table A2- 9 Confidence interval computation of the estimated parameters 
for 95% confidence level. 
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Appendix A3 – Chapter 3 
 
 
 
Figure A3. 1 Monthly cumulative installed capacity in MW by capacity 
range from January 2010 to May 2018. Data from UK Government Statistics 
Figure A3. 2 Monthly cumulative installed capacity in MW by the three 
main sectors: residential (green), commercial (orange) and utility (purple) 
from January 2010 to May 2018. Data from [1] 
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Figure A3. 4 Share in total cumulative installed capacity by sector: residential 
(green), commercial (orange) and utility (purple) from Januaru 2010 to May 
2018. Own calculation based on data from [1] 
Figure A3. 3 Monthly cumulative number of installations by the three main 
sectors: residential (green), commercial (orange) and utility (purple), from 
January 2010 to May 2018. Data from [1] 
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Obligation 
period (from 
April to March) 
Supply 
(%) 
Buy Out 
Price 
(£/MWh) 
Effective 
Price per 
Unit 
(p/kWh) 
Supply 
growth 
rate 
(p.p.) 
2002-2003 3 £30.00 0.09   
2003-2004 4.3 £30.51 0.13 1.3 
2004-2005 4.9 £31.39 0.15 0.6 
2005-2006 5.5 £32.33 0.18 0.6 
2006-2007 6.7 £33.24 0.22 1.2 
2007-2008 7.9 £34.30 0.29 1.2 
2008-2009 9.1 £35.76 0.33 1.2 
2009-2010 9.7 £37.19 0.36 0.6 
2010-2011 11.1 £36.99 0.41 1.4 
2011-2012 12.4 £38.69 0.48 1.3 
2012-2013 15.8 £40.71 0.64 3.4 
2013-2014 20.6 £42.02 0.87 4.8 
2014-2015 24.4 £43.30 1.06 3.8 
2015-2016 29 £44.33 1.29 4.6 
2016-2017 34.8 £44.77 1.56 5.8 
2017-2018 40.9 £45.58 1.86 6.1 
2018-2019 46.8 £47.22 - 5.9 
Table A3- 1 ROC shares and buy-out prices over the years (2002 – 2019). Data 
source: Ofgem 
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Figure A3. 5 Cumulative curves for installed capacity and number of 
installations by sector estimated with the "classical" Bass model 
 Sector α q m 
Installed 
capacity 
Residential 0.0057 0.04 3026 
Commercial 0.0006 0.06 5352 
Utility 0.0005 0.16 5817 
Aggregated 0.0006 0.08 14281 
Number of 
installations 
Residential 0.0062 0.04 1008820 
Commercial 0.0023 0.05 35385 
Utility 0.0005 0.17 443 
Aggregated 0.0061 0.04 1046952 
Table A3- 2 Classical Bass model estimates (α,q,m) by sector for installed 
capacity and number of installations 
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Table A3- 3 R2 values for Bass, intermediate and best fit models 
for each sector for installed capacity and number of installations 
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q_inf
q_sup
c1_inf
c1_sup
c2_inf
c2_sup
A2_inf
A2_sup
c3_inf
c3_sup
c4_inf
c4_sup
m_inf
m_sup
Capacity
Residential
-0.2787
0.28484
49.8584
49.85843
0.41746
0.50593
111.1497
178.793
-1.943311
14.33474
25091.88
25091.88
Commercial 
0.032344
0.03673
3.02337
3.375809
26.6061
35.52814
X
X
1.716256
5.071872
2.099493
32.57361
3811.352
5067.352
Utility
-0.32319
0.4119
54.6168
127.762
-161.487
228.6306
X
X
-108816.6
108971.8
-2.64E+12
2.64E+12
5440.25
6137.32
Aggregated
0.041905
0.04469
1.53216
1.798379
12.1393
18.07084
X
X
3.734816
6.800215
11531.86
14748.71
Number of 
instalaltions
Residential
0.002622
0.0041
42.1965
42.19646
0.44606
0.455401
114.0882
114.0979
4.794527
5.007838
19768022
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0.043305
0.04477
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1.045233
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X
X
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-0.07881
0.17606
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X
X
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423.4519
472.5481
Aggregated
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7.72208
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11621670
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Table A3- 5 Squared Multiple partial correlation coefficient (SMPCC) 
values for Bass, intermediate and best fit models for each sector for 
installed capacity and number of installations 
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